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Articles
Inheritance and Bankruptcy:
The Meaning of the "Fresh Start"
ADAM

I.

by
J. HIRSCH*

Introduction

When an insolvent individual debtor enters bankruptcy liquidation, she surrenders her remaining assets in exchange for a discharge,
wiping out the unpaid balance of her debts. The moment the debtor
files a petition for relief,1 the court draws a hypothetical "line of cleavage" between her pre- and postpetition assets and obligations. Any
nonexempt property owned and income earned up to the moment of
the petition flows into the bankruptcy estate for distribution to prepetition creditors. 2 Income earned and property accumulated thereafter
is hers to keep, subject only to the claims of subsequent, postpetition
creditors.3 The discharged debtor thus enjoys the privilege of a "fresh
start," an opportunity, so to say, for financial rebirth. 4 Leaving behind
* Associate Professor of Law, Florida State University. M.A. 1979, J.D. 1982, Ph.D.
1987, Yale University. The author wishes to thank Rob Atkinson, John Ayer, DeLloyd
Guth, John Larson, William McGovern, Mack Player, Mark Seidenfeld, and William K.S.
Wang, together with the participants in faculty colloquia at the University of British Columbia, the University of California at Berkeley School of Law, the University of California, Hastings College of the Law, and the Tulane University School of Law for many
helpful comments. Jennifer Beckett, Krys Johnson, and Barbara Marsh also provided invaluable research assistance.
1. 11 U.S.C. § 301 (1988).
2. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (1988).
3. 11 U.S.C. § 727(b) (1988).
4. See, e.g., In re Bruno, 68 B.R. 101, 103-05 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1986) (drawing this
analogy). The analogy is an old one. See, e.g., DREw R. McCoy, Tru ELusrvE REPUBLIC:
POLrIICAL ECONOMY" IN JEFFERSONIAN AmERICA 180 (1980) (quoting James Bayard's

statement in 1797 that bankrupts received an opportunity "to begin the world anew").
Indeed, this suggestion was not merely analogical, as some early English bankrupts were
sentenced to the gallows. See infra note 165.
[175]

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 45

her prior assets but also her outstanding liabilities, the debtor emerges
from bankruptcy liquidation in a restored state of nascent solvency.
All of this is elemental and elementary-the basic substance and
process of consumer bankruptcy. But let us now vary the hypothetical
just slightly. Suppose instead of beginning to earn income incrementally upon receipt of her discharge, a debtor were thereafter to
succeed to property spontaneously under her parent's will. By no coincidence at all, a debtor might today declare bankruptcy and tomorrow inherit a fortune. Should she keep her inheritance under the
theory of the fresh start, or should it flow back into the bankruptcy
estate to satisfy her prepetition creditors? In other words, should gratuitous transfers be treated like income under the Bankruptcy Code, or
should these two means of property acquisition be structurally
differentiated?
The legal rules that apply to this problem are (more or less) cut
and dried. Under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 (the Bankruptcy Act)
as originally enacted, gratuitous transfers split along the same strict
line of cleavage that applied to income. 5 If the debtor inherited the
day before filing her petition (irrespective of the actual date of distribution), 6 her legacy went to her creditors; if the day after, it was hers
5. Prior American bankruptcy acts had handled the problem in various ways. Under
the original Bankruptcy Act of 1800, inheritances received by a debtor after she was declared bankrupt, but before she obtained a certificate of discharge, went to her creditors.
Bankruptcy Act of 1800, reprinted in 10 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY app. § 50, at 1734
(James M. Moore & Lawrence P. King eds., 14th ed. 1978). The Bankruptcy Acts of 1841
and 1867 failed to distinguish inheritances from income, but the Act of 1841 set the date of
cleavage for all property at the adjudication of the debtor as a bankrupt, rather than at the
moment of the petition. Bankruptcy Act of 1841, reprinted in 10 COLLIER, supra, app. § 3,
at 1739. Inheritances received during the interval fell into the bankruptcy estate. Ex parte
Newhall, 18 F. Cas. 74 (C.C.D. Mass. 1842) (No. 10,159) (Story, J.). By contrast, the Act of
1867, like all subsequent acts, set the line of cleavage at the moment of the petition. Because the Act of 1867 also failed to distinguish inheritances from income, its treatment of
the problem precisely mirrored the Act of 1898. Bankruptcy Act of 1867, reprinted in 10
COLLIER, supra, app. § 14, at 1752-53; Bankruptcy Act of 1898, reprintedin id. app. § 70(5),
at 1824; see also Everett v. Judson, 228 U.S. 474, 479 (1912) (construing the line of cleavage
under the Act of 1898).
6. Under the ancient theory of title by inheritance, a devise of real property vested in
the beneficiary at the moment of the benefactor's death, whereas a bequest of personal
property vested only upon a decree of distribution. For the historical roots of this distinction, see 3 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 14.6 (A. James Casner ed., 1952). Nonetheless,
the bankruptcy cases uniformly held that, even for personal property, the moment of death
marked the time of acquisition for bankruptcy purposes. Thus, bankruptcy courts refused
early on to carry the conceptual baggage of feudalism that many other courts to this day
continue to lug about. While the theoretical justification for these cases was not always
clear, several judges took the view that title "related back" to the moment of death. Smith
v. Lynch (In re Smith), 71 F.2d 378, 381 (9th Cir. 1934); In re Mosier, 112 F. 138, 139 (D. Vt.
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to keep. And so, in a trickle of early cases, one finds debtors locked in
a desperate "race with death, ' 7 sprinting to the courthouse to file their
petitions even as their benefactors lay in extremis, drawing their final
breaths-sometimes winning (or losing) that race by only a matter of
hours. 8
This state of affairs drew criticism within broader reviews of the
effectiveness of the Bankruptcy Act,9 and in 1938 the bankruptcy
amendments passed into law by the Chandler Act10 altered the applicable rule. Under the revised Section 70 of the Bankruptcy Act,'1 reproduced with minor modifications in Section 541(a)(5) of the modem
Bankruptcy Code of 1978,12 the line of cleavage for inherited assets
1901); Ex parte Fuller, 9 F. Cas. 976, 977 (C.C.D. Mass. 1842) (No. 5147); McNaboe v.
Marks, 99 N.Y.S. 960, 961 (Sup. Ct. 1906). For later cases, see infra note 14.
7. William F. Adler, Some Effects of ChandlerBankruptcyAct on Other Branches of
the Law, 15 U. CN. L. REv. 429, 430 (1941).
8. Cases in which the debtor won the race include In re Swift, 259 F. 612, 613 (N.D.
Ga. 1919), affd sub nom. Bank of Elberton v. Swift (In re Swift), 268 F. 305 (5th Cir. 1920)
(inheritance vested 10 days after bankruptcy petition); Baker v. Shoun (In re Baker), 13
F.2d 707, 707 (6th Cir.) (six days after petition), cert denied, 273 U.S. 733 (1926); In re
Woods, 133 F. 82, 82 (D. Pa. 1904) (seven days after petition); In re Hall, 16 F. Supp. 18, 18
(W.D. Tenn. 1936) (one hour and 45 minutes after petition). Cases in which the debtor lost
include In re McKenna, 137 F. 611, 611 (N.D.N.Y. 1905) (inheritance vested one hour and
15 minutes before bankruptcy petition), and In re Stoner, 105 F. 752, 752 (E.D. Pa. 1901)
(five hours before petition). For other cases marking the line of cleavage for inheritances
at the moment of the petition, see In re Wetmore, 108 F. 520,523 (3d Cir. 1901); In re Lage,
19 F.2d 153, 155 (N.D. Iowa 1927), appeal dismissed, 25 F.2d 288 (8th Cir. 1928); In re Seal,
261 F. 112, 112 (E.D.N.Y. 1919); Ellis v. Fiske, 232 N.W. 891, 893 (N.D. 1930); In re
Beinhauer, 118 Misc. 527, 528 (N.Y. Sur. Ct.), aff'd, 194 N.Y.S. 917 (1922). The same rule
applied to life insurance proceeds. Everett, 228 U.S. at 479; In re Hogan, 194 F. 846, 851
(7th Cir. 1912).
9. HousE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 71sT CONG., 3D SEss., ADMINISTRATION OF
BANKRuPT ESTATES 22 (Comm. Print 1931) (the Donovan Report); STRENGTHENING OF
PROCEDURE IN THE JuDIcAr SYSTEM, S. Doc. No. 65, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 23 (1932)
[hereinafter Thacher-Garrison Report]; Lloyd K. Garrison, Proposed Revision of the
Bankruptcy Act, 18 A.B.A. J. 374, 376 (1932).
10. The Chandler Act evolved out of a series of draft bills prepared by the National
Bankruptcy Congress, an organization of bankruptcy experts formed in 1932. For the
political background and legislative history of the Chandler Act, see HousE COMM. ON
THE JUDICIARY, 74TH CONG., 1ST Sass., BANKRUPrcy Acr, AN ACT TO ESTABLISH A UNIFORM SYSTEM OF BANKRUPTCY THROUGHOUT THE U.S. (TENTATIVE DRAFT) iii-V
(Comm.
Print 1935) [hereinafter The Story of the Draft]; 1 COLLIER, supra note 5, § 0.07, at 17-21;

Mitchell S. Dvoret, FederalLegislation: Bankruptcy Underthe ChandlerAct: Background,
27 GEO. LJ.194 (1938); Mitchell S. Dvoret, Bankruptcy Underthe ChandlerAct Legislative History and Summary, 27 GEO. L.J. 345 (1939).
11. Bankruptcy Act § 70(a) (previously codified at 11 U.S.C. § 110(a)).
12. Instead of the potentially ambiguous time period of "six months" found in former
§ 70, the Bankruptcy Code uses the more precise term "180 days." 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(5)
(1988). Additional modifications are discussed infra note 22. The Code took effect on
October 1, 1979.
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was moved forward six months. Any right 13 to an inheritance arising 14
13. Under the Bankruptcy Act, only interests presently transferable under state law
went to the bankruptcy estate, thereby exempting rights to contingent future interests (but
not vested remainders) in many jurisdictions; however, if a contingent future interest in
real property happened to vest in interest (thereby rendering it transferable) within the sixmonth period, it went to the bankruptcy estate under a separate subsection of § 70. Bankruptcy Act § 70(a)(5) & (a)(7) (previously codified at 11 U.S.C. §§ 110(a)(5) & (a)(7)); 4A
COLLIER, supra note 5, § 70.37, at 453-62; 3 HAROLD REMINGTON, A TREATISE ON THE
BANKRUPTCY LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 1218-1219.04, at 64-67 (5th ed. 1957); Edward C. Halbach, Jr., Creditors' Rights in Future Interests, 43 MINN. L. REV. 217, 238-42,
247-50 (1958). The modem Code has eliminated the limitation to transferable property,
sweeping into the bankruptcy estate "all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property," 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1), and the new six-month window likewise covers any interest in
an inheritance "that would have been property of the estate if ... [it] had been an interest
of the debtor on the date of the ... petition," 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(5) (1988). Therefore, any
contingent future interest, whether or not transferable under state law, should now fall into
the bankruptcy estate under the Code, so long as the debtor held it prior to the petition or
receives it by inheritance within six months thereafter, irrespective of when it eventually
vests in interest or possession. See HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, BANKRUPTCY LAW
REVISION, H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 175-76 (1977), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6135-36 (stating that property of the estate "includes all interests, such
as... contingent interests and future interests, whether or not transferable by the debtor");
see also id. at 367-68. The case law has not, however, been uniform in acknowledging this
change. Compare Neuton v. Danning (In re Neuton), 922 F.2d 1379, 1382-83 (9th Cir.
1990) (holding that contingent interests go to the bankruptcy estate so long as they have
value); Anderson v. McGowan (In re Anderson), 128 B.R. 850, 853-54 (D. R.I. 1991)
(same); In re Hoblit, 89 B.R. 756, 757 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 1986) (same); In re Reynolds, 50
B.R. 20, 21 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 1985) (same); Kloos v. Dias (In re Dias), 37 B.R. 584, 586-87
(Bankr. D. Idaho 1984) (same), with Abney v. Hicks (In re Hicks), 22 B.R. 243 (Bankr.
N.D. Ga. 1982) (holding that contingent interests that are nontransferable under state law
go to the debtor), and with In re Garten, 52 B.R. 497, 499-500 & n.1 (Bankr. W.D. Mo.
1985) (holding that, following state law, both vested and contingent remainders constitute
present interests in property). See generally George R. Pitts, Rights to Future Payment as
Property of the Estate Under Section 541 of the Bankruptcy Code, 64 AM. BANKR. L.J. 61,
73-80 (1990) (discussing debtors' rights to contingent future interests).
14. As under bankruptcy law prior to the Chandler Act, see supra note 6, the relevant
moment is the time when the benefactor dies, not when the inheritance is ultimately distributed. Whereas the Chandler Act referred to inheritances that "vest" within six months
of bankruptcy, Bankruptcy Act § 70(a), the modern Code refers to inheritances "that the
debtor acquires or becomes entitled to acquire" within that time, 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(5).
The post-1938 cases offer two alternative theories to justify this result. The first is that
under state law, either (a) title to personalty "relates back" to the time of death following a
decree of distribution (while title to realty actually passes on death), or (b) "equitable," if
not "legal," title continuously exists in the beneficiary following the benefactor's death.
The second theory is that federal law preempts state title theory for bankruptcy purposes.
Cf. Bostian v. Milens, 193 S.W.2d 797, 803-04 (Mo. Ct. App. 1946) (holding that under
state law equitable title to personalty passes to heirs upon death); In re Berry, No. 4285, 28
J. NAT'L ASS'N REF. BANKR. 19, 30 (1954) (D. Minn. 1953) (holding that federal law is
controlling); Balsley v. Farmer's & Merchant's Bank (In re Elliot), 81 B.R. 460, 462 (Bankr.
N.D. Il1.1987) (holding that under state law title to realty passes immediately upon death);
In re Olson, 39 B.R. 872, 874 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1984) (holding that under state law realty
vests when will enters probate); In re Means, 16 B.R. 775,776-77 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1982)
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up to six months after a petition' 5 for bankruptcy relief' 6 now pours
(holding that under state law equitable title to personalty passes to heirs upon death);
Lonstein v. Rockman (In re Lonstein), 950 F.2d 77, 78-80 (1st Cir. 1991) (holding that
under state law title to all property vests at death); Caso v. Bentley (In re Bentley), 120
B.R. 712, 715 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990) (holding that federal law is controlling); Williams v.
Chenoweth (In re Chenoweth), 132 B.R. 161, 164-66 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. 1991) (holding that
under state law passage of title relates back to the time of death), aff'd on reh'g, 143 B.R.
527 (S.D. Ill. 1992), affd, 1993 WL 327841 (7th Cir. 1993); Anderson v. McGowan (In re
Anderson), 128 B.R. 850,853 (Bankr. D. R.I. 1991) (holding that under state law equitable
title passes on death). But cf. Boatmen's Bank v. Powell (In re Powell), 92 B.R. 378, 379
(Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1988) (refusing to find that an acquired legacy related back to the decedent's death) (discussed infra note 17).
15. Whether the case is voluntary or involuntary, the six-month period commences
with the filing of the petition, not with the order for relief. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(5). This was
also true under the prior Bankruptcy Act. C.T. Foster, Annotation, Constructionand Application of Provisionof Bankruptcy Act (§ 70, subd. (a)(8)) with Respect to Property Vesting in BankruptAfter Bankruptcy By Bequest, Devise, or Inheritance, 11 A.L.R.2d 738, 743
(1950).
16. The rule applies to relief under all chapters of the Bankruptcy Code, not merely to
liquidation under Chapter 7. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a). When the debtor chooses rehabilitation
under Chapters 12 or 13, property of the estate includes not only inheritances received
within six months of the petition, but also any inheritances received before the case is
closed. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1207 (a)(1), 1306(a)(1) (1988). If an inheritance comes into a Chapter
12 or 13 estate after a family farmer plan or wage-earner plan has been approved, the plan
can be modified to reflect the debtor's enhanced ability to satisfy her creditors. In re
Euerle, 70 B.R. 72, 73 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1987); In re Cook, 148 B.R. 273, 280 (Bankr. W.D.
Mich. 1992) (dicta). See generally Harry L. Deffebach, Comment, PostconfirmationModifications of Chapter13 Plans: A Sheep in Wolfs Clothing, 9 BANKr, . DEV. J. 153 (1992).
Some debtors, having commenced cases under these chapters and then having received
inheritances more than six months later but before their cases closed, have exercised their
rights to convert to Chapter 7 liquidation, claiming that such a conversion operates retroactively to bar the inheritances from the estate. While some courts have upheld such claims,
others have ruled that conversion of a case from one chapter to another updates the petition, and hence the attendant date of cleavage and commencement of the six-month period, to the conversion date. Compare, e.g., In re Lybrook, 951 F.2d 136, 136-37 (7th Cir.
1991) (Posner, J.) (holding conversion from Chapter 13 to 7 updates the petition to capture
inheritances, per statutory construction and public policy) with, e.g., Blood v. Wineburg (In
re Marshall), 79 B.R. 147, 149 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1987) (holding conversion from Chapter
13 to Chapter 7 does not update the petition to capture preconversion accretions of property, per construction and policy) and with Arkison v. Swift (In re Swift), 81 B.R. 621, 623
(Bankr. W.D. Wash. 1987) (holding conversion from Chapter 13 to 7 when plan had not
been confirmed does not update petition, and distinguishing cases involving confirmed
Chapter 13 plans). And compare In re Brownlee, 93 B.R. 662, 665-66 (Bankr. S.D. Iowa
1988) (holding conversion from Chapter 12 to 7 updates the petition to capture inheritances, looking by analogy to the Eighth Circuit's prior Chapter 13 precedents, and ruling
immaterialthe fact that the Chapter 12 plan was unconfirmed) with Arkison v. Plata (In re
Plata), 958 F.2d 918, 921-22 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding conversion from Chapter 12 to 7 does
not update petition, looking by analogy to the Ninth Circuit's prior Chapter 13 precedent).
And compare Kepler v. Independence Bank of Madison (In re Ford), 61 B.R. 913, 917
(Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1986) (holding conversion from Chapter 11 to 7 updates the petition,
looking by analogy to Chapter 13 cases) (dicta) with Koch v. Myrvold (In re Myrvold), 44
B.R. 202, 204-05 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1984) (holding conversion from Chapter 11 to 7 does
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back into the bankruptcy estate for distribution to creditors; 17 only
inheritances received more than six months after bankruptcy go to the
discharged debtor. 18 Income, on the other hand, continues to divide
along the conventional line of cleavage drawn on the date of the petition. 19 Thus, Section 541(a)(5) distinguishes legacies from income and
carves out an exception to the traditional policy of an immediate fresh
start. In the wake of her petition, the debtor-beneficiary now faces a
window of vulnerability that will shut only if her benefactor survives
20
for the requisite space of time.
not update petition to capture inheritances, distinguishing Chapter 13), affd, 784 F.2d 862
(8th Cir. 1986). See generally Comment, Disposition of Funds Held in Limbo: Consequences of a Conversion, 8 BANKR. DEV. J. 211 (1991).
17. But cf. Powell, 92 B.R. at 379-80. There the court construed § 541(a)(5) to capture
for the bankruptcy estate only interests in decedents' estates already in existence when the
petition is filed, so long as that interest is resolved, by contest or lack of contest, within 180
days of the petition. The court's reasoning in Powell is criticized in Bentley, 120 B.R. at
716.
Debtors who gain rights to an inheritance within six months of the commencement of
the bankruptcy case are required to file a supplemental schedule of assets with the court,
notwithstanding the prior closing of the case. BANKR. R. 1007(h). Failure so to file can
result in denial or revocation of the discharge. 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(2) & (d)(2) (1988); see
also Ashton v. Sentney (In re Sentney), 145 F.2d 719,720 (9th Cir. 1944) (holding denial of
discharge requires evidence that failure to file resulted from bad faith); Gefreh v. Everetts
(In re Everetts), 71 B.R. 110, 112 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1987) (holding that disbursement by
debtor of postpetition inheritance that belongs to the bankruptcy estate may result in revocation of discharge, but only if knowingly fraudulent). On the duty of the personal representative of the probate estate in such cases, see Adler, supra note 7, at 431-34.
18. Box v. Box, 21 N.W.2d 868 (Neb. 1946); Myrvold, 44 B.R. at 202; Palmer &
Palmer v. United States Trustee (In re Hargis), 887 F.2d 77 (5th Cir. 1989), clarified on
reh'g, 895 F.2d 1025 (5th Cir. 1990).
19. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(6) (1988).
20. This rule may be compared with British bankruptcy practice. Under one nineteenth-century bankruptcy act, debtors had to assign to the bankruptcy trustee (then
known as the "provisional assignee") "all future Estate ... which ...

may revert, descend,

be devised or bequeathed, or come to him or her" in order to receive a discharge. Debtors
thus lost all expectancies, whenever received. 7 Geo. 4, ch. 57, § 11 (1826) (Eng.); see also
the form following the act. By contrast, modern British law gives the bankruptcy judge
broad discretion to suspend the discharge or to condition it upon the debtor's consent to
return any specified afteracquired property to the bankruptcy estate. MUIR HUNTER &
DAVID GRAHAM, THE LAW AND PRACTICE IN BANKRUPTCY 122 (19th ed. 1979); Douglass
G. Boshkoff, Limited, Conditional, and Suspended Discharges in Anglo-American Bankruptcy Proceedings, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 69, 87, 88 & n.96, 89 (1982). While no published
British cases have explored the treatment of expectancies under this provision, Canadian
courts, operating under the same discretionary system, have held that a discharge should
be made conditional only if the debtor is "likely to [inherit] in the immediate or near
future," thus approaching the environs of § 541(a)(5) via a different route. In re Stafford,
37 C.B.R. (old ser.) 206, 208 (Ont. 1959); Re Baker, 63 C.B.R. (new ser.) 21 (Ont. 1987).
For early English cases setting the sealing of the certificate of discharge as the line of
cleavage for expectancies, see Tudway v. Bourne, 96 Eng. Rep. 1231, affd, 97 Eng. Rep.
529 (K.B. 1759); Moth v. Frome, 27 Eng. Rep. 262 (Ch. 1761).
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Though this modem rule is relatively clear in its application, 21
some issues do remain. Section 541(a)(5) pertains to inherited assets
and death benefits, 22 not to inter vivos gifts.23 The treatment of propOne American proposal for reform of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 advanced the British system of discretionary suspension of the discharge as a solution, inter alia, to the
postpetition inheritance problem. Thacher-Garrison Report, supra note 9, at 23, 99-103;
see also JAMES A. MACLACHLAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF BANKRUPTCY § 122 (1956)
(endorsing discretionary discharge); William 0. Douglas, Some Functional Aspects of
Bankruptcy, 41 YALE LJ 329, 347 (1932) (same). One early legislative initiative, the unpassed Hastings-Michener Bill, called for a suspended discharge but only under specified
conditions, not including anticipated inheritances. See Full Text New Bankruptcy Bill, 8
AM. BANKR. REV. 260, 268-69 (1932). But see infra note 194 for criticism of the ThacherGarrison Report and the Hastings-Michener Bill. In the congressional hearings on the
proposed Chandler Act, a drafter compared the six-month window to the British discretionary law, suggesting that the approach ultimately taken in the Chandler Act was more
conservative: "But here it is a very modest restriction at best." Amendments to the Bankruptcy Act as Proposed by the National Bankruptcy Conference: Hearings on H.R. 10382
Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 74th Cong., 318 (1936) (statement of Paul
King) (unpublished) [hereinafter H.R. 10382 Hearings].
21. For technical discussions, see 4A COLLIER, supra note 5, § 70.27; 4 COLLIER ON
BANKRUPTCY § 541.18 (Lawrence P. King ed., 15th ed. 1992); 3 REMINGTON, supra note
13, § 1219.05; Foster, supra note 15.
22. The former § 70 included within the six-month window only property comprising
a "bequest, devise or inheritance," which was construed not to encompass proceeds of a
life insurance policy that matured postpetition. Klebanoff v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 362 F.2d
975, 979 (2d Cir. 1966). This language is replicated in 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(5)(A), but the
drafters of the Bankruptcy Code added another subsection making property acquired by
the debtor within six months of bankruptcy "as a beneficiary of a life insurance policy or of
a death benefit plan" part of the estate. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(5)(C); see, e.g., Geekie v. Watson (In re Watson), 65 B.R. 9, 9 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 1986) (applying § 541(a)(5)(c)); Butler v.
Sharik (In re Sharik), 41 B.R. 388, 389-90 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1984) (same). On the treatment of life insurance in bankruptcy, see also Vein Countryman, The Use of State Law in
Bankruptcy Cases, Part 1, 47 N.Y.U. L. REv. 407, 447-49 (1972) [hereinafter Countryman,
The Use of State Law]; Walter T. Plumb, Jr., The Recommendations of the Commission on
the Bankruptcy Laws-Exempt and Immune Property, 61 VA. L. REv. 1, 61-72 (1975); infra
notes 126-132 and accompanying text.
Quaere whether a wrongful death claim falls under either § 541(a)(5)(A) or (a)(5)(C).
One case decided under the Bankruptcy Act held that a wrongful death claim under the
Federal Employers' Liability Act was not an "inheritance" under the plain meaning of
§ 70(a). In re McHugh, 75 F. Supp. 766, 767 (D. Mass. 1947), affd sub nom. Friedman v.
McHugh, 168 F.2d 350 (1st Cir. 1948). In a subsequent case, decided under the Bankruptcy
Code, the court held that a wrongful death claim was an "inheritance" under
§ 541(a)(5)(A) when, under the applicable state statute, a right of action would have belonged to the decedent had he lived and thus was "inherited" by the debtor. Thus the
court distinguished McHugh, in which the right of action was not a "continuance" of a right
which the injured party would have had but for his death. Rose v. DeNeen (In re Hendricks), 22 B.R. 572, 577 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1982). Similarly, in Gold v. Surowitz (In re
Surowitz), 94 B.R. 438, 439 (E.D. Mich. 1988), the court held that a wrongful death action
accruing to the decedent's estate under state law is an "inheritance" for purposes of
§ 541(a)(5)(A), whereas a wrongful death action accruing directly to the decedent's survivors under state law is not. The court asserted that its holding was "not... contrary" to
Hendricks, although it criticized the Hendricks court's interpretation of state law. Id.at
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erty acquired postpetition by virtue of nonprobate will substitutes

(such as revocable inter vivos trusts, pay-on-death designations, and
gifts causa mortis) has never been resolved. 24 Nor is it entirely clear
440 n.4. Neither of these opinions addresses the possible application of § 541(a)(5)(C) to a
wrongful death claim, but such an interpretation would appear to contradict the plain
meaning of that subsection. In another case decided under the Bankruptcy Act, property
received under a divorce decree was held not to constitute an "inheritance" for purposes of
former § 70. In re Cummings, 84 F. Supp. 65, 70-71 (S.D. Cal. 1949). The Bankruptcy
Code overrides Cummings by capturing for the bankruptcy estate property received within
six months of bankruptcy by virtue of a settlement agreement or divorce decree under 11
U.S.C. § 541(a)(5)(B). For the legislative history on this point, see REPORT OF THE COMM.
ON THE BANKRUPTcY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. Doc. No. 137, 93d Cong., 1st
Sess., pt. 2, at 149 (1973).
23. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(5)(A) refers only to property acquired "by bequest, devise, or
inheritance." Though the issue has never been litigated, "[n]o one would suggest that the
bankruptcy trustee could attach" a postpetition gift. Scott v. Bank One Trust Co., 577
N.E.2d 1077, 1083 (Ohio 1991) (dicta).
24. Only one case adverted to the issue, noting in a significant dictum:
[The creditors] maintain, however, that in this modern age, sophisticated methods
have been devised to transfer wealth from one generation to the next and that the
insurance policy route is one way to accomplish this objective. Therefore, they
say, these technical property terms in § 70(a) should be interpreted broadly to
encompass insurance proceeds. This argument is spurious .... Our guidelines of
interpretation are relatively narrow; and, we are unpersuaded that we should rewrite the Bankruptcy Act in such a drastic fashion when it was simple enough for
Congress to have done so.
Klebanoff, 362 F.2d at 979-80 (emphasis added) (holding that a revocable life insurance
contract that matured within six months of bankruptcy did not constitute an "inheritance"
for purposes of the Bankruptcy Act; see supra note 22). This strict mode of statutory construction, though heedless of Justice Douglas's admonition that courts not read the "words
[of the Bankruptcy Act] with the ease of a computer," Bank of Marin v. England, 385 U.S.
99, 103 (1966), is in keeping with the current Court's approach, which has construed literally not only the words but also the punctuation of the Bankruptcy Code. United States v.
Ron Pair Enter., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241-42 (1989). See generally Robert K. Rasmussen, A
Study of the Costs and Benefits of Textualism: The Supreme Court's Bankruptcy Cases, 71
WASH. U. L.Q. 535 (1993). But other courts have held that "the question of what constitutes an inheritance under 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(5)(A) is answered by state law." Surowitz,
94 B.R. at 439. If so, we face the difficulty that, under state law, will substitutes such as
revocable trusts have been deemed inter vivos for some purposes (such as immunity from
probate administration, see GEORGE G. BOGERT & GEORGE T. BOGERT, THE LAW OF
TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 104 (2d ed. rev. 1984)), and testamentary for others (such as
taxation, see id. § 286, at 171-74, and federal estate taxation, see I.R.C. § 2038(a) (1992)).
See WILLIAM M. McGOVERN ET AL., WILLS, TRUSTS AND ESTATES § 4.7, at 193-95, § 16.8,
at 792-95 (1988). Whereas will substitutes have usually been held testamentary from the
standpoint of creditors' claims against the benefactor (though the issue remains controversial and was left unresolved under the new Uniform Probate Code, see UNIF. PROBATE
CODE §§ 6-101(b), 6-212, 6-215 (1991); see generally Richard W. Effland, Rights of Creditors in NonprobateAssets, 48 Mo. L. REv. 431 (1983)), neither cases nor legislative history
have addressed the treatment of will substitutes from the standpoint of creditors' claims
against the debtor. If will substitutes are deemed testamentary for purposes of creditors'
claims in bankruptcy, they will be deemed to be transferred when the benefactor dies and
will be subject to the six-month window of § 541(a)(5)(A). If they are held to constitute
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whether a debtor can avoid this provision of the Code by disclaiming
her inheritance.25 But these, and a few other wrinkles that remain to
gifts, on the other hand, they will be deemed to be transferred when the initial instrument
of gift is executed and will fall into the bankruptcy estate if that event occurred before (but
not after) the petition. Moreover, if will substitutes are considered gifts, the six-month
window will not apply, and the benefactor will remain free to exercise any reserved right to
revoke the gift. This issue is bound to arise soon, given the soaring popularity of will
substitutes. See generally John H. Langbein, The NonprobateRevolution and the Future of
the Law of Succession, 97 HARV. L. REv. 1108, 1115-25 (1984).
25. A disclaimer does not permit the debtor to benefit directly from the inheritance,
but given that the alternative beneficiary is often another family member, the debtor will
usually be able to benefit surreptitiously. See generally Adam J. Hirsch, The Problem of
the Insolvent Heir,74 CORnNELL L. Rxv. 587 (1989). Under state law, the majority of jurisdictions permit an insolvent debtor to disclaim an inheritance on the theory that a disclaimer is not a "transfer," but a minority treat the disclaimer as a fraudulent conveyance.
Id. at 591-601; Helen B. Jenkins, Rights of Unsecured Estate Creditors Under the Uniform
Fraudulent TransferAct in Property TransferredPriorto Death,45 OKLA. L. REv. 275, 29397 (1992). In a bankruptcy proceeding, the trustee can assert the rights of a creditor under
state law to avoid fraudulent conveyances. 11 U.S.C. § 544(b) (1988); see also McGraw v.
Betz (In re Betz), 84 B.R. 470, 472 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1987) (holding insolvent disclaimer
to be a fraudulent conveyance in bankruptcy per state law without specific reference to
§ 544(b)). Assuming state law fails to treat an insolvent disclaimer as a transfer, however,
the trustee would have to rely on his independent power to avoid fraudulent conveyances
in bankruptcy under 11 U.S.C. § 548 (1988 & Supp. II 1990). Cases decided under the
Bankruptcy Act § 67(d) (the precursor to § 548) nonetheless held that the power to avoid
fraudulent conveyances hinged on state-law definitions of whether a disclaimed inheritance
had ever "vested" in the debtor. Thus, in effect, state law determinations of whether an
insolvent disclaimer constituted a fraudulent conveyance continued to control the issue.
Mickelson v. Detlefsen (In re Detlefsen), 610 F.2d 512, 515 (8th Cir. 1979); Hoecker v.
United Bank, 476 F.2d 838, 841 (10th Cir. 1973); In re Dankner, 384 N.Y.S.2d 683, 684
(Sur. Ct. 1976); Milens v. Bostian, 139 F.2d 282, 284-85 (8th Cir. 1943), remanded, 193
S.W.2d 797 (Mo. 1946) (remand for ruling on state law); cf In re Champion, 5 Collier
Bankr. Cas. (MB) 645, 651-52 (N.D. Ga. 1975) (holding disclaimer ineffective under state
law because debtor's petition assigned the inheritance "by operation of law" to the trustee
in bankruptcy, an argument rejected in Detlefsen, 610 F.2d at 514 n.5, 516 n.13); see also Ex
parteFuller, 9 F. Cas. 976, 976 (C.C.D. Mass. 1842) (No. 5147) (stating that state law exclusively governs wills of real estate). Some of these cases are discussed in David E. Leigh,
Note, Renunciation of a Legacy or Devise as a Fraudulent Transfer Under the Bankruptcy
Act, 49 bIm. L.J. 290 (1974); Alice McCann, Wills-DisclaimerExecuted Within One Year
of Bankruptcy Not a Transfer, 20 WAYNE L. Rlv. 969 (1974). The modern Bankruptcy
Code eliminates the definitional requirement that property be "vested" in order to fall into
the bankruptcy estate. See 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) & (a)(5). Still, the law remains unsettled:
One court has distinguished disclaimers executed pre- and postpetition, holding prepetition disclaimers effective per state law and postpetition disclaimers ineffective as postpetition transfers, per 11 U.S.C. § 549 (1988). Jones v. Atchison (In re Atchison), 101 B.R. 556,
558 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. 1989) (Meyers, J.), aff'd, 925 F.2d 209 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct.
178 (1991). Another opinion has instead distinguished pre- and postpetition inheritances,
holding only the latter, if disclaimed, to be fraudulent conveyances by virtue of federal law.
Williams v. Chenoweth (In re Chenoweth), 132 B.R. 161, 164 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. 1991) (Meyers, J. again, contradicting himself), affd, 143 B.R. 527 (S.D. I1. 1992), aff'd, 1993 WL
327841 (7th. Cir. 1993). Other courts have held disclaimers void in bankruptcy without
drawing either of these distinctions. Lowe v. Brajkovic (In re Brajkovic), 151 B.R. 402,
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are technical details.

407-09 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1993); Casciato v. Stevens (in re Stevens), 112 B.R. 175, 177
(Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1989); Cornelius v. Cornell (In re Cornell), 95 B.R. 219, 222 (Bankr.
W.D. Okla. 1989); Geekie v. Watson (In re Watson), 65 B.R. 9, 12 (Bankr. C.D. Il. 1986);
Flanigan v. Lewis (In re Lewis), 45 B.R. 27, 30 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1984); see also Nashville
City Bank & Trust Co. v. Peery (In re Peery), 40 B.R. 811, 816 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1984)
(debtor-disclaimant denied a discharge for fraud under 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(2) (1988)). And
still another court has held disclaimers valid in bankruptcy, without analysis. In re Jessen,
82 B.R. 490, 495 (Bankr. S.D. Iowa 1988). Several of these cases are discussed in Douglass
G. Boshkoff, Bankruptcy in the Seventh Circuit: 1991, 25 IND. L. REV. 981, 981-83 (1992).
On the debtor's right in bankruptcy to decline to exercise a spousal right to an elective
share, see In re McCourt, 12 B.R. 587, 590-91 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1981), discussed in

H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 261-62 (1986). On
the trustee's right to contest a will that could benefit the debtor, compare Tallman v. Tallman, 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) 325, 332 (1850); In re Beinhauer's Estate, 193 N.Y.S. 758 (Sur.
Ct.), affd, 194 N.Y.S. 917 (App. Div. 1922), with Caso v. Bentley (In re Bentley), 120 B.R.
712, 717 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990), and Balsley v. Farmer's & Merchant's Bank (In re ElliTHOMAS

ott), 81 B.R. 460, 462 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1987).

Compare the reverse scenario in which a debtor is not the disclaimant but rather the
beneficiary of disclaimed property. In one case, a benefactor died prior to the debtor's
bankruptcy petition, and the named beneficiary subsequently disclaimed her inheritance to
the debtor as alternative beneficiary more than six months after the petition. Held, the
inheritance nonetheless went to the bankruptcy estate because, under state law, title to the
disclaimed inheritance "related back" to the date of the benefactor's death. Norman v.
Schulte (In re Schulte), 107 B.R. 763, 764 (Bankr. D. Wyo. 1989).
The debtor might also assign her expectancy to a third party before it vests. But assignments of expectancies are effective against the beneficiary and the trustee in bankruptcy only if made for consideration and only in the absence of fraud. In re Cornell's Will,
12 N.Y.S.2d 162, 165 (Sur. Ct. 1939); In re Barnett, 37 F. Supp. 531, 532 (E.D.N.Y. 1941),
rev'd, 124 F.2d 1005 (2d Cir. 1942). For discussions, see 3 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY,
supra note 6, § 14.12; McGOVERN ET AL., supra note 24, § 1.5, at 29; Foster, supra note 15,
at 743-44.
26. Case law interpreting the Chandler Act upheld the debtor's right to claim exempt
property out of a postpetition inheritance that belonged to the bankruptcy estate under
§ 70(a). In re Carl, 38 F. Supp. 414, 417 (W.D. Ark. 1941) (homestead rights). Section
70(a) of the Bankruptcy Act was amended in 1952 to codify Carl. Pub. L. No. 82-456, 66
Stat. 420, 430 (1952); see In re Hamill, 317 F. Supp. 909, 914 (D. Kan. 1970). The modern
Bankruptcy Code has eliminated this language but simultaneously overhauled the structure
of the bankruptcy estate. Whereas the Bankruptcy Act had failed to include exempt property in the initial bankruptcy estate (leaving the reference to after-acquired property in the
Chandler Act ambiguous), the modern Code includes exempt property a priori and then
disgorges it back to the debtor under 11 U.S.C. § 522 (1988). Because § 541(a)(5) merely
captures inherited property for the bankruptcy estate, it is again subject to exemptions
from the bankruptcy estate under § 522(b). In re Means, 16 B.R. 775,776-77 (Bankr. W.D.
Mo. 1982); In re Howard, 6 B.R. 220,223 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1980). For other related cases,

see DAVID G. EPSTEIN ET AL., BANKRUPTCY 595 n.11 (1993). See also infra notes 126-132
and accompanying text.
The treatment of a debtor's right to receive a family allowance out of a probate estate
under §§ 541(a)(1) & (a)(5) remains somewhat ambiguous. In In re Stumpff, 107 B.R. 346,
349 (Bankr. E.D. Okla. 1989), order restated, 109 B.R. 1014 (Bankr. E.D. Okla. 1989), the
court held that a debtor's interest in the allowance accrued for purposes of inclusion in the
bankruptcy estate at the time when the probate court entered its order allowing the pay-
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The larger, more interesting question is whether the six-month
window serves to fulfill public policy. Is this a well-advised rule?
Commentators have had remarkably little to say about it,27 and the

legislative history is equally scant.2 The new line of cleavage constituted just one strand in the tangle of innovations introduced by the
Chandler Act,29 and it crept into law with scarcely any critical discussion.30 Yet the issue merits greater scrutiny than it has heretofore rement stream, rather than when the payments were actually made, or (implicitly) when the
benefactor died. Stumpff, 109 B.R. at 1016. This treatment is inconsistent with other
courts' handling of ordinary bequests. See supra notes 6 & 14. In its initial statement of its
holding, the court ruled that the date of distribution was not dispositive (without specifying, as the restatement did, what the legally significant date was), emphasizing that its
holding depended on the state-law rule that an allowance is an "advance" on, rather than
an addition to, the beneficiary's initial right to an estate distribution. Stumpff, 107 B.R. at
348. Melding the two opinions, one is led to the odd (to say the least) conclusion that the
court would date to the post-mortem court order allowances that are advances, but date to
the time of distribution allowances that are (under state law) additions to the beneficiary's
inheritance rights under the will. This legal issue needs clarification.
The status of a third party's inheritance right that has been assigned to the debtor for
consideration (the assignment would not otherwise be enforceable) also remains unclear.
In an early case, the Sixth Circuit held that the assignment of an inheritance to the debtor
still constituted an expectancy rather than a chose in action (and because the case was
decided prior to the Chandler Act, the court did not have to decide the further question of
whether an assigned expectancy, escaping the bankruptcy estate initially, would then be
subject to the six-month window as a potential inheritance of the debtor). Baker v. Shoun
(In re Baker), 13 F.2d 707, 708 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 273 U.S. 733 (1926). Though the
issue has never been relitigated, commentators have uniformly rejected Baker, urging that
an expectancy assigned to the debtor for consideration should be deemed a chose in action
and hence should fall into the bankruptcy estate initially, regardless of when it vests. 2A
RIcHARD R. POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 384 (Patrick J. Rohan ed., rev. ed.

1992); 1 AMERICAN

LAW OF PROPERTY,

mENT OF PROPERTY

§ 317(2) & cmt. b (1940); Recent Decisions, 27 COLUM. L. REv. 86,87

supra note 6, § 4.80, at 541 & n.4 (1952); RESTATE_

(1927); Recent Case Notes, 36 YALE L.. 272, 272-73 (1926). Compare the treatment of
contractual wills, discussed infra note 116. On spendthrift trust income under § 541(a)(5),
see infra note 222; on the constitutionality of § 541(a)(5), see 4A COLLIER, supra note 5,
§ 70.27, at 374 n.6.
27. The issue has never before been the subject of a published note or article. Scattered commentary on the problem will appear hereinafter.
28. See infra notes 33, 71-77, 150, and accompanying text.
29. In urging passage of the Chandler Act, Professor MacLachlan described this,
along with other changes in the contours of the bankruptcy estate, as "a small portion of
the subject matter of the Bill," a "negligible modification . . . [that] could readily be
dropped [if opposition were encountered] without substantially impairing its usefulness."
James A. McLaughlin, Aspects of the Chandler Bill to Amend the Bankruptcy Act, 4 U.
CHI. L. REv. 369, 381 (1937). (I will note here to spare the reader further confusion that
MacLachlan altered the spelling of his name in 1948; his early publications bear his original
surname.)
30. The six-month window was not highlighted among the "general purposes" of the
drafters of the Chandler Act in their preface to their legislative analysis. HousE COMM.
ON THE JUDICIARY, 74TH CONG., 2D Sass., ANALYSIS OF H.R. 12889 iv-v (Comm. Print
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ceived. Though inheritances raise only a peripheral problem under
the theory of the fresh start, still that theory represents one of the
central components of bankruptcy law. By probing the periphery, we
may glean insights into forces operating at the core. But putting aside
for the moment these broader concerns, this Article advances the specific hypothesis that Section 541(a)(5) is theoretically faulty and ought
to be repealed. As will be shown, the existing rule lacks rhyme or
reason: rhyme, in the sense that the rule is logically inconsistent with
other provisions of the Bankruptcy Code; reason, in that it fails intrinsically to comport with public policy.
In the analysis that follows, I will begin by exploring the stated
rationales for the six-month window and examining their persuasiveness as policy dogma. I will then free myself from the existing dogma
and address the provision from an analytical perspective neglected by
its drafters. Finally, having completed this exercise, I will remark a
few lessons learned in the course of it about the discharge and about
the process of bankruptcy lawmaking that permitted a rule so ill-conceived as the six-month window to come into being in the first place.
H.

Justifications Shattered in the Unpacking

A number of rationales for the six-month window appeared, or
1936) [hereinafter ANALYSIS OF H.R. 12889]. The voluminous papers of the principal
drafter of the revised § 70, containing many substantive discussions of other aspects of the
section, include none on the six-month window. See James Angell MacLachlan Papers,
Harvard Law School Library, ins. boxes 1-3 (unpublished papers) [hereinafter MacLachlan
Papers]. Similarly, in the Congressional hearings on the Chandler Act, the issue was barely
discussed. In the first hearing, Paul King, one of the drafters, briefly described the sixmonth window and invited questions; there were none. Revision of the Bankruptcy Act:
Hearings on H.R. 6140 Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., pt.
2, at b14-15 (1935) (statement of Paul King) (unpublished). In the second hearing, the
issue was debated for several minutes. H.R. 10382 Hearings, supra note 20, at 315-18. In
the third and final hearing, James MacLachlan, another drafter, failed to mention the innovation in a discussion ostensibly "cover[ing] the most important ... changes in language
which have been made" in § 70. Revision of the Bankruptcy Act: Hearings on H.R. 6439
Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary,75th Cong., 1st Sess. 210-12 (1937) (statement of
James A. MacLaughlin) [hereinafter H.R. 6439 Hearings]. Nonetheless, in the one brief
debate on the issue, Congressman Chandler himself praised the six-month window as "a
very valuable section." H.R. 10382 Hearings, supra note 20, at 318. The drafters of the
Bankruptcy Code of 1979 failed to revisit the issue; the decision to carry forward the sixmonth window from the Act to the Code was taken without any substantive discussion.
For the legislative history, see H.R. Doc. No. 137, supra note 22, pt. 1, at 192-93; id. pt. 2,
at 147, 149; Bankruptcy Act Revision: Hearings on H.R. 31 and H.R. 32 Before the Subcomm. on Civil and ConstitutionalRights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,94th Cong.,
1st & 2d Sess. app. § 4-601(a)(4) (1975); H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 13, at 176.
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were alluded to, in the legislative history of the Chandler Act.31
Taken as a whole, these rationales form the ostensible theoretical
foundation for the six-month window. To assess the rule, we must begin by testing the soundness of that foundation.
A. Reliance Theory
The official revision notes accompanying the Chandler Act con-

tain only one scrap of commentary explicitly directed at justifying the
six-month window. The statement was attributed to Jacob Weinstein,
a practitioner and treatise writer, who served prominently on the
Act's drafting committee. 32 The passage reads in its entirety:
These provisions are also intended to correct an abuse which is
quite prevalent. Liberal credits are frequently extended by tradesmen in reliance upon such expectancies, and quite often such debtors invoke the [Bankruptcy] Act to escape payment. 33This is
virtually a fraud upon the Act and should be discouraged.

While the meaning of this brief discourse is not entirely clear, Weinstein appears to be saying that when a potential borrower with prospects of inheritance seeks credit, the parties will typically (if
implicitly) agree that any inherited assets will be made available to
satisfy the debt. A declaration of bankruptcy effective against an im31. Earlier criticisms of the pre-Chandler Act rule failed to address the issue substantively. See supra note 9.
32. Weinstein, who practiced law in Philadelphia, was a member of the Bankruptcy
Committee of the Commercial Law League of America, the National Association of Federal Practitioners, and the National Bankruptcy Conference (though he did not begin to
participate until its third session in 1933). Weinstein served on the subcommittee of the
Conference that drafted the revised § 70. The Story of the Draft, supra note 10, at 263-65.
It was Weinstein who, along with two other participants (Professor James MacLachlan of
the Harvard Law School and Watson B. Adair of the National Association of Referees in
Bankruptcy), composed the final language of the six-month window as it appeared in the
Chandler Act. Letter from Watson B. Adair to Paul H. King (Mar. 1, 1937), in MacLachIan Papers, supra note 30, Ins. box 2, folder 11. Following passage by Congress, Weinstein
published a treatise on the entire Act. JACOB WEINsTEIN, THE BANKRurcy LAW OF 1938
(1938). On his eminence in the field, see Other Amendatory Proposals,6 J. NAT'L ASS'N
REF. BANKR. 175, 175 (1932).

33.

ANALYSIS OF

H.R. 12889, supra note 30, at 226 n.4;

REVISION OF THE NATIONAL

Act, H.R. REP. No. 1409, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 34 (1937) (same, without
attribution); Senate Judiciary Committee Report No. 1916-Revision of the NationalBankruptcy Act Reproduced,A2 CORP. REORGANIZATION & AM. BANKR. REv. 199,211 (1939)
(same, abbreviated) [hereinafter Report No. 1916]. Weinstein repeated this argument in
his Congressional testimony advocating passage of, and subsequently in his treatise examining, the Chandler Act. H.R. 10382 Hearings, supra note 20, at 316-17 (statement of Jacob
I. Weinstein); WEINsTEIN, supra note 32, at 158. The author of an earlier critique of the
Bankruptcy Act of 1898 had similarly characterized the action of declaring bankruptcy in
order "to retain an expected inheritance" as one of several "border-line cases just short of
outright fraud." Garrison, supra note 9, at 376.
BANKRupTcY
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pending inheritance would therefore deprive creditors of the benefit

of their bargains.
The first thing to notice about this rationale is that it fails to cor-

respond precisely with the rule it purports to justify. If it is "fraudulent" to use bankruptcy to protect an inheritance that creditors are
relying on, then those creditors should be permitted to reach it whenever it vests, as long as they can maintain a writ of execution. 34 But
even ignoring this imprecision, Weinstein's analysis appears untena-

ble. His bold empirical assertion that "liberal credits" are "frequently" extended in reliance on expectancies is-in this day and
age-palpably false. Perhaps back in 1938 creditors had sufficiently
close personal relations with their debtors to become acquainted with
their prospects of inheritance. 35 Be that as it may, the revolution in
consumer credit following the Second World War has seen the industry burgeon; in the process, the business of lending has grown impersonal and routine.36 Today, consumer credit dossiers do not routinely
34. Conceivably, Weinstein might have argued that the likelihood of reliance on expectancies was greater when they in fact matured within six months of the petition
(although temporal proximity between maturity of the expectancy and the date credit was
extended would appear a more pertinent consideration). In the one congressional hearing
on the six-month window, the time period selected for the provision was briefly discussed.
One Congressman wondered why the period chosen for capturing inheritances differed
from the period chosen for avoiding preferences. Weinstein responded that "[tihere is no
particular relation between the two." At the same time, he allowed that the six-month
period was "arbitrary" and was "a compromise." The chairman of the National Bankruptcy Conference, Paul King, weighed in that "[y]ou might possibly make it a year without going too far." Congressman Chandler defended the time period as it appeared in the
draft: "Six months would seem to me to be about the right period of time. If you made it
longer possibly you would work a hardship, and if you made it shorter possibly you would
work a hardship." H.R. 10382 Hearings, supra note 20, at 317-18. Unfortunately, Chandler failed to expand on his perception of the nature of these "hardships." For other possible policy explanations for the six-month limitation, see infra note 85 and text
accompanying notes 137, 138, 152, & 153. For proposals to extend the window of vulnerability, see infra notes 82-83.
35. Although studies are lacking, there is reason to doubt whether such personal relations were widespread even in 1938. A substantial expansion in consumer credit had occurred in the 1920s, and the sales finance companies (though not yet the crecit card) had
already appeared by this time. MARTHA L. OLNEY, Buy Now PAY LATER: ADVERTISING,
CREDIT, AND CONSUMER DURABLES IN THE 1920s, at 86-134 (1991). Gordon Wood finds
that credit transactions grew dramatically in volume and became increasingly impersonal
as early as the late eighteenth century! GORDON S. WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF THE
AMERICAN REVOLUTION 65-70, 139-41 (1991).
36. On the growth of consumer credit and its present impersonal nature, see NATIONAL COMMISSION ON CONSUMER FINANCE, CONSUMER CREDIT IN THE UNITED STATES

5-21 (1972) [hereinafter

NATIONAL COMMISSION]; DAVID T. STANLEY & MARJORIE
GIRTH, BANKRUPTCY: PROBLEM, PROCESS, REFORM 24-27 (1971); TERESA A. SULLIVAN
ET AL., As WE FORGIVE OUR DEBTORS 12-13, 337 (1989). For a recent popular account,
see Nancy Shepherdson, Credit Card America, AM. HERITAGE, Nov. 1991, at 125.
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37
include information about the debtor's inheritance prospects. Commercial lenders instead focus on present assets and income-and with
good reason. Before they mature, wills are private documents. Information about their contents is difficult to obtain. Moreover, wills
(true to their name) are ambulatory. A benefactor can alter his will at
will. As a consequence, the "present value" of the expectancies it creates, if otherwise subject to actuarial estimation, will remain indeterminate. Only in a few special cases, where the debtor's expectancies
are notorious and realistically secure, might creditors nowadays agree
to consider them when deciding whether (and at what price) to extend
credit. Weinstein's observation, in short, is at best anachronistic-and
quite possibly was spurious to begin with.38 If anything, a reliance
theory subverts, rather than supports, an across-the-board inclusion of
39
expectancies in the bankruptcy estate.
Even if we were to focus on those special cases in which the decision to extend credit is (or could efficiently be) predicated on the
debtor's inheritance prospects, Weinstein's analysis still misses the
mark. "Reliance" does not occur in a vacuum. Debtors and creditors
bargain in the proverbial shadow of the law (as well as extralegal social norms). They reasonably rely on whatever the law (and those
norms) make available for reliance.
Consider first the applicable social norms.40 When a debtor

37. See Hirsch, supra note 25, at 614 & nn.132-35.
38. See supra note 35. Even at an earlier time, when information about debtors was
less costly as a consequence of communal notoriety, the ambulatory nature of expectancies
must have cast doubt on their usefulness as a substitute for vested collateral. For a literary
depiction of such an arrangement (also illustrating its dangers to creditors), see GEORGE
ELIOT, MIDDLEMARcH: A STUDy OF PROvINcIAL LIFE 93-96 (Knopf 1991) (1871-72).
39. See infra note 45. On this basis one could even argue that vested inheritances
should be exempt from the claims of creditors who extended credit before the inheritances
were received, although such a rule would entail administrative difficulties. Hirsch, supra
note 25, at 626. Several of the cases decided prior to the Chandler Act denied creditors
recourse to expectancies in bankruptcy on the related technical ground that they were
valueless, and thus did not fit the definition of "property" of the debtor under § 70 of the
Bankruptcy Act. As one opinion noted, inheritance prospects "could [not] be sold to
strangers for any price" because they "depended upon the mere wish of the [benefactor]."
The benefactor "could... at any moment" execute a new will, "and the subject-matter of
these expectancies would dissolve into nothing." Baker v. Shoun (In re Baker), 13 F.2d
707, 707-08 (6th Cir. 1926); for similar discussions, see Hogan v. Fauerbach Brewing Co.
(In re Hogan), 194 F. 846, 849 (7th Cir. 1912), cert. denied, 273 U.S. 733 (1926); In re
Wetmore, 108 F. 520,523-24 (3d Cir. 1901); In re Seal, 261 F. 112, 112 (E.D.N.Y. 1919); see
also Lockard v. Stephenson, 24 So. 996, 996-97 (Ala. 1899); In re Shepard's Estate, 32 A.
1040, 1041 (Pa. 1895) (same analysis in related contexts).
40. On the phenomenon of extralegal social norms, see generally JON ELSTER, THE
CEMENT OF SOCIETY (1989). That these play a significant role even in business relationships is well known. See generally William M. Evan, Comment, 28 AM. Soc. REv. 67, 67-69
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brings an expectancy to the attention of her creditor, could that credi-

tor (operating, so to say, in a state of nature) reasonably assume that
the debtor would subsequently take no evasive action to shield the

expectancy from that creditor? Weinstein seems to have thought so,
but can we be so sure? The prevailing culture (if we can even generalize about it) appears to combine attitudes of trust and suspicion, of

duty and rivalry, 41 and judicial pronouncements historically have reflected this dialectic. In 1842, Justice Story defended the reliance interest of creditors: "As an honest debtor, he must desire, that his
creditors should derive as much benefit from all his 'rights of property,' as is possible." 42 Yet other contemporaries of Story took the

opposite view: "[A] great part of human conduct, in this imperfect
world, proceeds [from unworthy passions and motives]," observed a
state court justice in 1879; "The right, especially, to harry and bedevil
one's creditor is inestimable! '43 Presumably, many creditors would
expect debtors to do all they could to wriggle free from their obligations, even when debtors initially flaunted proof of their credit-worthiness. Any other expectation would be commercially reckless-not to
say self-destructive-in the face of evidence to the contrary. In this
light, Weinstein's assertion that credit was "frequently extended by
tradesmen in reliance upon . . . expectancies," which debtors then
"quite often" contrived to deny them, 44 appears logically inconsistent,
assuming creditors act rationally. Reliance could not long have survived such evasion: Once bitten, twice shy. The frequency of credit

extension on the basis of inheritance prospects must have plummeted
the moment debtors
45
expectations.

began

defying

their

creditors'

genial

(1963); Stewart Macaulay, Non-ContractualRelations in Business: A PreliminaryStudy, 28
AM. Soc. REV. 55, 55-67 (1963); Stewart Macaulay, An Empirical View of Contract, 1985
Wis. L. REV. 465.
41. Social commentators have often depicted debtors' attitudes as ambivalent:
"'Honest men,' writes a trade executive, 'are straining at the moral code that makes debts
an honorable bargain."' Thacher-Garrison Report, supra note 9, at 13. Others have noted
a variation of attitudes: "[S]ome debtors, although perhaps a small, but nonetheless appreciable, minority... feel a moral obligation to ... repay as much of their debts as possible."
In re Arnold, 869 F.2d 240, 243 (4th Cir. 1989). For a recent discussion, see Lisa J. McIntyre, A Sociological Perspective on Bankruptcy, 65 IND. L.J. 123, 128-37 (1989).
42. Ex parte Fuller, 9 F. Cas. 976, 977 (C.C.D. Mass. 1842) (No. 5147).
43. Daniel v. Frost, 62 Ga. 697, 707-08 (1879) (Bleckley, J.).
44. ANALYSIS OF H.R. 12889, supra note 30, at 226.
45. In only one case reported prior to the Chandler Act did a general creditor expressly assert that his decision to extend credit was premised on the debtor's representation of inheritance prospects. In re Seal, 261 F. 112, 112 (E.D.N.Y. 1919).
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But even assuming the expectations reported by Weinstein ex-

isted as a cultural starting point, what of the law? Formal legal rules
also shape expectations, and do so powerfully. Moreover, legal rules

define expectations as a matter of right. If lawmakers were to decide
that inherited property, whenever received, was exempt from creditors' claims, for example, no unsecured creditor would or could rely
on it. A debtor exercising her right to the exemption in these circum-

stances could hardly be accused of fraud, much less a "fraud upon the
[law]." 46 Nor would such an exercise present any substantive inequity.
The price of credit would adjust accordingly.
This point of jurisprudence-that the law delineates enforceable

reliance-surely comes as no revelation. It has been often averred, by
48
scholars47 as well as judges in bankruptcy and other related cases, to
46. Cf supra text accompanying note 33. This is an intriguing concept, one that Weinstein failed to explain, let alone explore. Indeed, the whole idea seems logically tenuous.
It may well be possible to defy the "spirit" of a law, when one insists on following its letter
in situations not intended or anticipated by its makers. That would appear to be what
Weinstein has in mind here. But is that "fraud," even when done knowingly, or just clever
lawyering? To borrow a leaf from those bespectacled folk who carry calculators in their
breast pockets, there is a difference between avoiding and evading taxes. So long as one
obeys the law, one commits no fraud. But, fraud aside, one could argue (as Learned Hand
has done in a famous tax opinion) that courts should construe statutes liberally, to encompass their spirit. See Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 809, 810-11 (2d Cir. 1934) (Hand, J.),
aff'd, 293 U.S. 465 (1935); see also Marvin A. Chirelstein, Learned Hand's Contribution to
the Law of Tax Avoidance, 77 YALE L.J. 440,444-46 (1968) (discussing Helvering). Such an
approach, applied to the old § 70, could have led to a different outcome in the pre-Chandler Act cases. See supra note 8 and accompanying text. Some modern bankruptcy courts
have denied relief to debtors who attempted "abuses of the provisions, purposes, or spirit
of bankruptcy law," on the ground that "[g]ood faith is an implicit jurisdictional prerequisite." In re Campbell, 124 B.R. 462, 464 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1991). But this good faith requirement has never been applied to the timing of a petition. See infra notes 161-162 and
accompanying text.
47. "So far as the prevention of disappointment is concerned... [i]f the laws change,
the expectations will change. Thus the more important issue, as Sidgwick saw nearly a
century ago, is not whether the law should prevent the disappointment of expectations, but
whether it should create such expectations in the first place." STEPHEN R. MUNZER, A
THEORY OF PROPERTY 401-02 (1990) (citing HENRY SIDGWICK, THE ELEMENTS OF POLITics 98 (London, MacMillan 1891)). And again: "A promise has present value, why? Because the law enforces it. 'The expectancy,' regarded as a present value, is not the cause of
legal intervention but the consequence of it .... ." L.L. Fuller & William R. Perdue, Jr.,
The Reliance Interest in ContractDamages,46 YALE LJ.52, 59-60 (1936). Cf.LAURENCE
H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTrTUONAL LAW § 9-9, at 615-16 (2d ed. 1988) (noting that
even a jurisprudence sanctioning reliance on the basis of existing legal rules-is logically
shaky, because the meta-rule that law is changeable implies that prospective changes in
legal rules can be anticipated).
48. Thus, the Supreme Court rejected the argument that the discharge under state
insolvency laws was unconstitutional under the Contracts Clause, so long as those laws
only applied prospectively:
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reject arguments of creditor reliance-even explicit reliance-when

maintained without legal warrant. Indeed, one court recently reiterated the point to reject a claim of explicit reliance on an inheritance
that vested more than six months after bankruptcy-a claim precisely
analogous to the ones cited by Weinstein to justify deviation from the
49
old line of cleavage set prior to the Chandler Act.
To the extent, then, that law is the root of reasonable expectations, Weinstein's analysis collapses into tautology: Creditors need
law to vindicate their expectations if and when the law itself creates

those expectations. Considered in this vein, Weinstein has placed the
social cart before the legal horse.
But perhaps Weinstein's point was that because, arguendo, creditors would rely on known inheritance prospects in the absence of legal
rules, laws should be crafted to sustain those "pre-existing" expecta[The municipal law of the State] forms, in my humble opinion, a part of the
contract, and travels with it wherever the parties to it may be found....
...[It is not] unjust, or oppressive, to declare by law, that contracts subsequently entered into, may be discharged in a way different from that which the
parties have provided, but which they know, or may know, are liable ... to be
discharged in a manner contrary to the provisions of their contract.
Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213,259, 267 (1827). Likewise, in connection with
preferences under the Bankruptcy Code,
Rules of law affecting parties to voluntary arrangements do not operate 'inequitably' in the business world-at least not once the rule is understood .... If the
extended preference period facilitates the operation of bankruptcy... then credit
will become available on slightly better terms. If ... [it] has the opposite effect,
creditors will charge slightly higher rates of interest and monitor debtors more
closely.
Levit v. Ingersoll Rand Fin. Corp., 874 F.2d 1186, 1198 (7th Cir. 1989).
The reliance argument has also been rejected in cases upholding the effectiveness of
spendthrift trusts: "It is argued that investing a man with apparent wealth tends to ...
induce [creditors] to give him credit. The answer is, that creditors have no right to rely
upon property thus held .... " Broadway Nat'l Bank v. Adams, 133 Mass. 170, 173 (1882).
Likewise: "To property so exempted the creditor has no right to look, and does not look,
as a means of payment when his debt is created .... " Nichols v. Eaton, 91 U.S. 716, 726
(1875); see also Fox v. Swartz, 51 N.W.2d 80, 85 (Minn. 1952) (applying the same principle
to exempt life insurance policies); Magill v. Newman (In re Newman), 903 F.2d 1150, 1151
n.1 (7th Cir. 1990) (noting that the argument of explicit reliance was raised improperly on
appeal). In still another setting, where a prospective borrower who was also the donee of a
power of appointment informed his prospective lender that he had exercised the power
under his will (thereby rendering it susceptible to the claims of his own creditors under
state law), the court refused to imply a legally permissible agreement by the donee not to
revoke the will (unexercised powers being immune to creditors' claims). "A will is ambulatory until death .... That is common knowledge with which the appellant creditors are
chargeable .... " Montague v. Silsbee, 105 N.E. 611, 612 (Mass. 1914).
49. Bowers Distillery, Inc. v. Kragness (In re Kragness), 63 B.R. 459, 464 (Bankr. D.
Or. 1986) (rejecting estoppel argument by creditor that debtor "specifically promised to
pay the debt owed to plaintiff from this specific asset").
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tions. In other words, law should be responsive to, rather than responsible for, social reliance. That is hardly a senseless notion.
Citizens do live by social norms. To the extent formal rules are
molded to reflect those norms, lawmakers avoid dissonance between
what the law tells citizens is right and what they themselves preconceive to be right.50
At the same time, this approach need not be followed remorselessly. When public policy so dictates, lawmakers may find it expedient to overrule social norms precisely in order to change them. To
suggest that legal sanctions must invariably mirror their extralegal
counterparts would be to fall prey to a variant of the Is-Ought fallacy
that philosophers since Hume have so delighted in puzzling over.51
The mere fact that a particular social norm exists (no matter how undesirable or even ugly) does not imply that lawmakers ought to sponsor

it.52

Were Weinstein's (presumed) argument accepted and applied

rigorously to creditors' rights in bankruptcy, it would prove far too
much. On this theory, no discharge could ever be granted because,
absent that legal right, unsecured creditors would rely on their debtors' future income streams!5 3 That lawmakers nonetheless created
(even exalted) the right of discharge, along with plenty of other rights
in virtually every facet of the law, makes plain the jurisprudential
frailty of Weinstein's position.
Ultimately, the key issue is not what expectations do debtors and
creditors entertain, but rather what expectations do lawmakers want
them to entertain? The balance of this Article will be devoted to an50. For a brief but interesting discussion, see KARL N. LLEWELLYN, JURISPRUDENCE:
REALISM IN THEoRY A

PRAncricu 480 (1962). See also infra note 238.

51. The classic statement of the fallacy appears in DAvm HumE, A TREATISE OF
HuMAN NATuRE 469-70 (L.A. Selby-Bigge ed., 2d ed. 1978) (1739-40). For more recent
discussions, see, e.g., Tim Is-OuGi-r QUESTION: A COLLECrION OF PAPERS ON THE CENTRAL PROBLEM IN MORAL PHILOSOPHY (W.D. Hudson ed., 1969); Lawrence Kohlberg,
From Is to Ought How to Commit the NaturalisticFallacy and Get Away with It in the
Study of Moral Development, in COGNITIVE DEVELOPMENT AND EPISTEMOLOGY 151
(Theodore Mischel ed., 1971). Scholars sometimes turn the fallacy around, committing
what I call the "Ought-Is" fallacy. Thus, for example, exponents of the Chicago School of
law and economics argue that law ought to be efficient, and, lo and behold, often discover
that it is. See J.M. Balkin, Too Good to Be True: The PositiveEconomic Theory of Law, 87
COLUM. L. REv. 1447 (1987) (reviewing WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER,
THE ECONOMIC STRUCrURE OF TORT LAW (1987)).
52. The area of equal protection law leaps readily to mind-and also illuminates the
deeply conservative nature of Weinstein's commentary when generalized into a peremptory, jurisprudential directive.
53. Weinstein's argument has been raised and rejected in the context of the discharge.
See supra note 48.
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swering this question in connection with inheritance rights, but we
may begin here with one general proposition: All else being equal,
society is best off when creditors can expect to satisfy their debts from
any of the debtor's interests in property. The broader the creditor's
opportunity for reliance, the more robust will be the market for credit
54
which will in turn channel resource to their most efficient users.
And, as it happens, state law has traditionally empowered creditors to
rely on just about anything. Even exempt property can be made subject to enforceable creditors' claims via the grant of a security interest
covering the property. 55 Similarly, under state law, creditors can assure themselves of recourse to a debtor's expectancies by demanding
an assignment of inheritance rights, or by demanding a waiver of the
56
right to disclaim an inheritance once it has vested.
Federal bankruptcy law, however, has traditionally functioned
differently. General propositions aside, lawmakers have found compelling policy reasons for denying creditors the opportunity to rely on
certain interests of the debtor in the event she becomes insolvent.
One of those interests is the debtor's future income stream. Were a
lender foolish enough to extend "liberal credits" in reliance on an insolvent debtor's prospective income, that lender would soon become
insolvent as well, for the debtor's right to seek a discharge, freeing up
her future earnings, will defeat any claim of "reliance." Were creditors to solicit a waiver of this right, their efforts would be futile57
under the Bankruptcy Code, the discharge cannot be waived ex ante.
Whether this ought to be so is a question we shall put off for just a
little while. 58 The point to be made here is simply that Weinstein's
suggestion that reliance justifies a limitation on the discharge (by
redrawing the temporal boundaries of the bankruptcy estate) contra54. See, e.g., Anthony T. Kronman & Richard A. Posner, Introduction: Economic
Theory and Contract Law, in THE ECONOMICS OF CONTRACT LAW 1-2 (Anthony T.
Kronman & Richard A. Posner eds., 1979).
55. DOUGLAS G. BAIRD, THE ELEMENTS OF BANKRUPTCY 31 (rev. ed. 1993). One
exception is the spendthrift trust, which creditors cannot reach by way of express agreement with the debtor. Cf. 2A AUSTIN W. SCOTT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 152.6 (William F.
Fratcher ed., 4th ed. 1987 & Supp. 1992) (on the assignment of income out of a spendthrift
trust).
56. Assignments to creditors of expectancies before they vest have generally been
upheld in equity under state law. E.g., In re Cunningham's Estate, 16 A.2d 712 (Pa. 1940).
See generally 3 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 6, § 14.12. Likewise, ex ante
waivers of the right to disclaim are enforceable under state law. See UNIF. PROB. CODE
§ 2-801(d)(3) & (e)(ii) (1991). If the expectancy has been assigned, then disclaimer is generally barred under state law, even absent a waiver. See id. § 2-801(e)(i).
57. 11 U.S.C. § 524(a) (1988).
58. See infra text accompanying notes 105-106.
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dicts the longstanding supposition that federal law preserves the right
to bankruptcy relief irrespective of the wishes or expectations of the

bargaining parties. And this supposition has traditionally applied to
expectancies as well as to income. The locus classicus of this approach

is the Local Loan case of 1934, in which the Supreme Court ruled that
an assignment of future wages to a creditor, creating a lien on those
wages, was dissolved by the discharge, even though liens ordinarily

"pass through" bankruptcy and remain effective despite discharge.5 9
To permit the debtor to create an effective lien against her own wages,
making the discharge functionally waivable, would have contradicted,
in the Court's emphatic words, "the clear and unmistakable policy of
the [B]ankruptcy [A]ct. '' 60
A parallel line of bankruptcy cases, originating before the Chandler Act and continuing after it, reached the same result with respect
to inheritances. 61 The rule is now codified into Section 552(a) of the
Bankruptcy Code, which stipulates that the discharge avoids all liens
over "property acquired," not just wages earned, "after the commencement of the [bankruptcy] case." 62 One can discern a clear disharmony between this provision and the six-month window presently
lodged in Section 541(a)(5) of the Code. 63 Section 541(a)(5) tells
creditors that they can rely on the right to satisfy their claims from

inheritances received up to six months after a petition for relief. To
the contrary, Section 552(a) tells them that they cannot rely expressly
on that right by soliciting a priority lien on, or an assignment of, a
debtor's expectancy. Such a lien or assignment will be void under Sec59. Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 242-43 (1934).
60. Id. at 244.
61. Brown v. Cunningham, 25 N.E.2d 113 (I11. 1940) (holding assignment of expectancy avoided by the discharge in bankruptcy); Gannon v. Graham, 231 N.W. 675, 679-80
(Iowa 1930) (same); see also Bowers Distillery, Inc. v. Kragness (In re Kragness), 63 B.R.
459,464-65 (Bankr. D. Or. 1986) (holding that an alleged waiver of the right to a discharge
with respect to an expectancy was "against public policy"); Segal v. Rochelle, 382 U.S. 375,
379-80 (1966) (dicta). Two earlier cases reached the opposite result. Bridges v. Kedon, 126
P. 149 (Cal. 1912); Dumont, Roberts & Co. v. McDougal, 200 Ill. App. 583 (1916). For
early discussions, see 3 A~mUCA.1RLAW OF PROPERTY, supranote 6, § 14.12, at 604 & n.73;
Annotation, Assignment of Expectancy or InchoateRight Dependent on Future Conditions
as a Lien Within the Provisionsof the BankruptcyAct Exempting Liens from the Operation
of the Act, 73 A.L.R. 1063 (1931); Note and Comment, 29 MICH. L. Rlv. 915 (1931).
62. 11 U.S.C. § 552(a) (1988) (emphasis added). The prior Bankruptcy Act contained
no analogous provision. Cf. 11 U.S.C. § 522(e) & (f) (1988) (also rendering unenforceable
waivers of rights to, and non-purchase money security interests in certain sorts of, exempt
property in bankruptcy).
63. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(5) (1988).
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tion 552(a) from the moment the debtor files her petition, rather than

six months thereafter.
The one legitimate argument that might be salvaged out of Weinstein's commentary is that by permitting creditors to reach post-discharge expectancies they may be preserved from error costs in those
instances where they failed to anticipate the possibility of a bankruptcy proceeding to protect the expectancy. 64 A similar rationale un-

derlies the doctrine of promissory estoppel, 65 whereby promisees who
fail to anticipate that a gratuitous promise might be broken, and who

detrimentally rely thereon, are allowed to enforce the promise. While
strict adherence to the principle that expectations follow from law
would lead us to conclude that no promisee could ever reasonably rely

on a promise unsupported by consideration, some promisees may
nonetheless rely on unenforceable promises by mistake. The doctrine
of promissory estoppel avoids their error costs, though only by sacri-

ficing the perceived benefits of a rule requiring consideration as a pre-

66
requisite to the enforcement of promises.
In the context of bankruptcy, by analogy, a creditor might detrimentally extend credit in reliance on the debtor's professed inheritance prospects, unmindful of the possibility that bankruptcy could

64. In the same vein, Karl Llewellyn argued that because lay persons tend to follow
social norms in their everyday dealings with the world, "legal certainty" from their standpoint can be achieved only by attuning legal rules to social conventions and expectations.
KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE CASE LAW SYSTEM IN AMERICA 82-83 (Paul Gewirtz ed. &
Michael Ansaldi trans., 1989) (1933).
65. For discussions, compare RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW
§ 4.1, at 95 (4th ed. 1992); Randy E. Barnett & Mary E. Becker, Beyond Reliance: Promissory Estoppel, Contract Formalities, and Misrepresentations, 15 HOFSTRA L. REV. 443
(1987); Jay M. Feinman, The Last Promissory Estoppel Article, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 303,
311-16 (1992); Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Enforcing Promises: An Examination
of the Basis of Contract, 89 YALE L.J. 1261, 1301-09 (1980).
66. For discussions of these perceived benefits (and a fascinating debate it is), see P.S.
ATIYAH, PROMISES, MORALS, AND LAW 212-15 (1981); MARVIN A. CHIRELSTEIN, CONCEPTS AND CASE ANALYSIS IN THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 16-22 (1990); JOHN P. DAWSON,
GIFTS AND PROMISES: CONTINENTAL AND AMERICAN LAW COMPARED 22, 93-96, 194-96,
199-201 (1980); CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISES 28-39 (1981); David Cohen &

Jack L. Knetsch, Judicial Choice and DisparitiesBetween Measures of Economic Values, 30
OSGOODE HALL L.J. 737,757-60 (1992); Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Principlesof Consideration, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 640, 664-65 (1982); Melvin A. Eisenberg, Donative Promises, 47
U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 8-18, 31-33 (1979); Mary Louise Fellows, Donative Promises Redux, in
PROPERTY LAW AND LEGAL EDUCATION 27 (Peter Hay & Michael H. Hoeflich eds.,
1988); Lon L. Fuller, Considerationand Form, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 799, 820-24 (1941);
Goetz & Scott, supra note 65, at 1300-01; Andrew Kull, Reconsidering Gratuitous
Promises, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 39, 40-46, 64-65 (1992); Richard A. Posner, Gratuitous
Promisesin Economics and Law, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 411, 414-24 (1977); Steven Shavell, An
Economic Analysis of Altruism and Deferred Gifts, 20 J. LEGAL STUD. 401, 419-21 (1991).
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intervene. Yet, as a response to this concern, the six-month window as

presently crafted is both over- and underinclusive. It is overinclusive
because many creditors, and certainly all commercial lenders, are perfectly familiar with the legal topography of the discharge-they take
calculated risks and suffer statistically anticipated losses, not error
costs. 67 And it is underinclusive because unsophisticated lenders

(such as wage creditors and many trade creditors) who sometimes fail
to allow for the possibility of bankruptcy, will presumably have relied
on promises of payment from all sources, not just the expectancies
netted by the six-month window. As presently cast, Section 541(a)(5)
cannot perform the role played on the contract-law stage by promissory estoppel.
At any rate, importing the principle of promissory estoppel into
bankruptcy law would contradict longstanding bankruptcy policy. In
weighing avoidance of error costs against the perceived benefits of
allowing debtors unconditional bankruptcy relief, the drafters of both
the Act and Code saw greater virtues in the latter. In no respect has

the discharge ever made special allowances for unsophisticated credi68
tors' error costs.
B. Discharge Theory

Plainly, we must move beyond Weinstein's largely circular and
unthematic analysis to a more fundamental question: As a substantive
67. SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 36, at 285; Hirsch, supra note 25, at 611 & nn. 124-25,
614 & n.136. According to the Restatement of Contracts, courts should award recovery for
promissory estoppel "if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise,"
unlike the blanket coverage of § 541(a)(5). REsTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CoNTRAS § 90
(1965). See also Goetz & Scott, supra note 65, at 1306 n.107 (noting that when the promisee was aware of the promisor's legal right to break the promise, "reliance is likely to be
characterized as unreasonable").
68. The Code does not permit creditors to rely on a debtor's promise to repay debts
when they are ignorant or unmindful of the debtor's legal right to a discharge. In this
respect, a plumber has no greater rights than American Express. Indeed, the Code even
extends the discharge to debts owed to certain involuntary creditors, persons who had no
opportunityat all to bargain with or deny credit to the debtor, such as tort victims. But see
11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(1), (5) & (6) (1988) (providing exceptions to the discharge for debts
arising out of a tax or customs duty, for alimony, maintenance, or support payments, and
for intentional tort claimants). Other areas of debtor-creditor law are similarly structured.
Spendthrift trusts are effective against creditors, even when they relied on assets they erroneously believed to be owned by debtors out of trust. Courts have defended this rule on
the ground that the error costs in such cases will (once again) be relatively small. Nichols
v. Eaton, 91 U.S. 716,726 (1875); see Broadway Nat'l Bank v. Adams, 133 Mass. 170, 17374 (1882). But see Utley v. Graves, 258 F. Supp. 959, 960 (D.D.C. 1966) (holding that a
spendthrift trust was subject to claims for alimony and maintenance), rev'd sub nom.
American Sec. & Trust Co. v. Utley, 382 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
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issue of public policy, how broadly or narrowly should the discharge

be framed? Once we arrive at an answer and pronounce it clearly, the
problem of baffled expectations will, in large measure, 69 take care of
itself. Which brings us to a second line of argument found in the legislative history of the Chandler Act, one offered by another prominent

member of its drafting committee, Professor James Angell MacLachlan, who taught bankruptcy at the Harvard Law School. 70 Said

MacLachlan:
This change would not go to the extent of striking at the elementary
if logically false idea that the spes successionis [expectancy of inheritance] of an heir is not property at all. A more conservative step is
taken in providing that where the bankrupt actually has a [future]
property interest at the time of the petition, the trustee shall have
the benefit of holding it during the administration in bankruptcy.
To an extent this involves a departure from the strict theory of the
date of cleavage, but the bankrupt ought not to get the benefit of all
legal complications at the expense of creditors. The vesting of such
property is usually independent of the bankrupt's economic efforts
and has no relation to his normal budget, so the usual reasons7 as1
signed for leaving him his after-acquiredproperty do not apply.

These thoughts, which appeared next to Weinstein's in the legislative record, 72 were quoted verbatim from a critical review of the
69. Except among unsophisticated creditors. Cf. supra notes 64-68 and accompanying
text.
70. MacLachlan chaired the subcommittee that drafted the revised § 70, and he participated in drafting the Boston Draft at the first session of the National Bankruptcy Conference in 1932. The Story of the Draft, supra note 10, at 263-64. MacLachlan was one of
three drafters of the final language of the six-month window as it appeared in the Chandler
Act. See supra note 32. For a biographical sketch, see James Angell MacLachlan, HARV.
L. SCH. BULL., May 1967, at 2-5.
71. ANALYSIS OF H.R. 12889, supra note 30, at 226 n.4 (emphasis added) (citations
omitted).
72. Though Weinstein and MacLachlan each publicly advocated the six-month window and supported its adoption within the subcommittee of the National Bankruptcy Conference drafting the new § 70, it may be noted that the provision itself traced to neither of
them. The first proposal for a six-month window appeared in a draft reform bill prepared
in 1932 by the Committee on Legislation of the National Association of Referees in Bankruptcy. Neither Weinstein nor MacLachlan sat on that committee. Amendments Considered Advisable by the Referees, 7 J. NAT'L Ass'N REF. BANKR. 3, 17 (1932). The members
of the committee are listed in Association's Committees, 6 J. NAT'L Ass'N REF. BANKR. 177
(1932). Subsequent drafts proposed by the National Bankruptcy Conference incorporated
the six-month window and acknowledged the Referees' draft (while at the same time polishing its provision in a succession of technical linguistic revisions). Bankruptcy Act,
Fourth General Bankruptcy Conference (second tentative draft) 101-02 & note (1933), in
MacLachlan Papers, supra note 30, Paige Box 2; Bankruptcy Act, Fourth General Bankruptcy Conference (third tentative draft) 102 (1933), in MacLachlan Papers, supra note 30,
Paige Box 2; The Story of the Draft, supra note 10, at 189 & note; H.R. 6439 Hearings,
supra note 30, at 198. The draft bill produced by Weinstein himself on behalf of the Na-
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Bankruptcy Act that MacLachlan had published in the HarvardLaw
Review over a decade before the 1938 reforms.73 MacLachlan's pro-

posal at that time had been to incorporate into the bankruptcy estate
only the debtor's contingent future interests, not expectancies, and
only those vesting during the administration of the bankruptcy proceeding, not those vesting thereafter.74 A separate subsection geared
toward reaching contingent future interests vesting within six months
of bankruptcy was added alongside the one capturing expectancies
under the Chandler Act,75 and MacLachlan's commentary was cited,

strictly speaking, only to support this separate provision. 76 But in another commentary on the Chandler Act, published while it was pending before Congress, MacLachian left no doubt that he conceptualized
the two policy problems as identical. 77 Apparently, MacLachlan had
drawn back from a broader proposal in 1927 only because he was
afraid it would appear too radical-whence his reference to the "elementary if logically false idea" that an expectancy is not property, 78
tional Association of Federal Practitioners in 1932 failed to include a six-month window or
any other special provision for inheritances. Draft of New Bankruptcy Bill, 8 AM. BANKR.
Rv. 389, 448-49 (1932). For other early draft proposals that failed to address the issue,
see Full Text New Bankruptcy Bill, supra note 20, at 260, 296-97 (unpassed Hastings-Michener bill); Report of the Standing Committee on Commercial Law and Bankruptcy, 57
A.B.A. REP. 408,412-22 (1932) (A.B.A. draft); MacLachlan Papers, supra note 30, ms. box
1, folders 8-11; ms. box 2, folders 7-11 (Reuben Hunt draft, Harold Remington amendments, and other relevant papers). The Thacher-Garrison Report, which suggested a different approach to the issue, is discussed supra note 20 and infra note 194.
73. James A. McLaughlin, Amendment of the Bankruptcy Act, 40 HARV. L. Rv. 583,
610 (1927).
74. A proposal to that effect was first included in a list of proposed amendments to
the Bankruptcy Act that MacLachlan had composed in 1926. He sent a copy of the draft
amendments to Professor Vflliston for comment. Letter from James McLaughlin to Samuel Williston (Apr. 30, 1926), in MacLachlan Papers, supra note 30, ms. box 1, folder 2.
(No reply is extant in the MacLachlan Papers.)
75. Bankruptcy Act § 70(a)(7) (previously codified at 11 U.S.C. § 110(a)(7)) (establishing a fixed six-month window for contingent interests in real property analogous to the
one covering expectancies).
76. "With reference to contingent and executory interests, we again quote from the
article by Prof. McLaughlin ..... " ANALYSIS OF H.R. 12889, supra note 30, at 226 n.4.
77. "Property acquired [by inheritance or survivorship] stands on a very different basis from the bankrupt's subsequent earnings. It is in the nature of a windfall having no
relation to his normal budget. It seems unnecessary to the protection of the honest but
unfortunate debtor to allow the spendthrift to obtain immunity in bankruptcy while his
wealthy ancestor is on the death bed." McLaughlin, supra note 29, at 380-81. This statement did not appear in the legislative history, however.
78. ANALYSIS OF H.R. 12889, supra note 30, at 226 n.4 (quoted supra text accompanying note 71). MacLachlan cited here (with, as the text suggests, disapproval) to three cases:
an American case, Bank of Elberton v. Swift (In re Swift), 268 F. 305 (5th Cir. 1920); an
English case holding that debtors could retain expectancies under wills that matured after
they received their discharge, Moth v. Frome, 27 Eng. Rep. 262 (Ch. 1761); and another
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and his characterization of his proposal to intervene only in those

cases "where the bankrupt actually has a property interest at the time
of the petition" as "[a] more conservative step. '79 MacLachlan's initial failure to extend his analysis from contingent interests to expectancies stemmed not from his perception of the problem, but from a

vague and unreasoned inclination to legal conservation.
Assuming it applies to the six-month window, MacLachlan's com-

mentary raises immediate questions about the consistency of the
Code. If inheritances fall into the bankruptcy estate because they are

"independent of the bankrupt's economic efforts," 80 why are not
postpetition gifts, or even lottery winnings, treated in the same way? 81
And why are creditors' rights to expectancies limited to those vesting
within six months of bankruptcy? The argument, once again, might as
easily be asserted to justify an indefinite extension of the date of

cleavage.
This last point, at least, did not escape MacLachlan's attention,
for he subsequently advocated precisely that concept in his bankruptcy treatise, 82 and other commentators have adopted a like
stance. 83 As drawn up in 1978, the Bankruptcy Code took one step in
English case holding expectancies to be unassignable, In re Ellenborough, 1 Ch. 697 (Ch.
1903).
79.

ANALYSIS OF H.R. 12889, supra note 30, at 226 n.4 (quoted supra text accompany-

ing note 71).
80. Id.
81. See supra note 23.
82. "There is no good reason why this innovation need be confined to such a brief
period. ...

[I]t ...

represent[s] the minimum protection that should be afforded to the

bankrupt[cy] estate. If this provision proves harmless, the question may arise in due course
concerning the extent to which the estate may be given further protection by subsequent
legislation." MAcLACHLAN, supra note 20, at 179. MacLachlan cited approvingly to the
English statute of 7 Geo. 4, ch. 57, § 11 (1826) (Eng.) (quoted supra note 20), capturing all
contingent interests and expectancies for the bankruptcy estate. Id. at 179 n.4; see also
infra note 85; McLaughlin, supra note 29, at 380-81 (describing the six-month window as a
"very minor" extension of the trustee's title, and asserting the Bankruptcy Act's "extraordinary leniency" to debtors).
83. "In view of the analytical and economic similarities of transferable future interests
and expectancies, it is awkward to explain on any basis why the trustee gets the first and
not the second." 4A COLLIER, supra note 5, § 70.37, at 459 n.14. Professor Ven Countryman took the same position, arguing that anything of value, including expectancies of inheritance, should fall into the bankruptcy estate. Countryman added that any type of
property deemed necessary for the debtor's rehabilitation could then be classified as exempt, but there is no indication that he viewed inheritances in this light. He characterized
the six-month window as "generous" to debtors. Countryman, The Use of State Law, supra
note 22, at 444-45, 473-75. Countryman's position on this issue (though unfortunately
wanting of substantive analysis) is intriguing, given that his corpus of scholarship is hardly
notable for its solicitude to the interests of creditors. See, e.g., Vern Countryman, Bankruptcy and the Individual Debtor-and a Modest Proposal to Return to the Seventeenth
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this direction, though not two. Whereas the Chandler Act treated
contingent interests and expectancies alike, funneling both into the

bankruptcy estate if they vested within six months of the petition, the
Code now reserves contingent interests for the estate regardless of
when they ultimately vest.84 The six-month window for expectancies
continues as before, however, for reasons that may have more to do
with tradition than with reasoned policy.8 5
But before we hurry to the conclusion that all expectancies
should be amalgamated with contingencies and treated as property of
Century, 32 CATH. U. L. REv. 809 (1983) [hereinafter Countryman, Bankruptcy and the
IndividualDebtor]. For related proposals to give bankruptcy courts discretionary power to
suspend the discharge, see supra note 20 and infra note 194.
84. See supra note 13.
85. As MacLachlan told the story,
It is accepted as unquestioned dogma having an ancient historical basis that the
expectancy of an heir to inherit from his ancestor is not a property right, and will
not pass to the trustee.... Arguments on such a question tend to involve metaphysical distinctions about the inherent nature of different legal rights. Such distinctions often leave the modem mind cold. If they are of any assistance in
determining what the law is, they are of no assistance in determining what the law
ought to be. Any attempt to amend the Bankruptcy Act to operate in more pragmatic terms, however, would be an attempt to storm the citadels of professional
conservatism where their front seems most impregnable. A modest flanking
movement was initiated in 1938 [with the Chandler Act], however ....
MACLACHLAN, supra note 20, at 178-79; see also 3 REMWGTON, supra note 13, § 1217, at
62 (characterizing the six-month period as "purely artificial"'). According to MacLachlan,
the one reasoned justification for a six-month limit was administrative convenience: "Six
months was chosen because the Bankruptcy Act contemplaies, in asset cases, a minimum
of something over six months for administration ... and any period much more extended
might appear to countenance a dilatory administration in bankruptcy, which is contrary to
the policy of the act." MAcLACHLAN, supra note 20, at 179; see also supra note 74 and
accompanying text detailing his original proposal, which called for a window limited to the
term necessary to administer the estate. Cf Adler, supra note 7, at 433-34 (claiming that in
consumer bankruptcy cases administration "often is closed... long before" the passage of
six months). This rationale, however, fails to withstand analysis. The only reason to expedite administration in bankruptcy is to minimize the cost to creditors. If creditors find it in
their interest to hold an estate open and are willing to bear the cost, then there is no public
policy against their doing so. See Countryman, The Use of State Law, supra note 22, at 474
(suggesting that bankruptcy estates include anything of value, and "[i]f the trustee then
finds that there is no effective way he can sell... [it] without delaying the closing of the
estate he can abandon it"); Ven Countryman, Fora New Exemption Policy in Bankruptcy,
14 RurGERS L. REv. 678, 701-03 (1960) (noting that if it is efficient to do so, a bankruptcy
trustee can hold open an estate to capture spendthrift trust income that creditors would be
entitled to reach under state law) [hereinafter Countryman, Fora New Exemption Policy].
In fact, trustees have traditionally been empowered to hold estates open indefinitely if that
is in the interest of creditors. E.g., In re Brown, 94 F. Supp. 259, 263 (N.D.N.Y. 1950)
(permitting a trustee to hold an estate open for fourteen years while waiting for contingent
interest to vest); In re Meyers, 139 B.R. 858, 860, 862 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1992) (permitting
a trustee to hold an estate open for thirteen years while awaiting proceeds from a lottery
ticket).
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the estate under the Bankruptcy Code, let us reflect a bit on the merits

of the case. Does MacLachlan's argument stand up to analysis?
Before we can answer this question, we must first address a more fundamental question: viz., what is the discharge supposed to accomplish
for society? Only after we pin down (if that is possible86) the policies
underlying the discharge can we proceed to consider whether inclu-

sion of expectancies in the bankruptcy estate conforms or conflicts
with those policies.

The discharge has given rise to a lively debate in recent years, a
debate made all the more intriguing by the subject's many-sidedness.

The idea of the fresh start can be probed from half a hundred different pedagogical angles, including history,8 7 political theory, 88 contract
86. Compare Lord Macnaghten on the rule in Shelley's Case: "[I]t is one thing to put
a case like Shelley's in a nutshell and another to keep it there." Van Grutten v. Foxwell,
1897 App. Cas. 658, 671.
87. The discharge was originally developed in Great Britain primarily as a device to
encourage debtors to disclose assets they had fraudulently concealed. 4 Anne ch. 17, preamble, §§ 1, 7, 17, 18 (1705) (Eng.); 10 Anne ch. 15 (1711) (Eng.); MACLACHLAN, supra
note 20, at 20-21, 88; see also Louis Edward Levinthal, The Early History of English Bankruptcy, 67 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 18-20 (1919). This aim also appeared in early American bankruptcy legislation, and it remains an acknowledged element of the discharge to this day.
PETER J. COLEMAN, DEBTORS AND CREDITORS IN AMERICA 12-13, 45, 270-71 (1974);
United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 447 (1973); Guardian Indus. Prods. v. Diodati (In re
Diodati), 9 B.R. 804, 809 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1981); WTHW Inv. Builders v. Dias (In re
Dias), 95 B.R. 419, 421 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1988); see 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(2)-(6) (1988) (denying discharge to uncooperative debtors). See generally CHARLES WARREN, BANKRUPTCY
IN UNITED STATES HISTORY (1935); Countryman, Bankruptcy and the Individual Debtor,
supra note 83, at 809-18; John C. McCoid II, The Origins of Voluntary Bankruptcy, 5
BANKR. DEV. J. 361 (1988). For ancient antecedents of the discharge, see Max Radin, The
Nature of Bankruptcy, 89 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 6 (1940); Charles G. Hallinan, The "Fresh
Start" Policy in Consumer Bankruptcy: A HistoricalInventory and an Interpretive Theory,
21 U. RICH. L. REV. 49, 53 n.11 (1986); see also Louis E. Levinthal, The Early History of
Bankruptcy Law, 66 U. PA. L. REV. 223, 225 (1918).
88. Early republican theorists feared that debt threatened the survival of a republic
because, as a lure to luxury and extravagance, it debased the "virtue" of its citizens and
made them subservient to creditors who were potential tyrants. In addition, some theorists
feared that a vibrant market for credit would push the United States toward commercialization and away from the agrarian economy they considered essential ballast for a republic. Thomas Jefferson (who never got out of debt himself) thus urged legal reforms to
make credit less attractive, and he stood opposed to federal bankruptcy legislation. EDMUND S. MORGAN, AMERICAN SLAVERY, AMERICAN FREEDOM 383-84 (1975); McCoY,
supra note 4, at 178-84; Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Thomas Pleasant (May 8, 1786),
in 9 PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 473 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1950); Letter from Thomas
Jefferson to Archibald Stuart (Jan. 25, 1786), in id. at 218; 17 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON 331-33 (Andrew A. Lipscomb & Albert E. Bergh eds., 1903); GORDON S.
WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, at 416-18 (1969); see also
Garry Wills, The Aesthete, 40 N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Aug. 12, 1993, at 6, 6 (discussing Jefferson's personal debt problems). Like many aspects of American republican ideology, these
concerns had English roots. See Paul H. Haagen, Imprisonment for Debt in England and
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theory, 89 natural law,90 libertarian philosophy91 (and its mirror image,
Wales 108-12 (1986) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Princeton University). And its ideological branches extend to the present: Special provisions for farmers under the Bankruptcy Code are a political vestige of the republican glorification of agrarianism. See David
Ray Papke, Rhetoric and Retrenchment: Agrarian Ideology and American Bankruptcy
Law, 54 Mo. L. REv. 871 (1989).
In another variation on this theme, some theorists feared that debtors facing stringent
debtor-creditor laws would be driven to revolt against the state, a prophecy fulfilled in
post-revolutionary Massachusetts. 2 WiLLIM BLAcKSrONrE, ComjMN xRs *472-73; for
an early discussion, see PLATO, THE COLLECrED DIALOGUES OF PLATO 784 (E. Hamilton
& H. Cairns eds., 1961); on debtor revolt, see ROBERT A. FEER, SHAYS'S REBELLION
(1988). From this political perspective, however, the discharge appears double-edged. On
the one hand, it encourages persons to get into debt and thus tends to promote commercial
speculation. On the other hand, the discharge provides an escape route from debt and
therefore could be viewed as a means of defusing the political threat of widespread debtor
subservience or unrest. The continued relevance of these early political concerns is, at any
rate, dubious in the latter-day republic, with its stronger state apparatus. One modern
bankruptcy court has offered a different political rationale for the discharge, turning agrarian republicanism on its head: Were each citizen restricted to "only one economic life,"
then the threat of a single economic failure "would frustrate and still the creative spirit
which lies at the heart of our democratic society." In re Bruno, 68 B.R. 101, 103 (Bankr.
W.D. Mo. 1986); similarly, see Polygram Distribution Inc. v. B.A. Sys., Inc. (In re BursteinApplebee Co.), 63 B.R. 1011, 1019 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1986) (asserting that absent the
"industry and creativity" preserved by the discharge "the predicate upon which our democratic institutions exist would stand in grave peril"); Chillicothe State Bank v. Carroll (In re
Carroll), 70 B.R. 143, 145 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1986) (asserting that the discharge is fundamental "to the preservation of... our national strength").
89. The discharge has been conceived as equivalent to a doctrine of impossibility covering contracts for credit. This is not the whole story of the discharge, since it-unlike
doctrines of contract excuse--cannot be waived or modified by the parties. But, were the
discharge simply conceived as a default rule built into the contract for credit, its utility as a
means of efficiently assigning risk of impossibility would be unclear. Pertinent considerations include: (1) the relative ability of debtor and creditor to bear (or insure against) the
risk, (2) the relative abilities of the parties to control the risk, (3) the assignee of risk most
bargaining parties would agree upon (which, if presumed, can avoid transaction costs), and
(4) the relative knowledge (or cost of information) of the parties concerning the extent of
the risk. For discussions in connection with bankruptcy, see POSNER, supra note 65, § 14.4,
at 402; Theodore Eisenberg, Bankruptcy Law in Perspective, 28 UCLA L. REv. 953, 981-83
(1981) [hereinafter Eisenberg, Bankruptcy Law]; Robert A. Hillman, ContractExcuse and
Bankruptcy Discharge,43 STAN. L. Rlv. 99 (1990); Margaret Howard, A Theory of Discharge in Consumer Bankruptcy, 48 OHIo ST. L.J. 1047, 1063-68 (1987); JACKSON, supra
note 25, at 228-30; Samuel A. Rea, Jr., Arm-Breaking, Consumer Credit and Personal
Bankruptcy, 22 EcON. INQUIRY 188, 191-92 (1984); John C. Weistart, The Costs of Bankruptcy, 41 L. & CoNTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1977, at 107, 111-12. For relevant contract law
discussions, see POSNER, supra note 65, §§ 4.1, 4.5; Anthony T. Kronman, Mistake, Disclosure,Information, and the Law of Contracts,7 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1978); Richard A. Posner
& Andrew M. Rosenfield, Impossibility and Related Doctrines in Contract Law: An Economic Analysis, 6 J. LEGAL STuD. 83 (1977); Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in
Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87 (1989).
90. Were the debtor to remain indefinitely in bankruptcy without a discharge, she
would lose her right to enjoy income or to sue for personal wrongs, except for the benefit
of the bankruptcy estate. Some have suggested that this state of affairs would leave the
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debtor "an outlaw, a mere slave to the trustee," which is contrary to natural justice. Ex
parte Vine (In re Wilson), 8 Ch. D. 364,366 (Eng. C.A. 1878); JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW
AND NATURAL RIGHTS 189 (1980); HENRY SIDGWICK, THE ELEMENTS OF POLITICS 93 (4th
ed. 1919) (1891); 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED

STATES 5-6 (1833). In a less quoted passage from the leading American opinion on the
discharge, Justice Sutherland similarly characterized the debtor's earning power as "in the
nature of a personal liberty quite as much as, if not more than, it is a property right." Local
Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 245 (1934); see also Boshkoff, supra note 20, at 112-13 &
n.169 (characterizing 1932 proposal to restrict the discharge condemned as "absolutely out
of step with our conception of liberty"); Uniform System of Bankruptcy: Joint Hearingson
S. 3866 Before the Subcomm. on S. 3866 of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary and the
Subcomm. on Bankruptcy Legislation of House Comm. on the Judiciary, 73d Cong., 1st
Sess. 546, 641, 743 (1932) ("UnAmerican"); MAcLACHLAN, supra note 20, § 122, at 113

(reporting National Bankruptcy Conference opposition to suspended discharge as "semipeonage"); Farmer's and Merchant's Bank v. Jones (In re Jones), 67 B.R. 484, 487 (Bankr.
W.D. Mo. 1985) (suggesting that without a discharge "the great indebtedness owed by the
debtors would make life nearly impossible for them"); Carroll,70 B.R. at 145 (asserting
that the discharge is "vital.. . to the preservation of the concept and practice of individual
freedom"). More recently, critics have characterized proposals to abolish consumer bankruptcy liquidation and offer discharge only in connection with a Chapter 13 "wage earner"
plan as contrary to the spirit of the other "13"-the Thirteenth Amendment. Countryman,
Bankruptcy and the Individual Debtor,supra note 83, at 826-27; Steven L. Harris, A Reply
to Theodore Eisenberg's Bankruptcy Law in Perspective, 30 UCLA L. REv. 327, 348-49,
360-61 (1982). For criticism of existing limitations of Chapter 7 relief on this basis, see
Karen Gross, Preserving a Fresh Start for the Individual Debtor: The Case for Narrow
Construction of the Consumer CreditAmendments, 135 U. PA. L. REv. 59, 69-70, 85 (1986)
(hereinafter Gross, Fresh Start); Karen Gross, The Debtor as Modern Day Peon: A Problem of UnconstitutionalConditions,65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 165 (1990). But rejecting this
analogy, see Eisenberg, Bankruptcy Law, supra note 89, at 988-89; Theodore Eisenberg,
Bankruptcy Law in Perspective: A Rejoinder, 30 UCLA L. REv. 617, 635-36 (1983) [hereinafter Eisenberg, A Rejoinder]; Thomas H. Jackson, The Fresh-StartPolicy in Bankruptcy
Law, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1393, 1405 n.38 (1985). For a recent opinion rejecting a constitutional challenge to its power (per § 707(b)) to refuse to grant relief under Chapter 7, see In
re Higginbotham, 111 B.R. 955, 967 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1990). But cf. In re Molina Y
Vedia, 150 B.R. 393, 398-400 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1992) (construing the discharge as embodied in § 541 in light of congressional intent to avoid any potential conflict with the Thirteenth Amendment).
91. Denying debtors the right to waive the discharge ex ante arguably violates their
autonomy. Such autonomy may be grounded on utilitarian ideology (assuming that individuals are the best judges of their own interests), on transcendental philosophy (assuming
that self-reliance and individual responsibility are morally compelled), or on existential
philosophy (assuming that the making of choices is an essential aspect of the human condition). 2 RALPH WALDO EMERSON, Self-Reliance, in THE COLLECTED WORKS OF RALPH
WALDO EMERSON 25 (Joseph Slater ed., 1979); MARTIN HEIDEGGER, BEING AND TIME
157-59 (John Macquarrie & Edward Robinson trans., 1962) (1927); JOHN STUART MILL,
ON LIBERTY 68-69, 141-43 (Gertrude Himmelfarb ed., Penguin Classics 1985) (1859). For
an early defense of autonomy in connection with debt, see Coleman, supra note 87, at 181
(quoting a South Carolinian commentator); and more recently, JOHN C. GRAY, RESTRAINTS ON THE ALIENATION OF PROPERTY at iii-v (2d ed. 1895). On the other hand, if
theorists are justified in describing hopeless insolvency as a form of slavery, see supra note
90, then it becomes possible to compare waiver of the discharge to subjection to the risk of
slavery. The right of voluntary consent to slavery is controversial, even within libertarian
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paternalism 92), moral philosophy, 93 distributive ethics, 94 cultural antheory, because it is a right that simultaneously upholds and undermines personal autonomy. GERALD DwoRK N, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF AUTONOMY 128-29 (1988);
DON HERZOG, HAPPY SLAvEs: A CRITIQUE OF CONSENT THEORY (1989); MIL, supra, at
172-73; Anthony T. Kronman, Paternalismand the Law of Contracts, 92 YALE LJ. 763,
774-86 (1983); Donald H. Regan, Justificationsfor Paternalism, in THE LIMITS OF LAW:
NoMos XV, at 189, 192-201 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1974). For
early discussions, compare THOMAS HOBBES, LEvrATrAN 255-56 (C.B. Macpherson ed.,
Penguin 1968) (1651); JoiiN LOCKE, Two TREATIsEs OF GOVERNMENT bk. 2, § 23, at 284

(Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) (1690). For discussions specifically in connection with bankruptcy, compare SrGVrcIcK, supra note 90, at 91-93; Kronman, supra, at
785-86; and JACKSON, supra note 25, at 233-34.
92. Making the discharge nonwaivable could be justified as a paternalistic move: protecting those persons who are prone to reckless borrowing from their own poor judgment
and the subsequent "regret" they would otherwise experience. That a significant class of
irrational borrowers exists is evident. See infra note 97. Though denying the equation of
insolvency and slavery, Professor Jackson argues that a nonwaivable right of discharge can
still be reconciled with libertarianism-that is, can be conceptualized as not paternalisticif we find that debtors (like Ulysses) recognize in themselves a susceptibility to some irrational temptation (here, to waive the discharge) and wish to prevent themselves ex ante
from succumbing to it. Such an act of "self-paternalism," since it is self-imposed, accords
with individual autonomy. JACKSON, supra note 25, at 234-35, 240-41 & n.43; GORDON
TULLOCK, THE LOGIC OF THE LAW 56 (2d ed. 1987). See generally JON ELSTER, ULYSSES
AND THE SIRENS: STUrIES IN RATIONALITY AND IRRATIONALITY 36-111 (1979). There is,

however, no reported empirical evidence of such a recognition and widespread political
preference in connection with contracts for credit. Thus, characterization of the nonwaivable right of discharge as self-paternalistic is problematic. See Jon Elster, Selfishness and
Altruism, in BEYOND SELF-INTEREST 44, 47 (Jane J. Mansbridge ed., 1990) ("Giving food
stamps instead of money is an example [of paternalism]. If the recipient had voted for this
mode of transfer it would be an unobjectionable form of self-paternalism, but that is not
how these decisions are made. They are taken by the welfare bureaucracy.")
Professor Jackson also argues that nonwaivability is not paternal because, irrespective
of current popular preferences, awareness of the temptation to waive the discharge and a
consequent move for nonwaivability "accords with the result of a hypothetical initial deliberation behind a Rawlsian 'veil of ignorance."' JACKSON, supra note 25, at 236-37, 241.
This argument appears too clever by half. To suggest that persons who fail to perceive
what is in their interest could perceive it if they engaged in a Rawlsian gedanken experiment does not alter the fact that they do not perceive it, and that others are accordingly
acting on their behalf. Indeed, that is part and parcel of the concept of paternalism! If
subjects would not perceive outside intervention to be in their best interest if in possession
of hypothetically perfect information, then the central moral justification for paternalistic
intervention-namely, that the paternalist spares the subject from regret-would disappear. See Regan, supra note 91, at 190-92. Rawlsian theory provides a justification for the
division of rights, by asking what rights persons would create before they knew their status
(as, say, a debtor or a creditor). It does not offer a way around the dilemma of
paternalism.
93. See infra notes 164-171 and accompanying text.
94. Because creditors demand an interest rate that will allow them to profit in the
aggregate, despite incidental debtor bankruptcies, the discharge produces a wealth transfer
from those debtors who avoid bankruptcy to those who succumb to it. Richard Posner has
described this transfer as a subsidy from the "prudent" to the "feckless," "a curious basis
on which to redistribute wealth!" POSNER, supra note 65, § 14.4, at 402; see also Eisenberg,
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thropology, 95 behavioral psychology, 96 even cognition and sociobiology. 97

But the conventional justification for the discharge,
articulated most famously (though hardly originally) in the Local
Bankruptcy Law, supra note 89, at 983. But the discharge can also be viewed as a form of
insurance against insolvency, in which capacity it redistributes wealth from the fortunate to
the unlucky-a less ethically troubling proposition. Part of the cost of the discharge may
also be borne by creditors and by society at large. Howard, supra note 89, at 1065-68.
95. Bankruptcy, and the discharge that culminates it, can be viewed as classic sort of
ostracism-cum-reinstatement ritual. For an example drawn from native American society,
see KARL N. LLEWELLYN & E. ADAMSON HOEBEL, THE CHEYENNE WAY 9-12 (1941).
The breaking of the bench was the original cultural ritual signaling the debtor's ostracism
(and giving bankruptcy its name). Israel Treiman, Acts of Bankruptcy: A Medieval Concept in Modern Bankruptcy Law, 52 HARV. L. REV. 189, 189-90 & n.2 (1938). On the
historical stigma of bankruptcy, see, for example, Adam Smith, An Inquiry Into the Nature
and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, reprinted in 39 GREAT BOOKS OF THE WESTERN

WORLD 1, 148 (Robert M. Hutchins ed., 1952) (1776); for a modern discussion, see McIntyre, supra note 41, at 128-33; see also Perry v. Commerce Loan Co., 383 U.S. 392, 395
(1966) (acknowledging historical stigma). While the modern American Bankruptcy Code
has sought to erase this stigma, individual creditors have striven to perpetuate it. For a
modern equivalent of the broken bench of old, see Turner Advertising Co. v. National
Serv. Corp. (In re National Serv. Corp.), 742 F.2d 859, 860 (5th Cir. 1984) (creditor advertised debtor's bankruptcy on billboards). The discharge proceeding, though discretionary
since 1986, remains ritualized to this day. 11 U.S.C. § 524(d) (1988). For a defense of the
ritual aspect of bankruptcy, see Ferdinand F. Stone, A Primeron Bankruptcy, 16 TUL. L.
REV. 339, 354, 361 (1942).
96. The discharge arguably functions to relieve the psychological trauma of financial
calamity, along with its common symptoms (depression, alcohol abuse, marital difficulty,
etc.). H.R. Doc. No. 137, supra note 22, pt. 1, at 53; Hallinan, supra note 87, at 73; G.
Stanley Joslin, The Philosophyof Bankruptcy-a Re-Examination, 17 U. FLA. L. REV. 189,
193 (1964); Kronman, supra note 91, at 785-86; see, e.g., Everett v. Judson, 228 U.S. 474
(1913) (debtor committed suicide); see also DAVID CAPLOVITz, CONSUMERS IN TROUBLE

273-89 (1974) (empirical study of the symptoms of debt); Lawrence M. Ginsburg & Sybil
A. Ginsburg, A Psychoanalytic View of Personal Bankruptcy, in THE LAST TABOO:
MONEY AS SYMBOL AND REALITY IN PSYCHOTHERAPY AND PSYCHOANALYSIS 70 (1986)

(case study of the symptoms of debt). But the psychological impact of a bankruptcy pro-

ceeding (which by tradition incorporates no psychological counseling) may not be unambiguously salutary. STANLEY & GIRTH, supra note 36, at 65-69; Howard, supra note 89, at

1060-61; Philip Shuchman, Theory and Reality in Bankruptcy: The Spherical Chicken, 41
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1977, at 66, 88-89.
97. Professor Jackson has argued that certain cognitive processes predispose persons
to act impulsively and to underestimate risk, thereby leading them "systematically" to
overconsume credit. These disabilities can serve to justify state intervention to prevent

persons from irrationally waiving their right to a discharge. JACKSON, supra note 25, at
228-43; see also Hallinan, supra note 87, at 109-18. But see In re Goodson, 130 B.R. 897,
903 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1991) (pointing to debtor's lack of self-control as a ground for
denying bankruptcy relief). A number of responses are in order. First, processes of cognition may operate systematically, but they do not tend uniformly toward the overconsumption of credit: For example, the empirically verified phenomenon of risk aversion also
affects social behavior. This psychological cross-current could just as easily incline persons
toward conservative borrowing. On the psychology of risk aversion, see Adam J. Hirsch &

William K.S. Wang, A QualitativeTheory of the Dead Hand, 68 IND. L.J. 1, 31 n.117 (1992);
cf. JACKSON, supra note 25, at 239-40 (downplaying risk aversion).
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Loan case,98 proceeds from the direction of economics. Put simply,
the discharge functions to avoid the social costs of insolvency. Without the discharge, a hopelessly insolvent debtor would lose her incentive to produce, preferring instead to consume leisure, and
administratively costly welfare benefits. 99 By restoring the debtor to
Second, to the extent that some persons today are prone to over-borrow, this proneness may well be partly (I dare say, largely) cultural in nature-a sequela to the rise of a
consumerist ethic that cherishes material possessions and encourages persons to favor
present over future consumption, coupled with the concurrent development of modem
marketing. These cultural attributes are notorious. See, e.g., DANmL HoRowrrz, Tim
MORALITY OF SPENDING (1985); OLNEY, supra note 35, at 118-84; VANCE PACKARD, Tim
HIDDEN PERSUADERS (1957); ROBERT B. SETTLE & PAMELA L. ALRECK, WHY THEY Buy
221-43 (1986); DAVID M. TUCKER, Tim DECLINE OF THRIFT IN AMERICA (1991). For
skeptics of sociobiological explanations of human behavior (e.g., Stephen Jay Gould, Cardboard Darwinism, N.Y. REv. BOOKS, Sept. 25,1986, at 47, reprintedin STEPHEN J. GOULD,
AN URCHiN IN rm STOma 26 (1987)), these aspects of our culture suggest an additional
explanation for observed patterns. For early discussions in connection with bankruptcy,
see Walter D. Coles, The Solicitor General'sBankruptcy Report and New Bankruptcy Bill,
18 A.B.A. J. 293, 293-94 (1932) (describing the rise of consumerism as a cause of insolvency, but also characterizing debtors as "honest optimists"); Douglas, supra note 20, at
348-50 (citing "seductive" sales techniques and "excessive optimism"); see also Hallinan,
supra note 87, at 67-68, 77-78; cf. id. at 81-82.
Third, whatever its organic and/or environmental origins, the existence of an identifiable class of "credit card junkies" has now been confirmed empirically. SULLWvAN ETr AL.,
supra note 36, at 184-90. But if the discharge does function to protect these persons from
their own bad judgment, one may observe that it is merely a palliative remedy, for it makes
no effort to cure their behavioral tendencies. Debtor education has long been urged by
other commentators, and Jackson's analysis could be applied to underscore its importance,
but it has never been incorporated into formal bankruptcy process. H.R. Doc. No. 137,
supra note 22, pt. 2, at 52-53; NATIONAL COMMISSION, supra note 36, at 193-200; Hallinan,
supra note 87, at 78-80, 133-34; Howard, supra note 89, at 1060; cf Hallinan, supra note 87,
at 134-35; JACKSON, supra note 25, at 239-40 (questioning the capability and cost-effectiveness of debtor education); but see James A. MacLachlan, PuritanicalTherapy for Wage
Earners,68 COM. L.J. 87, 89 (1963) (arguing that a Chapter 13 proceeding is itself salutary,
in that it "can contribute substantially to the elementary business education of many debtors"); Jack L. Van Baalen, Bankruptcy Code Chapter 13-What Price the "Better Discharge"?, 35 OKLA. L. Rlv. 455, 485-86 (1982) (same). A conclusion that propensities to
over-borrowing are linked to genetics would not imply that educational efforts will prove
ineffectual. Even sociobiologists reject the notion of biological determinism. See Peter
Singer, Ethics and Sociobiology, 11 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 40, 61 (1982).
Finally, a mandatory rule overriding irrational undervaluation of the discharge, standing alone, will not work unequivocally to the advantage of debtors, because that same
undervaluation may irrationally drive down demand for credit once its price is adjusted to
reflect the actual cost of the discharge. For an economic analysis, see Rea, supra note 89,
at 189-91.
98. Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 242-43 (1934).
99. In some reported cases insolvent debtors quit their jobs. E.g., In re Keebler, 106
B.R. 662 (Bankr. D. Haw. 1989); see also In re Graham, 21 B.R. 235, 238-39 (Bankr. N.D.
Iowa 1982) (recognizing the danger that debtors denied a discharge would cease employment). (Subjection to wage garnishment also often resulted historically in involuntary loss
of employment, but such action by employers is illegal under modem federal and state
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solvency, the discharge simultaneously removes the debtor's incentive

to rely on inefficient state aid and renews her incentive to contribute
to the gross national product. 10 0 In this respect, the utility of the dis-

charge is not unequivocal, for it has a second economic edge' 01 : As a
form of insurance against insolvency, the discharge creates incentives
legislation. See 15 U.S.C. § 1674 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).) An analogy can be drawn here
to the economic theory of taxation. Like taxes, indebtedness reduces one's net return from
labor, though the consequence of that reduction is unclear. One may be stimulated to
greater labor to make up for the tax (the "wealth effect"), or one may be stimulated to
substitute leisure for labor because, as a valuable good, leisure is now relatively less costly
(the "price effect"). In the case of hopeless insolvency-like confiscatory taxation-the
price effect swamps the wealth effect. See WALTER J. BLUM & HARRY KALVEN, JR., THE
UNEASY CASE FOR PROGRESSIVE TAXATION 21-23 (1953). Still, to the extent persons enjoy their jobs, or are simply habituated to a work routine, their productivity may not suffer
(or suffer as badly as we would expect) in the event of insolvency. See Arthur A. Leff,
Injury, Ignorance and Spite-The Dynamics of Coercive Collection, 80 YALE L.J. 1, 15 &
n.42 (1970) (discussing wage garnishment). See generally THE NATURE OF WORK: SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES (Kai Erikson & Steven P. Vallas eds., 1990); ROBERT E. LANE,
THE MARKET EXPERIENCE 235-422 (1991); F. Thomas Juster, Preferencesfor Work and
Leisure, in TIME, GOODS, AND WELL-BEING 333 (F. Thomas Juster & Frank P. Stafford
eds., 1985); Curt Tausky, Work is Desirable/Loathsome: Marx Versus Freud, 19 WORK &
OCCUPATIONS 3 (1992).
100. In the classic language of Justice Sutherland, the discharge provides debtors "a
new opportunity in life and a clear field for future effort, unhampered by the pressure and
discouragement of pre-existing debt." Local Loan, 292 U.S. at 244; for analogous statements see, for example, UNIFORM SYSTEM OF BANKRUPTCY, H.R. REP. No. 65,55th Cong.,
2d Sess. 32 (1897); H.R. Doc. No. 137, supra note 22, pt. 2, at 71, 68-74; MACLACHLAN,
supra note 20, at 88; see also FRIED, supra note 66, at 108-09 (1981) (emphasizing avoidance of the need for social welfare assistance); POSNER, supra note 65, § 14.4, at 402 (noting as a social cost of discharge denial the extended intervention by the judicial system
required to supervise a gradual repayment plan). For earlier expressions of this rationale
see, for example, 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 88, at *483-84; COLEMAN, supra note 87, at
271; McCoY, supra note 4, at 180; SIDGWICK, supra note 90, at 93; 3 STORY, supra note 90,
at 5-6; WARREN, supra note 87, at 159; Hallinan, supra note 87, at 57 n.24, 66 n.69; Williams
v. U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co, 236 U.S. 549, 554-55 (1915) (and earlier cases cited
therein); Stellwagen v. Clum, 245 U.S. 605, 617 (1918) (and earlier cases cited therein).
Such rhetoric had roots in prior condemnations of imprisonment for debt. On this antecedent strain of ideology, see DONALD VEALL, THE POPULAR MOVEMENT FOR LAW REFORM 1640-1660, at 145-51 (1970); COLEMAN, supra note 87, at 250, 271; see also Jay
Cohen, The History of Imprisonmentfor Debt and its Relation to the Development of Discharge in Bankruptcy, 3 J. LEGAL HIST. 153 (1982). Still another branch of this rhetoric has
grown up to support the extension of poor relief. 2 JOHN STUART MILL, PRINCIPLES OF
POLITICAL ECONOMY bk. 5, ch. 11, § 13, at 468-69 (The Colonial Press rev. ed. 1899)
(1848).
101. And a third one: for one must also consider the impact of the discharge on creditors, who are thereby denied satisfaction of their debts. Such denial may render some
creditors dependent on state support, which again entails social costs. The Bankruptcy
Code operates to blunt this edge of the discharge, however, by excepting from its coverage
certain creditors who would otherwise likely fall into this category. Thus, alimony and
child support obligations are not discharged in bankruptcy. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5) (1988).
On the other hand, all creditors who suffer bad debt losses as a result of the discharge pass
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for individuals to risk higher loads of debt. 10 2 But the marginal significance of this "moral hazard"'10 3 is probably small, for absent the discharge insolvent debtors would still be substantially judgment-proof
(and potentially eligible for state welfare), a circumstance creating

similar incentives for reckless borrowing. 1°4
The bar on ex ante waivers of the right of discharge also follows
from this economic theory. Because the social costs of insolvency are
external to the contract for credit, the bargaining parties would not
bear the full cost of an agreement to foreclose the fresh start. 0 5 At
part of them on to society, interalia, by deducting them from their taxable income. STANLEY & GmTH,supra note 36, at 37-39.
102. POSNER, supra note 65, § 14.4, at 402; Hallinan, supra note 87, at 83-84, 98-109;
Weistart, supra note 89, at 110. This criticism is an old one. 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 88,
at *473; COLEMAN, supra note 87, at 181, 273-74, 281; McCoy, supra note 4, at 183-84;
HENRY SmGwIcK, THE PRNcIPLEs OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 430 (3d ed. 1901) (1883);
Hallinan, supra note 87, at 67 n.73. But cf.BAiRD,supra note 55, at 33-34 (noting that the
moral hazard here is small, given the other costs to the debtor of reckless borrowing).
103. On this problem, which arises in connection with all forms of insurance, see Mark
V. Pauly, The Economics of Moral Hazard." Comment, 58 AM. ECON. REv. 531, 531-35
(1968); Kenneth J. Arrow, The Economics of Moral Hazard.- Further Comment, 58 AM.
ECON. REv. 537 (1968).
104. Hirsch, supra note 25, at 619. The incentive to recklessness created by stringent
insolvency laws was noticed early. COLEMAN, supra note 87, at 281-82; for a recent recapitulation, see Joslin, supra note 96, at 193. Compare Professor Jackson's argument that a
right of discharge operates to mitigate the moral hazard of borrowing. According to Jackson, the discharge shifts "the risk of ill-advised credit decisions" from social insurance to
creditors, who are better able to monitor debtors and thereby to check their propensities to
over-consume credit. JACKSON, supra, note 25, at 230-31. The difficulty with this analysis
is that, even in the absence of a discharge, creditors still bear the private cost of a default. It
is only the social cost of default (cessation of labor, etc.) that falls on society, and this does
not shift to creditors if the discharge is available-it simply disappears, given the debtor's
renewed incentive to productivity. Because creditors must suffer the private cost of a default irrespective of whether the right to a discharge exists, they will monitor debtors to
avoid over-borrowing under either hypothetical legal regime. And if a discharge raises
incentives to over-borrowing above the level that would exist without it, as it is bound
marginally to do, then private costs (in terms of monitoring plus defaults not efficiently
preventable) must accordingly rise. Of course, social costs will simultaneously fall-that is
the cutting edge of this legal sword-but not as a result of a shift in the risk of default.
105. The point is hinted at in Local Loan:
This purpose of the act has been again and again emphasized by the courts as
being of public as well as private interest ....
... To preserve [the] free exercise [of the power to earn a living] is of the
utmost importance.., because it is a matter of great public concern. From the
viewpoint of the wage earner there is little difference between not earning at all
and earning wholly for a creditor. Pauperism may be the necessary result of
either.
Local Loan, 292 U.S. at 244-45. For a further elaboration, see Hallinan, supra note 87, at
118-32; JACKSON, supra note 25, at 230-32, 243-48, 256-57; Weistart, supra note 89, at 111.
Avoiding external costs in order to achieve efficiency is a classic justification for contract

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 45

the same time, the parties are not significantly injured by the loss of
this opportunity, for an ex ante waiver is of marginal value to lenders:
If prevented from seeking a discharge, an insolvent debtor could still
stymie her creditors by ceasing to produce property against which
they could levy. Hence, by mandating an unwaivable right of discharge, lawmakers avoid external costs without significantly distorting
10 6
the cost of credit.
Now, how does MacLachlan's policy analysis fit into this economic model of discharge? The nub of the argument is the hypothesis
that expectancies are ordinarily "independent of the debtor's economic efforts. 1 0 7 If this assertion were true, then we could conclude
in short order that prospects of inheritance ought not come under the
discharge-ever. Once we stipulate, first, that the purpose of the discharge is to encourage economic effort, and, second, that inheritances
do not follow from economic effort, then logically the fresh start need
not include them. The syllogism demonstrates that freeing inheritances from the debtor's pre-existing obligations will fail to advance
the ends of bankruptcy law.
Yet, one may join issue with Professor MacLachlan's minor premise. Certainly, his commentary is well taken in connection with future
interests that will vest vel non on the basis of extraneous contingencies. The modern Bankruptcy Code reflects this logic (better even
than the Chandler Act did) by capturing for the bankruptcy estate all
future interests of the debtor, whenever they vest. 10 8 But MacLachIan's reasoning becomes problematic when extended to expectancies
generally. His terse analysis oversimplifies the social and economic
context in which inheritances are conferred.
In examining this problem, it may be helpful to distinguish three
basic scenarios under which inheritances may descend in connection
regulation. See, e.g., ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 43-51

(1988); Jackson, supra note 90, at 1418; Regan, supra note 91, at 201-06.
106. The point was recognized early: "The instances are rare of debtors who under
such circumstances ever acquire enough afterwards to pay their old debts; and thus.., the
existing law [offering no discharge] is seldom of any advantage to the creditor, whilst it is
injurious to the debtor, and to community in which he resides." COLEMAN, supra note 87,
at 271 (quoting Joseph Cutler, 1853); see also SIDGWICK, supra note 90, at 93; Coles, supra
note 97, at 297, 350. For modern discussions, see STANLEY & GIRTH, supra note 336, at 3739; Shuchman, supra note 96, at 82-83. But see William H. Meckling, FinancialMarkets,
Default, and Bankruptcy: The Role of the State, 41 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn
1977, at 13, 29; CREDIT RESEARCH CENTER, CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY STUDY: CONSUMERS' RIGHT TO BANKRUPTCY-ORIGINS AND EFFECTS 81-100 (1982).
107. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
108. See supra note 13.
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with bankruptcy. First, the debtor's benefactor may be mentally com-

petent and physically capable of action when the debtor seeks bankruptcy relief. Second, the benefactor may be irreversibly non compos
mentis or physically in extremis at that time. Third, whatever the benefactor's mental and physical state, he may have no direct sociological
links with the debtor; the debtor could have no inkling of the expectancy in her favor until the day she receives the good news by registered mail. This last scenario, incidentally, is recognized in the lore, if
not the law, of inheritance as giving rise to the "laughing heir," the
beneficiary who takes in default of close relatives of the decedent. 10 9
While the scenario usually arises in connection with intestacy, there
has been the occasional "laughing legatee" as well."10
In fact, only the laughing heir truly falls into the category of persons who do nothing to "earn" their inheritances. Some courts, echoing MacLachIan, have characterized inheritances as windfalls"visitations of the fickle goddess of fortune," as one judge has put
it."' But this description rarely befits inheritances by grieving (as opposed to laughing) beneficiaries. To be sure, benefactors leave assets
to members of their family in part because they identify their own
welfare with that of their relatives-a phenomenon the economists in109. Though the law makes no specific provisions concerning laughing heirs, it nonetheless minimizes the opportunities for inheritance beyond the social network of the benefactor by limiting intestate inheritance in most jurisdictions to the second collateral line of
the decedent's blood relatives. More distant relatives do not qualify as heirs, and in default
of nearer relatives the decedent's property escheats to the state. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE
§§ 2-103, 2-105 (1991).
110. George McGovern, the Democratic Party's nominee for President of the United
States in 1972, was a laughing legatee, under circumstances that drip with irony. McGovern's original political platform called for a 100% federal estate tax-effectively abolishing
inheritance-on gross estates above $500,000. He lost. Six years later, in 1978, McGovern
inherited the bulk of the estate (amounting to some $200,000 after taxes) of an "eccentric
spinster," whom he did not know, but who had "admired his politics"-which he gratefully
accepted. Eileen Shanahan, McGovern Callsfor Tax Reform, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 1972, at
14; Eileen Keerdoja et al., Living Well Is the Best Revenge, NEWSWEEK, May 23, 1983, at
12-13.
111. Strom v. Wood, 164 P. 1100, 1102 (Kan. 1917) (West, J.). Likewise characterizing
inheritances as windfalls or analogizing them to lottery winnings, see, for example, In re
Shepard's Estate, 32 A. 1040, 1041 (Pa. 1895); In re Kalt's Estate, 108 P.2d 401, 403 (Cal.
1940); In re Lybrook, 951 F.2d 136, 138 (7th Cir. 1991) (Posner, J.). MacLachlan himself
described inheritances as "in the nature of a windfall," see supra note 77, and other bankruptcy (but not inheritance!) scholars have offered like characterizations. E.g., 4A CoLLIER, supra note 5, § 70.37, at 460; 3 REMINGTON, supra note 13, § 1217, at 61-62.
Accordingly, § 541(a)(5) has sometimes been called the "windfall clause." Douglas Q.
Wickham, Chapter 7 or Chapter13: Guiding Consumer Debtor Choice Under the Bankruptcy Reform Act, 58 N.C. L. REv. 815, 817 (1980).
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sist on calling "interdependent utility functions. ' 112 But benefactors
also make bequests because their beneficiaries behave in ways that
give them personal satisfaction. Like wage laborers, beneficiaries do,
1 3
in some sense, earn their inheritances.1
Needless to say, there are limits to the analogy of inheritances to
wages; gratuitous transfers do differ from classical employment contracts in important ways. Wages ordinarily trace to specific economic
activities and obligations and bear a direct relation to the economic
value of the services rendered. Bequests, by contrast, ordinarily trace
to a diffuse constellation of unstipulated social services (semantically
summarized in some testamentary instruments as "love and affection"), and they vary in size according to the available resources of the
benefactor. Still, these distinctions are hardly crystal clear. Service
agreements often sketch out the employee's responsibilities vaguely,
and the earnings they generate may include elements of gratuity, especially when the employee is a member of the employer's family or
social network. 1 4 When the element of gratuity predominates, we
have a word for it-we call the employment a sinecure. Similarly,
some employees (notably performers) earn income, at least in part, by
winning the "love and affection" of their employers1 5-a fact that
may help to explain why performers' earnings, like gratuities, often
seem to bear no rational relation to the services rendered. By the
112.

E.g., Gary Becker, A Theory of Social Interaction, 82 J. POL. ECON. 1063, 1074-83

(1974), reprinted in GARY BECKER, THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO HUMAN BEHAVIOR

253-81 (1976). Adam Smith, who also discussed the phenomenon, labeled it "sympathy."
ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS 3 (Dugald Stewart ed., rev. ed.,

London, Henry G. Bohn 1853) (1759).
113. On the willingness of courts to recognize this functional reality, see infra note 188
and accompanying text. The contrary notion, that gratuitous transfers are devoid of any
economic significance, has been floated by some contracts scholars and applied to justify
the refusal of the law to enforce promises to make gifts. One recent critic suggests that
such assertions "reflect little more than mercantilist prejudice." Kull, supra note 66, at 49;
see id. at 47-50; cf Lawrence M. Friedman, The Law of the Living, the Law of the Dead:
Property, Succession, and Society, 1966 WIs. L. REV. 340, 353, 355 (describing gifts and
bequests as consistent with a system of free market transfers of personal property).
114. For a nice illustration of such a network, simultaneously employing and giving, see
Garry Wills, FatherKnows Best, 39 N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Nov. 5, 1992, at 36 (discussing the
network surrounding Prescott Bush). In addition, commercial exchange sometimes takes
the form of reciprocal gifts (nowadays often of information). For an anthropological dis-

cussion,

see CLAUDE LEvI-STRAUSS, THE ELEMENTARY STRUCTURES OF KINSHIP

52-68

(rev. ed. 1969); for a brief modern treatment, see ARTHUR A. LEFF,SWINDLING AND SELL.
ING 141-43 (1976).

115. Employers often make (ostensible) "gifts" to their employees, and some even
leave them testamentary bequests. For an example (better known for its legal implications
1955).
than its factual setting), see Farkas v. Williams, 125 N.E.2d 600 (Ill.
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same token, gratuitous transfers may arise out of explicit bargains for
specific services, a circumstance acknowledged, both linguistically and
legally, by the creation of the hybrid legal categories of conditional
bequests and contracts to make wills.116 The line between earnings
and gratuities is surely visible to the naked eye-but the closer one
117
looks the blurrier it becomes.

These social facts have not escaped scholarly notice, at least
within the field of inheritance law. From Bracton's De Legibus,
scrivened in the thirteenth century, to Page on Wills, typed in the
twentieth, commentators have justified freedom of testation on the
ground that it promotes socially productive behavior by beneficiaries.1 s The point should not be exaggerated, for persons obviously
116. The very concept of a contract to make a will-a bound gratuity-appearsto be a
contradiction in terms. But this seeming contradiction derives precisely from the illusory
purity of the terms themselves-it is a conceptual solecism that in itself helps to clue us
into the fact that the bright line we think we see between these categories is in reality an
image created by artificial light.
Not surprisingly, courts struggling to classify contracts to make wills have disagreed
over whether they constitute expectancies or choses-in-action for purposes of inclusion in a
bankruptcy estate. Cf In re Lage, 19 F.2d 153, 154-55 (N.D. Iowa 1927) (holding that a
joint will, reflecting a binding covenant not to revoke the will, created no vested interest in
the beneficiary); In re Meiburg, 1 F. Supp. 892, 894-95 (N.D. Iowa 1932) (same); In re
Bryson, 49 F.2d 408, 409-10 (N.D. Tex. 1931) (holding that the debtor's remainder interest
under contractual joint will did constitute a vested interest).
117. For discussions of the cultural anthropology and economy of gratuities, emphasizing their existence within a culture of implicit reciprocity, see KENNETH E. BOULDING,
EVOLUTIONARY ECONOMICS 50-54 (1981); DAVID CHEAL, THE GIr ECONOMY (1988);
Carol M. Rose, Giving, Trading, Thieving, and Trusting: How and Why Gifts Become Exchanges, and (More Importantly) Vice Versa, 44 FLA. L. REv. 295 (1992) (and commentaries following); and the sources cited in Jane B. Baron, Gifts, Bargains,and Forms,64 IND.
L.J. 155,194-98 (1989); Hirsch, supranote 25, at 630 nn.203-05; Hirsch & Wang, supra note
97, at 9 n.30; see also the brief but provocative discussion in JESSE DUKEMINIER & STANLEY M. JOHANSON, WILLs, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 6-8 (3d ed. 1984) (omitted from the 4th
ed.). The haziness of the distinction between gifts and income has caused knotty problems
for courts presented with the issue of classifying financial transfers for tax purposes. William A. Klein, An Enigma in the FederalIncome Tax: The Meaning of the Word 'Gift', 48
MINN. L. REv. 215 (1963). A number of tax theorists have proposed to merge the two
categories and tax all wealth transfers as income, as a matter of tax policy. HENRY SIMONS,
PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION: THE DEFINITION OF INCOME As A PROBLEM OF FISCAL
POLICY 56-58, 134-47 (1938); Joseph M. Dodge, Beyond Estate and Gift Tax Reform: Including Gifts and Bequests in Income, 91 HARv. L. REv. 1177 (1978); Maijorie E. Komhauser, The ConstitutionalMeaning of Income and the Income Taxation of Gifts, 25 CONN.
L. REv. 1 (1992); John McNulty, FundamentalAlternatives to Present Transfer Tax Systems,
in DEATH, TAXES AD FAMILY PROPERTY 96-97 (Edward Halbach, Jr. ed., 1977). For a
related legal problem caused by categorical ambiguity, see infra note 188.
118. 2 HENRY DE BRACTON, ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND 182 (George
E. Woodbine ed. & Samuel E. Thorne ed. & trans., 1968) (ins. c. 1230); 1 WILLIAM H.
PAGE, ON THE LAW OF WILLS § 1.7, at 28 (William J. Bowe & Douglas H. Parker eds.,
1960 & Supp. 1993) (citing to judicial authorities). The social utility of the benefactor-
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are moved to care for each other by more than the prospect of reward.
At the same time, the point should be not be shrugged off. As King
Lear learned the hard way, our children might behave quite differently toward us were inheritance abolished (or made mandatory).1 1 9
120
It is a tie, albeit one of many, that binds families together.
With all of this in mind, we can begin to integrate inheritance
theory into bankruptcy theory. A debtor who becomes hopelessly insolvent will not only be disinclined to engage in ordinary economic
labor; to the extent that creditors can also levy against her expectancies, the debtor will have a disincentive to engage in the sorts of behavior that occasion gratuitous transfers. By granting the debtor a
discharge, the law rekindles the debtor's interest in selling her labor;
and by including inherited assets within the ambit of the discharge, the
law also encourages her to produce "social capital"' 2 1-that is, social
resources derived from reciprocal benevolence-whereby the aged
may be provided with care, comfort, and other aspects of filial
devotion.
Such an analysis is not completely alien to the thinking of those
judges who have taken the time and trouble to contemplate the problem. The Supreme Court in Local Loan spoke generally of the need
to give the debtor a "new opportunity in life" and a "clear field for
future effort,"' 22 and in a subsequent dictum in Segal v. Rochelle the
Court amplified the point, asserting that the aim of the discharge was
"to leave the bankrupt free after the date of his petition to accumulate
new wealth in the future.' 23 That meant the expectancy of future
wages did not qualify for inclusion in the bankruptcy estate, "nor,
analogously, [did] an intended bequest to [the debtor] or a promised
gift-even though state law might permit all of these to be alienated in
24
advance.'
The opinion in Segal offered no explicit rationale for consolidating its analysis of future wages and future gratuities, but the Court's
beneficiary relation is not universally accepted. For a further discussion, see Hirsch &
Wang, supra note 97, at 9-11.
119. See WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, KING LEAR.
120. The point first struck me in college, when it became apparent to me-perhaps the
reader has had a similar experience-that my rich friends were far more concerned about
their relationships with their parents than my poor friends. Prospects of inheritance (and
the loss of it) even lay somewhere in the back of the mind of the young John F. Kennedy.
NIGEL HAMILTON, JFK: RECKLESS YOUTH 155, 713 (1992).
121. JAMES S. COLEMAN, FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL THEORY 300-21 (1990).
122. Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 245 (1934).
123. Segal v. Rochelle, 382 U.S. 375, 379 (1966).
124. Id. at 379-80.
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readiness to do so suggests an intuitive recognition that the two, if not
conceptual twins, are at least related. 12 A little-remarked line of
cases, addressing the treatment of insurance contracts owned by the
debtor but covering the lives of others, offers a still more pertinent
strain of reasoning. Life insurance contracts are ordinarily exempt
from creditors' claims under Section 522, the exemption provision of
the Bankruptcy Code, 126 yet the six-month window created by Section
541(a)(5) includes a subsection reserving for the bankruptcy estate the
proceeds of life insurance that, like bequests, become due within a
half-year of bankruptcy. 127 When the debtor owns a policy on the life
of another' 28 these two provisions conflict, and the circuit courts have
split in resolving whether proceeds under these circumstances are exempt per se under the Code's exemption provision or includable per
29
se under the six-month window.
The Ninth Circuit reconciled the two sections by distinguishing
"ownership" rights from rights to proceeds, asserting that Section 522
125. Cases arising prior to the Chandler Act drew the same relationship implicitly,
defending the discharged debtor's right to retain a subsequent inheritance on the ground
that "[i]t is the theory of the Bankruptcy Act that ... [it] leaves to [the debtor] future
prospects and rights which materialize at a future day." Baker v. Shoun (In re Baker), 13
F.2d 707,708 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 273 U.S. 733 (1926); see also Bank of Elberton v. Swift
(In re Swift), 268 F. 305, 306 (5th Cir. 1920) (stating that one of the main purposes of the
Bankruptcy Act is to protect after-acquired property from creditors' claims).
126. 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(7) (1988), and analogous state exemption laws, which are effective in bankruptcy under 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(2)(A) (1988). On the development and
proliferation of the exemption for life insurance under state law, see William A. Brackney,
Creditors' Rights in Life Insurance, PROB. & PROP., Mar./Apr. 1993, at 52; Stefan A. Riesenfeld, Life Insuranceand Creditors'Remedies in the United States, 4 UCLA L. REv. 583
(1957). Where life insurance is not exempt and is owned by the debtor (or where the
benefactor's designation of the debtor as beneficiary is irrevocable), the policy becomes
part of the bankruptcy estate and can be used to satisfy creditors. Countryman, The Use of
State Law, supra note 22, at 447 (citing to case law).
127. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(5)(C) (1988).
128. Although this scenario may seem odd on first glance, it is no oddity to estate
planners. Benefactors who purchase life insurance on their own lives are commonly advised to give their unmatured policies to the intended beneficiaries as gifts. Because the
policies balloon in value at death, their transfer inter vivos generates estate tax efficiencies.
And the result is that beneficiaries then own unmatured insurance policies on other persons' lives. For a discussion, see JESSE DUKEMINIER & STANLEY M. JOHANSON, WILLS,
TRUSTS, AND EsTATms 982-83 (4th ed. 1990).
129. Compare the usual case where a debtor holds a policy on her own life. The policy
constitutes exempt property under 11 U.S.C. § 522 (1988), but suppose it is the debtor
herself who then dies within six months of bankruptcy. Can the debtor's creditors claim
the proceeds of the matured policy under § 541(a)(5)(C)? The answer is no. The proceeds, whether they flow directly under the terms of the contract to a third party beneficiary or through the debtor's own probate estate to beneficiaries, never become property of
the debtor, and hence do not go to her bankruptcy estate. Redfield v. Ansbro (In re
Goldberg), 98 B.R. 353, 358-59 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1989).
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protects the insurance contract only if it does not become payable

within six months of bankruptcy. 130 This result may well be correct as
a matter of technical statutory construction,' 3 ' but the Fourth Circuit
disagreed, holding that Section 522 should preempt Section 541(a)(5)
when the proceeds stem from an insurance contract owned by the
debtor. A debtor who retains ownership of an insurance policy after
bankruptcy will be obliged to continue to pay premiums under the
policy, the court observed, and "if the debtor fulfills his contractual
obligations [postpetition] ... he should not be denied the benefits of

the contractual relationship. In this sense, proceeds do not represent a
windfall .... ,,132
Thus did the Fourth Circuit cut through the Code and down to
the quick. Were debtors denied the proceeds of their insurance contracts following bankruptcy, they would lose their incentive to maintain their coverage. The six-month window should not apply when the
death benefits at issue are contingent upon the debtor's further efforts.
Presumably the Fourth Circuit would apply the same logic to will contracts and conditional bequests, even if they matured within six
months of bankruptcy, so long as they called for explicit postpetition
services by the beneficiary. Such cases would raise an analogous conflict between Section 541(a)(5) and (a)(6), excepting from the bankruptcy estate postpetition "earnings from services."' 33 But, in fact, to
apply this principle to the implicit social services that underlie virtu130. Woodson v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. (In re Woodson), 839 F.2d 610, 618, 620 (9th
Cir. 1988); accord In re McAlister, 56 B.R. 164, 166 (Bankr. D. Or. 1985); In re Poynor, 68
B.R. 919, 922 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1987), affid sub nom. Cyrak v. Poynor, 80 B.R. 75 (N.D.
Tex. 1987). See also In re Sharik, 41 B.R. 388, 390 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1984), where the court
held that a debtor's death benefits as beneficiary under a life insurance contract owned by
his spouse, who died within six months of debtor's bankruptcy, became property of the
estate under § 541(a)(5)(C), despite the fact that the decedent spouse was a codebtor in
the debtor's bankruptcy proceeding and had claimed the asset as exempt with respect to
her petition.
131. "The analysis advanced by [the debtor] . . . overlooks the distinction between
owning a policy and being its beneficiary .... Section 522 deals with one interest, Section
541 with the other. That the debtor in this case happened to wear both hats is of no consequence." Woodson, 839 F.2d at 618.
132. BancOhio Nat'l Bank v. Walters, 724 F.2d 1081, 1083 (4th Cir. 1984) (emphasis
added).
133. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(6) (1988). Compare Hooker v. Peterson, 204 S.W. 858 (Tenn.
1918), decided prior to the Chandler Act, where a debtor contracted with a benefactor to
provide labor as consideration for a bequest. Services continued until the benefactor's
death, ten months after the debtor's bankruptcy petition. The court held that this contract
was not property of the estate, because "[i]t could not be known .

.

. whether ...

[the

debtor] would continue to perform the services, . . . or whether he would fail so to do
through inability, .

.

. or through his own purpose." Id. at 860.
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ally every gratuitous transfer requires no colossal stretch of logic. At

least with regard to "grieving" heirs, there are no unearned windfalls
at all.
Yet, this argument may contain the seeds of a potent counterargument. For if inheritances are earned, in some sense of the word,
then it becomes necessary to ask when they are earned. By tradition,
the Bankruptcy Code has distinguished between earnings accrued pre-

and postpetition, allocating to creditors all nonexempt property accumulated prior to bankruptcy. 3 4 The fresh start, in other words, oper-

ates prospectively. This doctrine follows readily from discharge
theory, which aims to restore the debtor's incentive to engage in productive activity. Prior to the hopelessness that prompted the bankruptcy proceeding, the debtor had every incentive to produce, and the
fruits of that labor can be confiscated without cost to society. 3 5 Yet,
when a debtor inherits, hasn't she "earned" her bequest not at the
precise moment when it vests, but rather over a protracted period of
time? If we analogize expectancies to employment income, is not deferred income the more precise analogy, which under traditional analysis would flow back into the bankruptcy estate to the extent that it
traced to services rendered prepetition, irrespective of when it was

actually paid?

36

134. See supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text.
135. One could, in fact, argue that there is some utility in applying the discharge retroactively, for there will in practice be some hiatus between the onset of insolvency and the
petition in bankruptcy. Debtors in general slide gradually into bankruptcy, and those anticipating an imminent petition may be less productive in the months leading up to it than
they would have been otherwise. By awarding a discharge as of, say, four months priorto
bankruptcy, the law might modify debtors' productive incentives over that period, thereby
avoiding antecedent social costs (and also helping to ensure that anticipation of bankruptcy
is not a self-fulfilling prophecy). By denying debtors the right to discharge debts for "luxury goods and services" incurred within 40 days of bankruptcy, lawmakers have already
acknowledged the need to deter detrimental conduct by debtors in anticipation of bankruptcy (and, of course, by avoiding preferences made within 90 days of bankruptcy,
lawmakers have taken similar precautions against prescient creditors). 11 U.S.C.
§§ 523(a)(2)(C), 547 (1988). But relative to the distortions avoided by these provisions, the
social costs stemming from depressed laboriousness in anticipation of bankruptcy may be
insignificant.
136. For an early discussion, see Stein v. Leibowitt (In re Leibowitt), 93 F.2d 333, 335
(3d Cir. 1937), cert denied, 303 U.S. 652 (1938). For a recent discussion in connection with
a professional football contract, see In re Clark, 891 F.2d 111, 115 (5th Cir. 1989). Courts
have divided over the technical application of such an analysis. So long as deferred income
was earned entirely prepetition it makes no difference when the income was ultimately
paid over. E.g., Hebermehl v. United States (In re Hebermehl), 132 B.R. 651, 653-54
(Bankr. D. Colo. 1991). If deferred income was earned prepetition but paid along with
postpetition earnings, and the two can be readily traced and segregated, the court will
order a temporal accounting. E.g., Calder v. Segal (In re Calder), 94 B.R. 200,203 (Bankr.
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In the case of an inheritance vesting within six months of bankruptcy, virtually the entire bequest would seem to derive from "love
and affection" lavished prior to the petition. Indeed, this reasoning
could at last provide a theoretical justification, which has thus far

proven elusive, 137 for extending the line of cleavage for inherited assets only for a limited span of time. Such a rule arguably pulls back
into the estate assets effectively "earned" already, while leaving to the

debtor those that she manages to earn thereafter. In this connection,
the decision to delay the discharge for precisely 180 days with respect
to expectancies may be criticized as arbitrary. But this arbitrariness is
born of necessity, given the technical difficulty, inherent in the very

nature of reciprocal benevolence, of temporally accounting for remu138
neration from social services.
A possible rejoinder to this argument is that expectancies differ
from ordinary employment income in one highly pertinent respect:

The services that "earn" them create no proprietary rights in the provider, and hence the trustee in bankruptcy, stepping into the debtor's

shoes, cannot sue the benefactor in quantum meruit. Within the realm
of employment remuneration, the closest parallel would be to a discretionary bonus, which courts have unanimously assigned to the
debtor when awarded at any time following a petition. By placing

such bonuses (and, by analogy, expectancies) under the umbrella of
D. Utah 1988), affd sub nom. Calder v. Rupp, 912 F.2d 454 (10th Cir. 1990). Where prepetition earnings are deferred and entangled with postpetition labor, however, some courts
have awarded the deferred income to the debtor. E.g., Boyle v. Stefurak (In re Sloan), 32
B.R. 607, 613 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1983). Other courts have considered when the "bulk of
the work" was performed. E.g., Kleinfeld v. FDIC (In re Froid), 109 B.R. 481, 483 (Bankr.
M.D. Fla. 1989). Still other courts have applied "equitable principles" to allocate a portion
of deferred income to the bankruptcy estate, even when its pre- and postpetition derivations cannot be determined with precision. E.g., In re Malloy, 2 B.R. 674, 676 (Bankr.
M.D. Fla. 1980). See generally Countryman, The Use of State Law, supra note 22, at 449-55
(discussing the treatment of future payments in bankruptcy); Pitts, supra note 13, at 61-73,
80-88 (same).
137. See supra note 85, and text accompanying notes 34 & 82.
138. On the alternative approaches courts have taken to the problem of temporal accounting in such circumstances, see supra note 136. One court has described the six-month
window simply as "a considered balance between the Code's fresh start policy and its corresponding concern to effect a fair distribution of the debtor's property to her creditors."
Togut v. Hecht, 69 B.R. 290, 291 (S.D.N.Y. 1987). This conception lacks independent significance, and as a consequence begs the question. Apart from the policies underlying the
fresh start, creditors have a "fair" claim to all the debtor's nonexempt property necessary
to satisfy her debts. The decision to offer the discharge as of the date of the petition in and
of itself embodies a balancing of creditors' interests against the utility of the fresh start, so
we are still left with the issue of whether there is any reason under discharge theory to
establish separate dates of cleavage for different varieties of property.
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the fresh start, the employee retains her incentive to complete the

services that will in due course prompt her employer to confer
them.

1 39

But such an interpretation is ultimately too cold-blooded. In the
real world of human emotion, persons do not turn love and affection
on and off like a lightbulb. 140 After years of devotion, how likely is a

debtor to withhold social services during the six-month period when
her expectancies remain vulnerable to creditors' claims? Even the
coldly calculating debtor would find it in her interest to continue providing social services, lest her benefactor survive the six months and
take umbrage at this spontaneous lapse of attention. At any rate, assuming normal family relations, the temporary suspension of the fresh
start mandated by Section 541(a)(5) almost certainly has no impact on
a debtor's willingness to furnish loved ones with their accustomed social service. Thus, the bankruptcy estate can include what are effectively past "earnings" without compromising the debtor's future
conduct.
A better answer to the argument that debtors can be denied a

discharge for inheritances (at least for six months) without impairing
their incentives after bankruptcy is that such a denial will not, in practice, help creditors very much. Whenever we assess the social consequences of legal rules, we must bear in mind that they cast their
shadow upon the world both after and before the fact.141 Whatever its
aftereffects on beneficiaries' behavior, a rule pouring inheritances
back into the bankruptcy estate will also have ex ante implications for

the behavior of benefactors. A six-month window of vulnerability will
function primarily to deter direct bequests to debtors,142 with the con139. On the treatment of bonuses, see Vogel v. Palmer (In re Palmer), 57 B.R. 332,335
(Bankr. W.D. Va. 1986) (holding that bonuses are discretionary income earned only upon
determination of the chief executive officer that the employee's performance was satisfactory and conditioned in part on his employment as of a post-petition date).
140. In this respect as well, social life differs from commercial life-but how different is
different? Witness the phenomenon of "company loyalty." Once again, the images blur at
the margin.
141. For a general discussion of the ex ante consequences of rules in policy analysis, see
Frank H. Easterbrook, The Supreme Court, 1983 Term-Foreword: The Court and the
Economic System, 98 HARV. L. REv. 4,10-12, 19-33 (1984). Lately, the quantum physicists
have weighed in with a similar conclusion: Events can affect both the future and past
behavior of particles. See John A. Wheeler, Delayed-Choice Experiments and the BohrEinstein Dialogue,in AmuC.iAN PILosopHicAL Socmry, PAPERS READ AT A MEETING,
JuNE 5, 1980, at 9 (1981).
142. JACKSON, supra note 25, at 261 n.15; cf MACLACHLAN, supra note 20, at 178 (acknowledging but questioning this argument). On benefactors' behavior, see infra notes
201-203, 238 and accompanying text. In this same vein, a rule capturing inheritances in
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sequence that resources will be diverted away from them and from

their creditors.
It is part and parcel of the theory of the discharge that, by absolving debts, lawmakers spark economic activity that would not have occurred otherwise and that creditors, accordingly, would not otherwise
have been able to capture. Debtors and society gain substantially, but
not at the expense of creditors. 143 The same principle applies here:

By freeing expectancies from creditors' claims, the debtor (and, to the
extent that social behavior is affected, society) would benefit, the
bankruptcy could also prompt debtors simply to disclaim them ex post in order to thwart
creditors. This was a viable strategy under the former Bankruptcy Act, see supra note 25.
Some early courts accordingly cited to the debtor's power of disclaimer in bankruptcy as a
justification for the rule permitting the debtor to keep post-petition inheritances. In re
Lage, 19 F.2d 153, 154-55 (N.D. Iowa 1927); In re Meiburg, 1 F. Supp. 892, 895 (N.D. Iowa
1932). Though most courts have held disclaimers ineffective in bankruptcy under the
Code, see supra note 25, the superstructure of the argument offered in the early casesthat a rule capturing inheritances will not in practice adhere to the benefit of creditorsremains sound in the context of the rule's ex ante, if not ex post, consequences.
143. See supra note 106 and accompanying text. Other incarnations of this principle
can be found elsewhere in debtor-creditor law. Spendthrift trusts have been upheld on this
basis: Although they provide resources for debtors that creditors cannot reach, creditors
would be no better off if spendthrift clauses were ineffective, because no transfer would
otherwise have been made to insolvent debtors. Thus, they aid debtors without significantly harming creditors. Scott v. Bank One Trust Co., 577 N.E.2d 1077, 1083 (Ohio 1991).
Similarly, creditors' rights to levy against contingent interests owned by the debtor have
been struck down on the ground that they generally do not, upon forced sale, fetch their
full expected value. Debtors, who are then subject to deficiency judgments, would be significantly harmed by such a levy, while creditors would gain little by it. Suskin & Berry v.
Rumley, 37 F.2d 304, 306 (4th Cir. 1930); Smith v. Gilbert, 41 A. 284, 285-86 (Conn. 1898);
Adams v. Dugan, 163 P.2d 227, 231 (Okla. 1945); Howbert v. Cawthorn, 42 S.E. 683, 686
(Va. 1902); see Jones v. Harrison, 7 F.2d 461, 465 (8th Cir. 1925) (issue raised in connection
with trust construction), cert. denied, 270 U.S. 652 (1926); see also Hirsch & Wang, supra
note 97, at 35 n.136; Annotation, Contingent Remainder as Subject to Claims of Creditors,
60 A.L.R. 803, 803-06 (1929) (noting that in many, though not all, jurisdictions, a contingent remainder is not subject to levy and sale on an execution or attachment); Annotation,
GarnishmentAgainst Executor or Administrator by Creditor of Heir, Legatee, Distributee,
or Creditorof Estate, 59 A.L.R. 768, 786-90 (1929) (discussing the fact that a contingent or
other remote interest in property under a will cannot be fairly appraised and sold on execution, and thus is not open to attachment in the hands of an executor or trustee under the
will); Plumb, supra note 22, at 92-93 (discussing proposed bankruptcy provision excluding
from the bankruptcy estate contingent interests expected to fetch "a nominal or disproportionately small price as compared to the value to the debtor"); supra note 13. A debtor's
right to exempt from creditors' claims an unmatured life insurance policy has been similarly rationalized:
The right to maintain a policy may be a very important one, particularly if the
principal's insurability has deteriorated since the policy was purchased.... But
this right to maintain the policy is of value to the debtor only; it is not capable of
sale or transfer and is therefore of little use to [creditors].
Woodson v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. (In re Woodson), 839 F.2d 610, 618 (9th Cir. 1988); see
Plumb, supra note 22, at 61-63.
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transaction cost of diversion would be avoided, and creditors would be
left no worse off than they are now.
To be sure, this analysis may not apply in certain situations. Consider expectancies from benefactors who are physically in extremis or
who have lost their testamentary capacity by the time of a beneficiary's petition for bankruptcy relief. In such a case, the beneficiary
would already have done whatever was required to receive her inheritance. In effect, the expectancy would have matured into a future interest that should, if so characterized, flow into the estate under the
modem Bankruptcy Code whether it vested in possession in six
months or six years.144 Including it in the,estate would have no impact
on the beneficiary's future behavior. But the effect of the rule on the
benefactor's behavior is, under these circumstances, a matter of
conjecture.
Of course, a benefactor who is too infirm to alter his estate plan
when his beneficiary enters bankruptcy perforce cannot act to foil
creditors at that time. But if a benefactor knew that a wealth transfer
pending while he was incapacitated could be lost to his beneficiary,
that awareness in and of itself might motivate him to take testamentary precautions while his health still held. Thus, the ex ante consequences of a rule capturing the expectancies of incapacitated
beneficiaries could simply proceed (or rather precede) one step
sooner.145 Still, this scenario may assume more forethought-and
foresight-than can reasonably be expected of most benefactors. The
impact of bankruptcy rules on incapacitated benefactors' behavior ultimately remains unclear.
That lawmakers had this very situation in mind when they created
the six-month window is strongly suggested by their decision to limit
its application to testamentary transfers.146 A benefactor can give or
withhold inter vivos gifts as legal prudence demands, but a benefactor
who gives by necessity of death is often unable to deliberate (at least
for some space of time) before making the transfer. As a result, the
benefit to creditors of a delayed fresh start is likely to be greater with
144. See supra note 13.
145. Compare Baker v. Shoun (In re Baker), 13 F.2d 707 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 273
U.S. 733 (1926), decided prior to the Chandler Act, where the court posited that an expectancy from an ill or incompetent benefactor was not property of the bankruptcy estate,
since "even then there might be mental recovery, followed by transfer, before death, or
there might have been a will or conveyance before incompetency." Id. at 708 (emphasis
added). Some benefactors prepare ex ante for the possibility of incompetency by executing
durable powers of attorney. See UNnF. PROBATE CODE §§ 5-501 to 5-505 (1991).
146. See supra note 23.
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respect to expectancies of this sort. Nevertheless, the circumstance of
incapacitation is exceptional, and lawmakers could treat it under a
147
more limited, and better adapted, rule than the prevailing one.
Also questionable is the application of the analysis developed
here to succession by laughing heirs. When an inheritance goes by
default to a distant relative who had no sociological connection to the
decedent, then it more closely resembles an unearned windfall. In this
instance the benefactor is also less apt to respond ex ante to the impending bankruptcy of a beneficiary about whose affairs he is either
ignorant or indifferent. Discharge theory offers little justification for
including this type of expectancy in the fresh start, because inclusion is
unlikely to have behavioral repercussions for either party to the gratuitous transfer. (On the other hand, that logic applies to creditors, too:

When an inheritance springs out of nowhere, creditors undoubtedly
will never have relied on them.) At any rate, this circumstance is again
an exceptional one that could be singled out for special treatment in
bankruptcy. Whether doing so as a practical matter would be worth

the trouble, even if deemed theoretically proper, is another matter.
One is hard pressed to conceive of a principled standard whereby
courts could distinguish heirs who are laughing from those who are

grieving, and a troublesome gray area lies in between. 148 Given the
practical difficulty of telling them apart, it may be just as well to treat
149
all heirs alike.

In the usual case, at any rate, discharge theory appears no more
compelling than reliance theory to justify inclusion of expectancies in
the bankruptcy estate, even when they vest near in time to the peti147. Arguably, the simplest way to deal with bequests from benefactors who are physically in extremis or who lack testamentary capacity under discharge theory would be to
recognize them as functional equivalents of future interests and treat them accordingly
under the Bankruptcy Code. In that event, the estate could be held open as long as necessary for the expectancy to vest (assuming creditors decided it was to their economic advantage to do so). (If a benefactor subsequently recovered unexpectedly under these
circumstances, he would of course still have the right to disinherit the debtor-and her
creditors-by altering his will.) Cf.Baker, 13 F.2d at 708 (quoted supra note 145). See also
infra note 194 and accompanying text.
148. Consider, for example, cousins whom a benefactor saw, but only at the occasional
family gathering. Sociological ties may exist, but they may be attenuated.
149. So far as discharge theory is concerned, a rule distinguishing and capturing for the
bankruptcy estate all "unearned" expectancies could remain in effect indefinitely, or for as
long as creditors care to hold the estate open. But it must again be pointed out that such a
rule would create a conceptual inconsistency, in that debtors have the right to other
unearned postpetition windfalls under the discharge as currently applied. See supra text
accompanying note 81.
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tion. For all their fancy footwork, neither Weinstein nor MacLachlan

ultimately provided Section 541(a)(5) with a solid leg to stand on.
C. Abuse Theory
There remains one final, if ineffable, ground on which to predi-

cate the six-month window, a ground not articulated in the legislative
history, but which can readily be dug out of its subtext. The capture of

inheritances for the bankruptcy estate may serve to prevent debtors
from planningfor bankruptcy. The very fact that the debtor is aware

of her inheritance prospects and files her petition with the intention
thereby to preserve them under the fresh start may itself be deemed a
corruption of bankruptcy process. Weinstein almost certainly had that
peripherally in mind when he spoke of debtors who "invoke the Act
to escape payment" as committing an "abuse."' 50 One early commentator similarly commended the six-month window for parrying efforts
by debtors "acting in bad faith" to "use the bankruptcy act as a means
of evading payment of debts."' 51 More recently, the Ninth Circuit described the six-month window explicitly as functioning to "[prevent]
debtors from manipulating the bankruptcy date so as to deprive creditors of certain assets.'

52

This rationale would again suggest an expla-

nation for the temporal limit on Section 541(a)(5). For if an
inheritance follows hard on the debtor's petition, one can then infer
readily (but not otherwise) that the debtor timed the event with her
interests in mind. 153 In this regard, the mechanical operation of the
six-month window, eschewing a case-by-case inquiry into the debtor's
motives, could be conceptualized as an administratively efficient de-

terrent,

54 not

unlike the Bankruptcy Code's treatment of preferences

150. See supra note 33 and accompanying text. Paul King, who chaired the National
Bankruptcy Conference that drafted the Chandler Act, testified before Congress in a similar vein: "At least [the six-month window] obviates the situation where the rich aunt is
about to leave this mundane sphere and the nephew is in financial difficulties and wants to
reap the benefits entirely of the bequest that is coming and takes the step into bankruptcy." H.R. 10382 Hearings, supra note 20, at 318 (statement of Paul King). Unlike
Weinstein, King did not, at least expressly, set out his scenario of abuse in the context of
creditor reliance. Cf id. at 316-17 (testimony by Weinstein).
151. Louis D. Gage, Jr., Note, 1947 Wis. L. RPv. 398, 399.
152. Woodson v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co (In re Woodson), 839 F.2d 610, 619 (9th Cir.
1988); see also In re Hamill, 317 F. Supp. 909, 912 (D. Kan. 1970). For an early case decrying (but not overriding) such manipulation, see Bank of Elberton v. Swift (In re Swift), 268
F. 305, 307-08 (5th Cir. 1920).
153. See, e.g., Swift, 268 F. at 307. Here, to update a maxim coined long ago, the principle of pre hoc ergo propter hoc applies.
154. Weinstein, recall, spoke of actions by debtors that "should be discouraged." See
supra note 33 and accompanying text.
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under Section 547. That provision, which functions to deter bank-

ruptcy planning by creditors (as opposed to the debtor), overrides improvements in their position within three months of bankruptcy, also
without considering evidence of intent. 155 Under the former Bankruptcy Act, intent to opt out of the bankruptcy proceeding had to be
proven in order to avoid a creditor's preference, an approach that had
generated much litigation. 156 The Code abolished the intent-based

standard to escape from the resulting administrative burden, relying
instead on temporal proximity as a surrogate for intent.1 5 7 Likewise,

according to the Ninth Circuit, "Section 541(a)(5) makes it unnecessary for the court to resolve.., difficult questions about the debtor's
intent. It provides a prophylactic rule that operates without regard to
the debtor's subjective state of mind."'1 58 Still, the fundamental issue

remains: Is the debtor's intent to improve her position, knowing that
inheritance is nigh, a sufficient cause for legislative intervention at all?
One way to examine this question is to consider the moral impli-

cations of the debtor's action in such a case. Is the debtor's decision
to rush ahead with her petition so as to antecede an inheritance morally objectionable? Some critics have not hesitated to assert, though
without analysis, that it is. One early court characterized the debtor's

petition in these circumstances as "bad in morals," proceeding from
an "unworthy motive."'159 Another court branded the debtor's
155. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (1988).
156. Bankruptcy Act § 60(b) (previously codified at 11 U.S.C. § 96(b)); BAIRD, supra
note 55, at 170.
157. JACKSON, supra note 25, at 130-31; BAIRD, supra note 55, at 170.
158. Woodson, 839 F.2d at 620. Drawing the same conclusion, see Case Note, 49
CoLJM. L. REv. 270, 271 (1949). In Woodson, the manipulation was manifest, the debtor
having filed his petition three days before his parent's death from a pre-existing terminal
illness: "[H]er death could not have come as a surprise to [the debtor]." Woodson at 620.
But the failure of § 541(a)(5) to inquire into intent (as, mutatis mutandis, under modem
preference law) will result in its application to at least some unanticipated expectancies.
E.g., In re Poyner, 68 B.R. 919, 920 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1987) (benefactor died in an automobile accident shortly after beneficiary's bankruptcy). One commentator who endorsed the
Ninth Circuit's interpretation of the six-month window accordingly urged that wrongful
death actions be excepted from its purview on the ground that when these causes of action
arise postpetition they usually derive from accidents that occurred postpetition and thus
could not ordinarily have been anticipated. Case Note, supra, at 271; see also Recent Decision, 35 VA. L. REV. 112, 113 (1949). (On the unsettled state of the law in this area, see
supra note 22.) Such an approach, if followed, would carve out an exception for the (relatively rare) situation where intent could not be inferred-just as preference law does, by
analogy, in the situation where creditors' positions are improved in the ordinary course of
business. See 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(2) (1988).
159. In re Hall, 16 F. Supp. 18, 18 (W.D. Tenn. 1936).
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preinheritance petition "inequitable and unconscionable.' 60 It may
be noted that these same early courts nonetheless upheld the offensive petitions, observing that "[t]his statute makes no provision for
exceptional instances based upon bad motive or fraudulent intent.' 61
Modem courts have followed the same course, refusing to dismiss on

grounds of "bad faith" bankruptcy filings timed strategically, so long
as the debtor acted "within his legal rights."' 62 But these judgments,
of course, hung 6n a legal assessment of judicial power, not a moral
160. In re Swift, 259 F. 612, 613 (N.D. Ga. 1919), affd sub nom. Bank of Elberton v.
Swift (In re Swift), 268 F. 305 (5th Cir. 1920).
161. Hall, 16 F. Supp. at 18; see also Swift, 259 F. at 614; Bank of Elberton, 268 F. at
307-08. Compare In re Weidenfeld, 257 F. 872 (E.D.N.Y. 1919), where creditors had filed
an involuntary petition against the debtor, which he contested. Prior to adjudication, the
debtor inherited property. He then sought to withdraw his objection to adjudication,
which would have left him with his inheritance under pre-Chandler Act law. Simultaneously, the creditors sought to withdraw their involuntary petition! Despite the occurrence
of strategic behavior on both sides, the court concluded that the Bankruptcy Act vested it
with authority to refuse the debtor's motion and grant that of the creditors.
It does not seem to me that it was ever the intention of those who enacted the
Bankruptcy Law... to permit a bankrupt, who has resisted an adjudication for
nearly two years, to suddenly change his attitude ....
The attitude of this alleged bankrupt has already been the subject of [negative] comment ....
Id. at 873-74.
162. In re Thompson, 4 B.R. 18, 21 (Bankr. D. Me. 1979) (petition timed to protect a
workmen's compensation claim); see Bank of Sturgeon v. Stewart (In re Spelman), 19 F.2d
138, 138 (8th Cir. 1927) (petition timed to protect a preference); In re Cummings, 84 F.
Supp. 65, 71-72 (S.D. Cal. 1949) (petition timed to protect property settlement); In re
Goulding, 79 B.R. 874, 875-76 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1987) (petition timed to protect spendthrift trust distribution); Bowers Distillery, Inc. v. Kragness (In re Kragness), 63 B.R. 459,
465-66 (Bankr. D. Or. 1986) (same); see also Camden v. Fike (In re Fike), 117 F.2d 667,668
(7th Cir. 1941) (eschewing analysis of motive for filing in general); In re Chilhowee R-IV
School District, 145 B.R. 981, 983 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1992) (permitting bankruptcy planning so long as debtor acted within the law). Nonetheless, some courts have denied petitions for lack of good faith when debtors engaged in other sorts of "obvious clever
planning," despite their technical compliance with the requirements of the Bankruptcy
Code. In re Campbell, 124 B.R. 462, 464 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1991) (emphasis omitted)
(debtor placed all assets beyond reach of creditors under nonbankruptcy law); In re Brown,
88 B.R. 280, 284-85 (Bankr. D. Haw. 1988) (same); In re Hammonds, 139 B.R. 535, 541
(Bankr. D. Colo. 1992) (debtor engaged in sham transactions and was using bankruptcy as
a delaying tactic); for other recent judicial discussions of the implicit good faith requirement in bankruptcy, see In re Keebler, 106 B.R. 662, 664-65 (Bankr. D. Haw. 1989); In re
Khan, 35 B.R. 718, 719 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1984); for scholarly discussions, see Gross, Fresh
Start, supra note 90, at 93, 100; Robert L. Ordin, The Good Faith Principlein the Bankruptcy Code: A Case Study, 38 Bus. LAw. 1795 (1983); see also Lawrence Ponoroff & F.
Stephen Knippenberg, The Implied Good Faith Filing Requirement: Sentinel of an Evolving Bankruptcy Policy, 85 Nw. U. L. REv. 919 (1991) (addressing reorganizations); Good
Faith. A Roundtable Discussion, 1 Am.BANKR. INsT. L. Rlv. 11 (1993).
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assessment of the parties' equities. 16 3 If they can be read as calling

upon Congress to turn its own moral hand to the problem, then Congress apparently responded with the passage of the Chandler Act.
Ethical analysis of the debtor-creditor relation has a rich history.

Many early thinkers deemed failure to satisfy a creditor as the moral
equivalent of theft. To default after borrowing property loaned on the
pretense of a promise to repay seemed, at least within a communitarian society, hardly different from stealing the property out of the
lender's house. 164 Accordingly, early English insolvency statutes had

a quasi-criminal flavor; some bankrupts were even hanged in Great
Britain.165 But by at least the seventeenth century, if not earlier, theorists had also begun morally to distinguish deliberate defaulters from

those who failed to satisfy their debts as a result of uncontrollable
personal misfortune. Whereas "the wilful Bankrupt is one of the
worst sort of Thieves," still "the Honest Debtor, who fails by visible

Necessity" deserved "Pity and Compassion."'1 66 Over the same histor163. Thus, for example, the court in Gouldingruled, "albeit reluctantly.., that it is the
duty of a Judge to apply the laws as written by Congress, rather than to substitute personal
abstract concepts of justice and morality, to the cases it hears." Goulding, 79 B.R. at 876.
164. "But then, To Borrow, without any due care to Repay, or to Return that which has
been borrowed; this is most certainly so near to a sort of Stealing, that it will bring one into
a Bundle with that sort of Tares." COTToN MATHER, A FLYING ROLL, BROUGHT FORTH
TO ENTER INTO THE HOUSE AND HAND OF THE THIEF 16 (Boston 1713). For comparable
early English attitudes toward default, see DeLloyd J. Guth, The Age of Debt, the Reformation and English Law, in TUDOR RULE AND REVOLUTION 69 (DeLloyd J. Guth & John
W. McKenna eds., 1982).
165. "A bankrupt ... was formerly considered merely in the light of a criminal or
offender .. " 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 88, at *471-73. Imprisonment for debt began in
the thirteenth century; though not technically criminal, its harshness was recognized. W.J.
Jones, The Foundations of English Bankruptcy: Statutes and Commissions in the Early
Modern Period, 69 TRANSACTIONS AM. PHIL. Soc'y 1, 13-14 (1979). Under a seventeenthcentury statute, bankrupts unable to show blameless loss were liable to pillorying and mutilation. 21 Jam. 1, ch. 19 (1623) (Eng.). Debtors who concealed property while taking advantage of bankruptcy relief could be hanged under eighteenth century statutes. 4 Anne
ch. 17 (1705) (Eng.); 5 Geo. 2, ch. 30 (1732) (Eng.). Adam Smith reported that "many
have been since executed" under bankruptcy law, and he defended the "great justice" of
this practice. ADAM SMITH, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE 131-32 (R.L. Meek et al. eds.,
1978) (ms. 1762-66); cf. Jones, supra, at 50 & n.109 (suggesting that executions were few);
see also id. at 12. For additional historical background in this regard, see HENRY S. MAINE,
ANCIENT LAW 267 (1920); Frank R. Kennedy, Reflections on the Bankruptcy Laws of the
United States: The Debtor's Fresh Start, 76 W. VA. L. REV. 427, 428-34 (1974).
166. DANIEL DEFOE, AN ESSAY UPON PROJECTS (1697), quoted in Robert Weisberg,
Commercial Morality, the Merchant Character,and the History of the Voidable Preference,
39 STAN. L. REV. 3, 7-9 (1986); cf 2 MILL, supra note 100, bk. 5, ch. 9, § 8 (acknowledging
that some defaulters are morally blameless but suggesting that default is prima facie evidence of wrongful conduct). For historical discussions of this conceptual dichotomy, see
JULIAN HOPPIT, RISK AND FAILURE IN ENGLISH BUSINESS, 1700-1800, at 19-28 (1987);
Jones, supra note 165, at 9, 51-61. Similarly in America, "[w]e find in the conduct of debt-
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ical span, lending came to be recognized as a business, 167 and the cred-

itor's voluntary and self-interested decision to part with his property
was in due course distinguished from the involuntary transfer of his
property through criminal wrongdoing. 168 Visions of the creditor as a
professional risk-taker tended to undermine the whole moral framework of the lending transaction and rendered more tepid the indignation occasioned by debtor default.
The upshot is that moral analysis of debtor behavior is today
steeped in ambiguity. 169 In general, those advocates who continue to
posit a moral obligation to repay debts nonetheless are prepared to
acknowledge countervailing moral imperatives sufficient to justify the
discharge; sympathy for the "honest but unfortunate" debtor, 70 couors every moral shade, from gross fraud to the slightest negligence and entire innocence."
Jones, supra note 165, at 57-58 (quoting AMERICAN JumsT 11 (1834)). The conception of
the debtor as (potentially) a morally innocent party initially applied only to those who
borrowed venture capital, and early discharge legislation accordingly was confined to
merchants, "for the law holds it to be an unjustifiable practice, for any person but a trader
to encumber himself with debts of any considerable value." 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 88,
at *473-74; see also 2 ALExIS DE TOCQUEviLLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 236 (Alfred A.
Knopf 1946) (1840); McCoy, supra note 4, at 179-80. Only in this century have consumers
also come to be accepted as potential victims of economic forces beyond their control and
hence as deserving of debtor relief. For historical discussions, see Ian P.H. Duffy, English
Bankrupts, 1571-1861, 24 Am.J. L. HisT. 283 (1980); Haagen, supra note 88, at 108-12;
Hallinan, supra note 87, at 56-57, 65-69. Even today, however, vestiges of the old moral
bias against consumers survive in the Code. See 11 U.S.C. § 707(b) (1988) (restricting dismissal on grounds of "substantial abuse" to consumer debtors).
167. On this evolving conception in America, see WooD, supra note 35, at 139-40.
168. As William Godwin observed:
It is in vain that the whole multitude of moralists assure us, that the sum I owe to
another man is as little to be infringed upon, as the wealth of which he is in
possession. Everyone feels the fallacy of this maxim.... When [the debtor] ultimately fails of payment, the mischief he produces is real, but is not so great, at
least in ordinary cases, as that which attends upon robbery.
WILLIAM GODWIN, ENQUIRY CONCERNING POLITICAL JUSTICE (1795), quoted in P.S.
A AH, THm RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CoNrrRAcr 109 (1979). Adam Smith
agreed:
It is a common saying, that he who does not pay me what he owes me, does me as
great an injury as he who takes as much from me by theft or robbery. It is very
true the loss is as great, but we do not naturally [look] upon the injury as at all so
heinous.... The spectator can not think he has so good a ground for expectation
of the possessing it.
SMrrH, supra note 165, at 87.
169. The resulting moral ambiguity and ambivalence is also reflected in popular culture. See supra notes 41-43 and accompanying text. For a further Kantian perspective on
the problem, see IMMANUEL KANT, FOUNDATIONS OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 1819, 39-40, 47-48 (Lewis W. Beck trans., Liberal Arts Press 1959) (1785).
170. Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934); Brown v. Felson, 442 U.S. 127,
128 (1979). This qualifying phrase was a staple of bankruptcy discussions from at least the
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pled with a concern for basic human dignity, call for the grant of a
fresh start. 17 1 But those same advocates would not hesitate to penalize a debtor who has behaved dishonestly, or who by design has
brought her condition upon herself. 172 The question that then arises is
whether the conscious decision to plan for bankruptcy so soils the
debtor's hands as to defeat her moral claim to relief. And that, at
least in the present context, is a question of degree 17 3 on which it may
be difficult to forge a consensus. 174 The fact that few creditors will
have relied on the expectancies that planning protects (Weinstein's
eighteenth century. E.g., WARREN, supra note 87, at 17; Coles, supra note 97, at 297; Howard, supra note 89, at 1050 n.24.
171. E.g., John D. Ayer, How to Think About Bankruptcy Ethics, 60 AM. BANKR. L.J.
355, 369-70 (1986); Richard E. Flint, Bankruptcy Policy: Toward a MoralJustificationfor
FinancialRehabilitation of the Consumer Debtor, 48 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 515, 531-43,
565-74 (1991); Hallinan, supra note 87, at 138-43; for a related discussion, see Philip
Shuchman, An Attempt at a "Philosophy of Bankruptcy", 21 UCLA L. REV. 403, 449-54
(1973); suggesting that the issue remains morally ambiguous, see SULLIVAN ET AL., supra
note 36, at 341. For early criticisms of discharge legislation on the ground that it undermined the moral sanctity of the debtor-creditor relation, see Ogden v. Saunders, 14 U.S. (1
Wheat.) 213, 355-56 (1827); COLEMAN, supra note 87, at 128.
Modern recognition of a moral obligation to pay debts despite the right of discharge
can be found in the reaffirmation doctrine. Under this American doctrine (which
originated in Great Britain but has since been abolished by the canny English), a gratuitous reaffirmation of a discharged debt binds the debtor on the theory that the original
obligation to satisfy the debt furnishes a present "moral consideration" for the promise.
See generally Douglas G. Boshkoff, The Bankrupt's Moral Obligation to Pay His Discharged Debts: A Conflict Between Contract Theory and Bankruptcy Policy, 47 IND. L.J. 36
(1971). Professor Boshkoff dismissed this reasoning, however, as "slick verbalization." Id.
at 62.
172. Flint, supra note 171, at 540-41, 554 (asserting that the debtor's moral claim to
relief is premised upon a "covenant" between the debtor and society that requires "acertain level of fair dealing on the part of the debtor"); Howard, supra note 89, at 1050-56;
Philip Shuchman, The Fraud Exception in Consumer Bankruptcy, 23 STAN. L. REv. 735,
738-39 (1971). But see Charles J. Tabb, The Scope of the Fresh Start in Bankruptcy: Collateral Conversions and the Dischargeabilityof Debt, 59 Gno. WASH. L. REv. 56, 95-99 (1990)
("[W]ho cares if debtors take advantage of the discharge law? If letting people who are
hopelessly in debt regain their sense of self-worth and identity through debt forgiveness is
justifiable on a humanitarian basis, the justification remains valid whether the debtor is a
commercial Mother Theresa (sic) or Saddam Hussein.").
173. As one court has put it, the debtor's decision strategically to time her bankruptcy
"might not accord with the highest standards of ethics. But, for that matter, the very act of
bankruptcy-repudiation of one's debts-may be considered unethical by persons of high
moral sensibility." In re Cummings, 84 F. Supp. 65, 71 (S.D. Cal. 1949); see also Coles,
supra note 97, at 297 (suggesting that the debtor's conduct may fall into a "twilight zone").
174. Assuming ethical consensus is ever possible. On this problem, see (or rather savor) Arthur A. Leff, Unspeakable Ethics, Unnatural Law, 1979 DUKE L.J. 1229. For discussions suggesting the lack of a consensus on the morality of bankruptcy planning
generally, see Ayer, supra note 171, at 373-74; Howard, supra note 89, at 1054-57; Raymond T. Nimmer, Consumer Bankruptcy Abuse, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBs., Spring 1987, at
89, 91.
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contrary assertion notwithstanding' 75 ) would at least appear to

weaken moral criticism of the debtor in such a case. 176
At any rate, other theorists today downplay or even deny the
debtor's moral obligation to lenders in connection with the modem
market for consumer credit.177 In that context, the debtor-creditor relation may be conceived simply as an arm's length bargain between
economic actors whose entitlements and expectations are shaped by

nothing other than the agreement and its legal background. 178 At that
point, we are left to ponder whether bankruptcy planning runs afoul
not of ethical precepts, but of public policy. And the answer to that,
as usual, is a resounding Yes and No. Of course, we want persons to
plan their affairs in light of the law; influencing conduct is, after all,
what law is about. But at the same time, we do not want persons to
plan their affairs around the law. The trick (fiendishly difficult to
carry off) is to implement rules that encourage only those modifica179
tions of social conduct that accord with lawmakers' intentions.
175. See supra notes 33-39 and accompanying text.
176. Furthermore, the debtor arguably has a moral obligation to her benefactor to plan
for bankruptcy. See infra text following note 205.
177. Including me; see Hirsch, supra note 25, at 610-11; for weightier discussions, see
Hallinan, supra note 87, at 140-41; Doug Rendleman, The Bankruptcy Discharge: Toward
a Fresher Start, 58 N.C. L. REv. 723, 725-26 (1980); Shuchman, supra note 171, at 428-32,
444-49, 451-52. Some thinkers have even argued that because of their relative sophistication, creditors have a primary moral obligation when operating in the modem consumer
market not to lend aggressively or improvidently; if they nonetheless do so, it is creditors
who bear moral responsibility when their debtors default. Ayer, supra note 171, at 369;
Vern Countryman, Improvident Credit Extension: A New Legal Concept Aborning?, 27
ME. L. Rnv. 1, 2-7 (1975); Gross, FreshStart,supra note 90, at 102; Hallinan, supra note 87,
at 67-68. Countryman hinted at the idea in an earlier essay, Vern Countryman, The Bankruptcy Boom, 77 HARv. L. Rnv. 1452, 1458-60 (1964); for an early English anticipation, see
Haagen, supra note 88, at 110-11 (citing "A Dissertation on Credit" (c. 1750)). Some debtors, not surprisingly, have voiced agreement with this claim. In re Goodson, 130 B.R. 897,
903 (Bankr. N.D. Okl. 1991).
178. One might posit alternatively that persons do have moral obligations when they
act in a commercial environment, but that those moral obligations are shaped by the terms
of the bargain and its legal context. See DAVID GAuTHMR, MORALS BY AGREEMENT
(1986) (developing a contractarian theory of morality); see also Charles Fried, Moral Causation, 77 HARV. L. Rlv. 1258 (1964) (discussing the social benefits of such a conceptualization). Justice Holmes criticized this conceptualization, however, in Oliver Wendell
Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L. REv. 457, 460-62 (1897) (arguing that one has
no independent moral duty to fulfill contracts but simply chooses between performance
and damages). Under either conceptualization, at any rate, moral analysis would have no
independent significance.
179. The dilemma is concisely posed in Eisenberg, Bankruptcy Law, supra note 89, at
992; see also Bank of Elberton v. Swift (In re Swift), 268 F. 305, 307-08 (5th Cir. 1920). For
a discussion of bankruptcy abuse in a related utilitarian vein, see Chillicothe State Bank v.
Carroll (In re Carroll), 70 B.R. 143, 145-46 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1986); In re Bruno, 68 B.R.
101, 103-04 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1986). Professor Nimmer argues that the problem may be
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Once rules have been thus crafted, citizens can hardly be faulted for

planning, carefully or even cleverly; mere cleverness in wringing full
advantage out of rules is unobjectionable when it allows citizens to
take precisely what lawmakers have seen fit to give them.
In some instances, lawmakers have acted to close off avenues for
planning that contradict plain objectives of bankruptcy law. Code
provisions designed to deter persons from either incurring or satisfy-

ing debts in anticipation of bankruptcy fall into this category. 180 In
other instances, authorities have quarreled over the purposes of specific rules and hence have disputed the boundaries of their abuse.
Eve-of-bankruptcy conversions of nonexempt into exempt property
offer a good example. Some courts and commentators charge that
such planning frustrates bankruptcy policy, by allowing debtors to retain property they had no use for prior to bankruptcy and that they

will (presumably) liquidate back into cash as soon as the coast is clear.
But other courts and commentators maintain that planning of this sort
fulfills bankruptcy policy, by providing debtors with a minimum stock

of assets with which to make a fresh start. When a debtor converts
nonexempt property into exempt forms, one could argue, she is simply
"mak[ing] full use of the exemptions to which [s]he is entitled under
the law," and which lawmakers want her to have.' 8 ' Until lawmakers

define more precisely the rationale for excepting a set bundle of assets
from creditor levy, the substantive utility of exemption planning

(whatever

its

ambiguous. 182

superficial

moral

appearance)

must

remain

self-correcting, to the extent that persons are subject to extralegal social pressures not to
abuse rules. Nimmer, supra note 174, at 95; see also DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE 47-49 (1988) (discussing generally the problem of legal loopholes).
180. 11 U.S.C. §§ 523(a)(2)(C), 547(b) (1988); see also 11 U.S.C. § 546(c) (1988). Since
the discharge of debt is not premised on a public policy in favor of nonenforcement of
contracts for credit, but rather on a public policy in favor of social cost avoidance that
outweighs the utility of contract enforcement, debtors contravene the purpose of bankruptcy law when they borrow only because they anticipate being discharged from their
obligation to repay. Section 523(a)(2)(C) operates to deter debtors from this form of
bankruptcy planning. For a criticism of this provision, see Jeffrey W. Morris, Substantive
Consumer Bankruptcy Reform in the Bankruptcy Amendments Act of 1984, 27 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 91, 128-32 (1985); for an examination of this sort of planning, see Barry L.
Zaretsky, The Fraud Exception to Discharge Under the New Bankruptcy Code, 53 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 253, 256-58 (1979). On the public policy against satisfaction of debts in anticipation of bankruptcy (i.e., preferences), see JACKSON, supra note 25, at 122-50.
181. BANKRUPTCY REFORM ACT OF 1978, S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 76
(1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5862; JACKSON, supra note 25, at 275 n.44
(doubting this statement's interpretative relevance).
182. For discussions, compare Eisenberg, Bankruptcy Law, supra note 89, at 993-96;
Eisenberg, A Rejoinder, supra note 90, at 620-21; Marshall D. Gringauz, Recent Develop-
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Now, let us contemplate in this light the debtor's decision to time
strategically her bankruptcy petition in order to enhance her prospects
for the accumulation of future assets. Is this sort of manipulation of
the date of cleavage contrary to public policy? The answer would appear to hinge on the character and magnitude of the prospect in question. Consider wages. A debtor may plan her bankruptcy to precede
a particularly lucrative employment opportunity. If she does so, is she
committing an abuse? Not at all: The very purpose of the discharge is
to ensure that debtors have an incentive to take up employment.
Only if the activity were so lucrative relative to the earner's debt load
that she had this incentive anyway, without the right of discharge,
would her decision to enter bankruptcy prior to the employment conflict with the law's purpose. 183 While the Code fails to face this prob-

lem head on, one of its provisions does function to prevent this kind of
planning. Debtors are barred from timing bankruptcy to discharge
their student loans prior to launching their productive careers. 184 Presumably, students (at least members of the "me" generation) would
not embark on a costly course of study unless the income stream down
the road justified the investment. Denying them the discharge will
hardly deter graduates from pursuing the occupations their loans have
ment, Section 522 Exemptions: A Look at the IndividualDebtor's Reduction of the Bankruptcy Estate, 5 BANKR. Dnv. J. 131, 142-48 (1988); Harris, supra note 90, at 339-44;
Georgianne L. Huckfeldt, Note, Conversion of Nonexempt Assets to Exempt Assets Priorto
Bankruptcy-A Question of Fraud?,56 Mo. L. REv. 857, 867-68 (1991); Matthew J. Kernner, Comment, PersonalBankruptcy Dischargeand the Myth of the Unchecked Homestead
Exemption, 56 Mo. L. REv. 683, 684-85 (1991); JACKSON, supra note 25, at 275-78; Frank
W. Koger & Sheryl A. Reynolds, Is PrefilingEngineeringPrudentPlanningor Section 727
Fraud?(Or, When Does a PigBecome a Hog?), 93 COM. L.. 465 (1988); Alan N. Resnick,
Prudent Planningor Fraudulent Transfer? The Use of Nonexempt Assets to Purchase or
Improve Exempt Property on the Eve of Bankruptcy, 31 RUTGERS L. REv. 615, 627-29
(1978); Kevin A. Shacter, Recent Development, Bankruptcy Estate Planning: Grounds for
Denialof Discharge Under Section 727(a)(2)(A), 7 BANKR.DEv. J. 199 (1990).
183. Payments in satisfaction of debts can be analogized to taxation. If a tax is sufficiently small it will not deter productive activity, and can even encourage it. See supra note
99. Some courts, it may be observed, have also described the decision to enter bankruptcy
under these conditions as morally offensive. In re Kahn, 35 B.R. 718,719-20 (Bankr. W.D.
Ky. 1984); In re Peluso, 72 B.R. 732,737 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1987); In re Bell, 56 B.R. 637, 643
(Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1986); infra note 187; see also In re Arnold, 869 F.2d 240,243 (4th Cir.
1989) (affirming modification of wage-earner plan after debtor substantially increased his
income on grounds of fairness, "[e]ven if the prospect of higher Chapter 13 payments were
to discourage some debtors from working to improve their income," while observing that
the modification ordered should have no such effect).
184. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) (1988 & Supp. II 1990) provides that student loans made,
insured, or guaranteed by government are not dischargeable unless they first became due
seven years earlier, or unless excepting such loans from discharge will cause "undue
hardship."
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enabled them to enter.' 8 5 The bankruptcy court's right to dismiss con-

sumer debtors' petitions sua sponte on grounds of "substantial
abuse" 86 has likewise been applied to bar discharge when it is unnecessary to preserve debtors' incentives to grasp economic
87

opportunities.1

185. For a different interpretation of this provision, for which there is little substantive
legislative history, see JACKSON, supra note 25, at 250-52, 256 & n.5; see also H.R. Doc.
No. 137, supra note 22, pt. 2, at 140; Janice E. Kosel, Running the Gauntlet of "Undue
Hardship"-the Dischargeof Student Loans in Bankruptcy, 11 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV.
457 (1981); Brian C. Fries, Comment, Recent Amendments to the Bankruptcy Code-A
Politically Motivated Less Fresh Start?, 56 Mo. L. REV. 705, 707-13 (1991); Kurt Weiss,
Note, Discharging Student Loans in Bankruptcy: the Bankruptcy Court Tests of "Undue
Hardship", 26 ARIz. L. REV. 445 (1984).

186. 11 U.S.C. § 707(b) (1988).
187. As one court observed:
It is well established that the provisions of Chapter 7 were intended to afford
relief to a debtor when he finds himself in financial circumstances which threaten
his immediate well-being. If a debtor has the ability to repay all or a substantial
portion of his debts within a reasonable time, while at the same time maintaining
a reasonable standard of living, then he cannot be so financially destitute that his
immediate welfare is in question. In the absence of such jeopardy, it is morally
and legally unconscionable that a person should be able to extinguish his obligations without first making a reasonable effort to fulfill them.
In re Hudson, 56 B.R. 415, 419 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1985) (citation omitted), modified, 64
B.R. 73 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1986). For similar statements, see, for example, In re Krohn,
886 F.2d 123, 126 (6th Cir. 1989); In re Strong, 84 B.R. 541, 544 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1988); In
re Cord, 68 B.R. 5, 6-7 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1986); In re Grant, 51 B.R. 385, 392 (Bankr. N.D.
Ohio 1985).
In this regard, courts have examined with an extra ounce of skepticism (better than a
pound of cure?) the petitions of doctors for bankruptcy relief. "[D]octors may be slow [to]
pay but always eventually pay because they all become rich .. " In re Campbell, 63 B.R.
702, 703 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1986); see also, e.g., In re Khan, 35 B.R. 718 (Bankr. W.D. Ky.
1984); In re Traub, 140 B.R. 286 (Bankr. D.N.M. 1992). Courts have differed, however, in
their definitions of the indicia of "substantial abuse." For a recent discussion of the conflicting case law, see In re Nolan, 140 B.R. 797, 801-02 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1992). For scholarly discussions, see Wayne R. Wells & Janell M. Kurtz, A CriticalAnalysis of Bankruptcy
Code Section 707(b), 36 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 385 (1988); Irving A. Breitowitz, New Developments in Consumer Bankruptcies: Chapter7 Dismissal on the Basis of "SubstantialAbuse",
Part 1, 59 AM. BANKR. L.J. 327 (1985); Irving A. Breitowitz, New Developments in Consumer Bankruptcies: Chapter 7 Dismissal on the Basis of "SubstantialAbuse," Part 2, 60
AM. BANKR. L.J. 33 (1986) [hereinafter Breitowitz, Part 2]; Gross, Fresh Start, supra note
90, at 88-114; Nimmer, supra note 174, at 96-99; Andrea M. Proia, The Interpretationand
Application of Section 707(b) of the Bankruptcy Code, 93 COM. L.J. 367 (1988); David L.
Balser, Note, Section 707(b) of the Bankruptcy Code: A Roadmap with a Proposed Standardfor Defining SubstantialAbuse, 19 J. L. REFORM 1011 (1986); Robert M. Thompson,
Note, Consumer Bankruptcy: SubstantialAbuse and Section 707 of the Bankruptcy Code,
55 Mo. L. REV. 247 (1990); Wayne R. Wells et al., The Implementation of Bankruptcy Code
Section 707(b): The Law and the Reality, 39 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 15 (1991); Benjamin S.
Zacks, Comment, Bankruptcy, Chapter 7 Dismissal Section 707(b); The Impact Upon the
Consumer Creditor,the Bankrupt, and the Court. Proposalsfor the Future, 16 CAP. U. L.
REV. 547 (1987).
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This analysis nonetheless appears inapposite to expectancies.
However glittering a beneficiary's inheritance prospects may appear
relative to her debts, no amount of reciprocation can ensure that they
will ultimately mature, since they are not formally premised on an
economic exchange. 188 Accordingly, the debtor's incentive (or lack
thereof) to go on providing social services in the face of insolvency is
ultimately beside the point. Creditors should not expect to gain from
denial of discharge to a beneficiary because, to forestall that very
eventuality, the benefactor could disinherit her.18 9 When a debtor intentionally accelerates her petition in order to protect an expectancy
from which creditors could not dependably benefit, her action would
not appear to be abusive. 190
188. See supra text accompanying note 139. This theoretical distinction is a fiction
which is interesting in its own right. See Hirsch & Wang, supra note 97, at 9-10 & n.31.
While courts in general abide by the fiction, in some instances they do not. Where there
was at least an informal understanding that a gift was premised on the subsequent reciprocal provision of social services, some courts have treated the transactions as contracts and
have ordered restitution when the services were not forthcoming. McGovERN ET AL.,
supra note 24, § 5.5, at 224.
189. Once again, however, the distinction between earnings and expectancies in this
regard may be blurry: The debtor herself may withhold her labor, not because it is in her
interest to do so, but in order to spite her creditors if she is denied safe passage into bankruptcy liquidation. This psychological fact may undermine the entire premise that 11
U.S.C. § 707(b) (1988) can be used to benefit creditors. For discussions, compare
Boshkoff, supra note 20, at 116, 123 (discussing the idea of involuntary bankruptcy and
noting that an unwilling bankrupt is less likely to remain employed or cooperate);
Breitowitz, Part2, supra note 187, at 66-67 (arguing that to assume dismissal of Chapter 7
will benefit creditors "ignores the basic psychological fact that if all of the debtor's disposable income must be applied to ... debt" the income will decrease); Eisenberg, Bankruptcy
Law, supra note 89, at 987, 989 (refuting objections to involuntary Chapter 13 filing and
noting that noncooperation motivated by spite is rendered unlikely by threatening the
debtor with denial of discharge); Harris, supra note 90, at 360 (responding to Eisenberg by
stating that debtor cooperation is difficult and potentially expensive to coerce, and that
denying discharge undermines the fresh start); Howard, supra note 89, at 1084-85 (arguing
that mandatory Chapter 13 is not logical because, among other things, debtor willingness is
key to a successful Chapter 13 plan); Lynn M. LoPucki, "Encouraging"Repayment Under
Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code, 18 HAnv. J. ON LEGIs. 347, 381 (1981) (stating that
involuntary Chapter 13 will lead to debtor flight).
190. Compare Bank of Elberton v. Swift (In re Swift), 268 F. 305, 307-08 (5th Cir.
1920), where
[i]t was not denied that a party might take advantage of a voluntary proceeding in
bankruptcy for the very purpose of having any property he might accumulate
thereafter relieved from his debts, but it was said that there must be a line drawn
between a general purpose of that kind and a specific intent, such as is alleged to
exist here, where the acquisition of the property... followed so closely in time
upon the filing of the petition.
But compare In re Restea, 76 B.R. 728, 735 (Bankr. D.S.D. 1987), where the bankruptcy
court declined to invoke § 707(b) against a debtor whose prospects for future income were
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A distinction must again be drawn, however, between "true" expectancies and those that are virtually future interests. If a benefactor
is effectively incapable of altering his estate plan, then the debtor's
manipulation of the date of her petition could indeed damage the interests of creditors. 191 Furthermore, the debtor's decision to file her
petition on one day or another will have no impact on her incentive to
gratify the benefactor under these conditions. Unlike expectancies, a
future interest has already been "earned." Because this sort of planning fails to advance discharge policy, it could reasonably be deemed
abusive. 192 But abuse of this kind could be dealt with more precisely
by redefining functionally irrevocable expectancies as future interests,' 93 or simply by exerting the bankruptcy court's existing power to
dismiss petitions for "substantial abuse" in such cases.' 94 Either ap"at best, highly speculative." But see In re Lybrook, 951 F.2d 136, 138 (7th Cir. 1991)
(discussed infra note 194).
191. But see supra text accompanying note 145. Canadian courts have applied this distinction, suspending the discharge only of those debtors for whom inheritance "is a real
probability in the sense that the bankrupt can almost be assured of receiving moneys from
the estate." Re Baker, 63 C.B.R. (new ser.) 21, 23 (Ont. 1987); see also In re Stafford, 37
C.B.R. (old ser.) 206, 208 (Ont. 1959).
192. Timing a petition to protect even an assured inheritance could still be deemed in
accord with public policy if we were to posit that expected inheritances comprise a necessary support mechanism in the economic life cycle of individuals and hence a mechanism
debtors ought to be allowed to take measures to protect. Cf. In re Thompson, 4 B.R. 18, 21
(Bankr. D. Me. 1979) (holding the debtor's timing of his petition to protect a workmen's
compensation claim nonabusive, because the claim is a means of future support for the
disabled worker). On the importance of expectancies as a means of life cycle support,
substituting for what would otherwise have to be state support, see MARVIN B. SUSSMAN
ET AL., THE FAMILY AND INHERITANCE 1-3, 310-14 (1970); John H. Langbein, The Twentieth-Century Revolution in Family Wealth Transmission, 86 MICH. L. REV. 722, 729-39
(1988) (discussing the importance of family wealth transfers as a source of human capital).
On the other hand, if expectancies were in fact generally so perceived, then presumably
they would be declared exempt under state law, which-apart from homesteads and personal property set-asides-they are not. Cf. Patterson v. Shumate, 112 S. Ct. 2242, 2249-50
(1992) (noting the public policy in favor of giving exempt status to pension benefits).
193. See supra note 147.
194. 11 U.S.C. § 707(b) (1988). For an assertion that it would be appropriate to deny a
petition under § 707(b) when a debtor expected an inheritance sufficient to pay off her
debts, see In re Lybrook, 951 F.2d 136, 138 (7th Cir. 1991) (dicta) (Posner, J.); see also H.R.
Doc. No. 137, supra note 22, pt. 2, at 140. It may be observed that flexible rules for the
denial or delay of discharge, structurally akin to § 707(b), exist under the bankruptcy law
of Great Britain and were early advocated in the United States to deal, inter alia, with
inheritance planning. See supra note 20. Some commentators have opposed the British
system of discharge-and by the same token § 707(b)-as being too flexible, allowing for
the application of capricious standards of denial. For early criticisms on this ground, see
Notes on Bankruptcy Conference, Washington, D.C. (Apr. 29-May 2, 1932), in MacLachlan Papers, supra note 30, ins. box 2, folder 1, at 10 (criticizing the Hastings-Michener Bill);
Coles, supra note 97, at 297, 350 (criticizing the Thacher-Garrison Report). For modem
discussions, compare MAcLACHLAN, supra note 20, § 122; Boshkoff, supra note 20, at 118-
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proach would permit debtors to avail themselves of true expectancies,
while at the same time deterring another (far more gruesome) form of
planning that remains possible under the prevailing six-month window: manipulation not of the timing of the petition, but rather of the

date of the benefactor's death.195 When considered from the standpoint of abuse theory, the sole virtue of the Code's present treatment
196
of expectancies is administrative efficiency.

III. An Alternative Perspective: The Theory of Intent
There remains one final vantage point from which we may survey
the instant problem, a vantage point overlooked by the drafters themselves, but one that could have enabled them to perceive all expectancies, including even those that are functionally irrevocable, as meriting

legal protection by way of planned petitions. For if we turn once more
to inheritance theory, we find that the touchstone of probate law, its
leitmotif endlessly repeated in the case law and treatises on the subject, is the effectuation of testamentary intent.197 By guaranteeing as a
matter of public policy that a benefactor's last wishes concerning the
disposition of his property will be respected, probate law operates to
spur him throughout his life to produce more wealth and to save more
25; Breitowitz, Part2, supra note 187, at 67; Countryman, Bankruptcy and the Individual
Debtor,supra note 83, at 820-21, 827; Eisenberg, A Rejoinder, supra note 90, at 625-26;
Harris, supra note 90, at 353-56; Nimmer, supra note 174, at 92. On the other hand, so long
as § 707(b) is applied strictly to those cases where a functionally irrevocable expectancy
has not yet vested, courts would have to make no ad hoc value judgments on the issue of
abuse.
195. For a case noting the possibility that debtors may manipulate the date of a benefactor's death under the current six-month window by prolonging life support, see Caso v.
Bentley (In re Bentley), 120 B.R. 712, 715 n.4 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990). (Some persons,
however, take steps to provide their own advance directives concerning the continuation or
termination of their medical treatment, enforceable in most jurisdictions as a "living will.")
Surely, creditors would have no standing to petition for termination of life support under
these conditions, but the mind reels at the possibilities.
196. Apart from connoting conscious planning, a petition filed when the debtor's benefactor is near death could also imply (at least more often than not) that the benefactor by
then lacks legal or functional capacity. Thus, along with its limitation to testamentary
transfers, the fact that § 541(a)(5) is limited to a short time span suggests that its drafters
were mainly concerned with reaching gratuitous transfers by the incapacitated. See Harris,
supra note 90, at 357-60 (noting as a general matter the administrative burden of a case-bycase enquiry into bankruptcy abuse).
197. "[Tlhe intention of the testator is admitted to be the pole star by which the courts
must steer." 4 JAsnS KENT, COMMENTARmS ON AMERICAN LAW *537 (1860). This
phrase has echoed through the case law. E.g., Biles v. Martin, 259 So. 2d 258, 262 (Ala.
1972); Conlee v. Conlee, 190 S.W.2d 43, 46 (Ky. 1945). See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 1102(b)(2), art. 2, prefatory note (1991). For an early counterexample, see Reed v. Roberts,
26 Ga. 294, 300-01 (1858).
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of the wealth he produces. 198 To be sure, this policy is not immune to
criticism, 199 and it is hedged about with certain limitations,20 0 but as a
general principle its acceptance within the field of inheritance law and
theory is undoubted.
Putting to one side the relation of debtors and creditors, and focusing instead on the intentions of benefactors, how would we expect
a benefactor to react if his beneficiary fell into insolvency? So long as
an indebted beneficiary were not hopelessly insolvent, it would be
wrong to assume that her benefactor would invariably wish to disinherit her. If the beneficiary planned eventually to satisfy her creditors, the benefactor's bequest could speed that effort, freeing up the
beneficiary's future earnings and thereby indirectly facilitating consumption. Alternatively, if the beneficiary were tottering on the brink
of default, the benefactor might desire to bequeath specifically to
forestall a bankruptcy proceeding and thereby to preserve the beneficiary's financial reputation. In these circumstances, we cannot predict
the benefactor's wishes with any degree of confidence.2 0 '
But once the die is cast and default becomes inevitable, irrespective of inheritance, we may safely assume that no benefactor would
want his accumulated wealth to flow into the debtor's bankruptcy estate. The stigma of the proceeding would now be impossible to avoid;
and the advantage to the beneficiary of filling up the bankruptcy estate would be nil, for she would obtain the same discharge whether
her creditors received five or ten cents on the dollar.2 0 2 To bequeath
to a beneficiary in or en route to a bankruptcy proceeding would thus
be pointless-throwing good money, so to say, after bad debts.2 03
Given these verities, we can readily anticipate (and already
198. See Hirsch & Wang, supra note 97, at 7-8 & n.25, 37-38 & n.146.
199. Id. at 8-9, 38 n.147.
200. See generally Friedman, supra note 113 (discussing the tension between intent effectuation and other public policies).
201. See Hirsch, supra note 25, at 632, 635-36.
202. Likewise, a composition agreement conducted under state law would result in a
contractual right of "discharge" for the defaulting debtor. MAcLACHLAN, supra note 20,

§ 7, at 4.
203. Paying in full specific debts after bankruptcy may be in the interest of a debtor
who seeks a continuing relationship with those specific creditors. Thus, debtors who receive a discharge often reaffirm individual debts. On strategic repayment and reaffirmation, see STANLEY & GiRTH, supra note 36, at 59-62; Boshkoff, supra note 171, at 37; Rea,
supra note 89, at 205. On the other hand, the benefit to the debtor in ensuring that all
creditors receive somewhat greater satisfaction is attenuated; nor, given the one-shot nature of a gratuitous transfer to the debtor, would it signal to creditors that the debtor is a
better credit risk than she would otherwise have been perceived to be.
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have204) that any competent, attentive benefactor will take precautions to withhold his wealth from a bankruptcy estate. By the same
token, we can anticipate that any incompetent benefactor would long
to do the same. Indeed, the "race with death" that some early critics
found so appalling to "common decency," a "sad commentary on
human nature," to quote two of them, 20 5 would almost surely have
been run with the benefactor's blessing! He would gladly have stood
on the sidelines, cheering the debtor on, for then he could rest easy,
knowing that his life savings would not vanish into thin air. Whatever
the creditors' wishes, the incompetent benefactor would certainly object to a rule calling the race off, or even to a rule requiring the debtor
to win the race by a clear six months. This insight, incidentally, also
throws into a different moral light the debtor's act of planning her
bankruptcy to preserve an expectancy. Whatever her moral obligation to her creditors, a beneficiary arguably has a countervailing moral
obligation to her benefactor to see to it that his imputed wishes to
shelter his estate from unintended recipients are carried into effect.
Probate law has traditionally functioned to avoid similar sorts of
unintended bequests. Faced with ambiguous language, a number of
courts have construed testamentary trusts benefiting insolvent or
bankrupt beneficiaries to include spendthrift provisions, on the compelling assumption that testators under these circumstances would
have intended "to conserve the property by placing it beyond the
reach of ... creditors.

'206

Absent ambiguity, it is ordinarily incum-

bent upon the benefactor to register any change of intent by executing
a codicil.207 But even here, courts will revise estate plans "by operation of law" in certain situations where circumstances leave little room
204. See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
205. MAcLAcHLAN, supra note 20, at 179; 4A COLLIMR, supra note 5, § 70.27, at 374
n.6; see also supra notes 159-160 and accompanying text.
206. Wallace v. Foxwell, 95 N.E. 985, 989 (Ml.1911); Jones v. Harrison, 7 F.2d 461, 465
(8th Cir. 1925) (noting that "[a]ny other interpretation robs the creation of the trust of any
sensible or rational purpose"), cerL denied, 270 U.S. 652 (1926); see Eaton v. Boston Safe
Deposit & Trust Co., 240 U.S. 427 (1916) (construing an ambiguous trust for the benefit of
bankrupt beneficiary as spendthrift, though on unclear grounds). Contra In re Dudley's
Estate, 3 F.2d 832, 835 (D. Md.) (stating that specific language is necessary to create a
spendthrift trust), affd sub nom. Dudley v. licker, 7 F.2d 118 (4th Cir. 1925); Standard
Chemical Co. v. Weed, 285 N.W. 175, 176 (Iowa 1939) (same). There are no recent cases
on point, but for a similar assumption found in the modem case law, see McGoVERN ET
AL., supra note 24, § 8.2, at 309. In four jurisdictions today, all trusts are construed to be
spendthrift. BOGERT & BoGERT, supra note 24, § 222, at 416-17, 430-34, 438-40, 443-44.
207. E.g., Cook v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 428 N.E.2d 110, 115-16 (Ind.App.
1981) (refusing to recognize an unnamed beneficiary when the benefactor made no effort
to formalize his intent).
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20 8
for doubt as to the benefactor's wishes.
One such circumstance is where a named beneficiary predeceases

her benefactor. Since dead persons have no use for property, the benefactor almost certainly would prefer to bequeath to someone who is
living. If the benefactor nonetheless failed to amend his original estate plan, we may rest assured that his inaction stemmed from inadvertence or incapacity. Accordingly, by operation of law the bequest
"lapses" and instead of flowing through the probate estate of the
named beneficiary it goes directly to alternative takers.20 9 The princi-

ple of lapse could quite reasonably be extended to cover instances of
financial, as well as physical, demise. In both situations, the beneficiary has lost her capacity to enjoy the inheritance. In both situations,
the benefactor's preference to alter his estate plan can scarcely be

gainsaid.
The apparent intention of the drafters of the Chandler Act to use
the six-month window mainly to catch expectancies coming from functionally incapacitated benefactors 210 looks particularly odious from
the perspective of inheritance theory. Probate law has traditionally
shown a special solicitude for the plight of those who are physically
unable to keep current their estate plans. Inheritance commentators
have extolled efforts to accomplish by legal implication what the inca211
pacitated benefactor cannot accomplish for himself.
208. McGOVERN ET AL., supra note 24, § 5.4, at 221-23; W.A. Graunke & J.H.
Beuscher, The Doctrine of Implied Revocation of Wills By Reason of Change in Domestic

Relations of the Testator, 5 Wis. L. REV. 387 (1930); Elizabeth Durfee, Revocation of Wills
By Subsequent Change in the Condition or Circumstances of the Testator, 40 MicH. L. REv.
406 (1942). These rules "are the product of centuries of legal experience in attempting to
discern transferors' wishes." Langbein, supra note 24, at 1136-37. While revocation by
operation of law has traditionally been restricted to specific circumstances (such as divorce), several courts have asserted a general right to modify estate plans on a case-by-case
basis to accomplish the testator's probable intent. E.g., In re Estate of Branigan, 609 A.2d
431, 435 (N.J. 1992) (permitting modification of an estate plan to effectuate tax savings); In
re Will of Case, 585 N.Y.S.2d 1004, 1005 (Sur. 1992) (same).
209. McGOVERN ET AL., supra note 24, § 10.4, at 421-24. Though the doctrine of lapse
was originally premised on impossibility rather than intent, a theory of imputed intent
forms its modern foundation. Powell v. Thorsen, 322 S.E.2d 261, 264 (Ga. 1984); PAGE,
supra note 118, at 67-68; John 0. Fox, Estate: A Word to Be Used Cautiously, If at All, 81
HARV. L. REV. 992, 996-97 (1968); Philip Mechem, Some Problems Arising Under AntiLapse Statutes, 19 IOWA L. REV. 1, 1 (1933).
210. See supra text accompanying notes 146-147.
211. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-606(b) (1991) (providing a substitute bequest to
beneficiaries of property adeemed by extinction where the testator is incompetent); id. § 5407(b)(3) (permitting the court or a conservator to make inter vivos gifts or create revocable inter vivos trusts on behalf of, but not otherwise to alter the will of, an incompetent
person). For discussions, see Mary Louise Fellows, In Search of Donative Intent, 73 IOWA
L. REV. 611, 622-30 (1988); Rene A. Wormser, The Doctrineof Substitution of Judgment,in
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These considerations did not entirely escape critics of the original
Chandler Act reform. While the six-month window received its share
of (largely perfunctory) applause,2 1 2 to the extent that it was noticed
at all, 213 a number of commentators tossed in a raspberry, questioning
the rule's soundness from the standpoint of testamentary intent effectuation. One critic, who highlighted the provision as "[a] change of
far-reaching consequence," even claimed that by restricting the benefactor's right to bequeath freely to the discharged debtor it undermined the "fundamental principle" of freedom of alienation of

property. 214 Prior to the Chandler Act, several courts had also justified the immediate effectiveness of the discharge on this basis. 2 15 The
drafters in 1938 either were ignorant of or affirmatively ignored these

opinions.216

9 INsT. ON EST. PLAN. ch. 15 (1975). Under British law, courts have power to revise the
wills of incompetent testators to reflect their probable intent in the event of any changed
circumstance. 1 C.H. SHERRIN ET AL., WrLLiAMS' LAW RELATING TO WrLLS 33-37 (6th ed.
1987).
212. John E. Mulder, Ambiguities in the ChandlerAct, 89 U. PA. L. REv. 10, 13 & n.19
(1940); Mitchell S. Dvoret, Bankruptcy Under the ChandlerAct: Analysis, 27 GEO. L.J.
599, 609-10 (1939); Gage, supra note 151, at 398; Report No. 1916, supra note 33, at 210-11.
The drafters themselves were also charmed by their work product. Symposium: Chandler
Bankruptcy ModernizationAct, 13 J. NAT'L ASS'N REF. BANKR. 8, 25 (1938).
213. Most of the commentary on the Chandler Act simply ignored the new provision.
For a thorough bibliography, see 1 COLLIER, supra note 5, § 0.07, at 17-18 n.1.
214. Levi H. David, An Analysis of the New Chandler Bankruptcy Act, Al CoRP.
REORG. & AM. BANKR. REv. 497, 508 (1938) (quote); A. Grant Walker, The Chandler
Bankruptcy Act-An Address, A2 CORP. REORG. & AM. BANKR. REv. 43 (1938); see SAMUEL C. DUBERSTEIN, SOME IMPORTANT CHANGES IN THE BANKRUPTCY LAW As AFFECTED BY THE CHANDLER ACT 29 (n.d.) (c. 1938) (describing the scenario of a bequest
captured by a bankruptcy estate as "a very unfortunate situation"); Jacob Lashly, The
ChandlerBill, 23 VA. L. REv. 880, 896-97 (1937) (criticizing the six-month window as interfering with the unconditional discharge).
215. In re Woods, 133 F. 82, 83 (D. Pa. 1904); In re Lage, 19 F.2d 153, 154-55 (N.D.
Iowa 1927).
216. In his bankruptcy treatise, Professor MacLachlan responded to the argument, insisting that it was wrong to assume that benefactors would invariably prefer to shelter their
bequests from a bankruptcy estate. "Some ancestors believe in having debts paid as a
matter of principle, and may side with the creditor as against an improvident heir." MACLACHLAN, supra note 20, at 178. Such "old-time conscientiousness," to quote an old-time
judge, is hardly to be anticipated in this day and age. Daniel v. Frost, 62 Ga. 697, 705-06
(1879) (Bleckley, J.). Compare the discussion in Lage:
I think it universally recognized that one of the principal considerations that control parents in the testamentary disposition of their property is a desire to bestow
their bounty upon their offspring.... Disposition by will at death is in its nature
inconsistent with the idea that the estate or property disposed of should be seized
upon and taken by creditors of the beneficiaries before ever they come into it.
19 F.2d at 155. See also infra note 238.
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Not only does the six-month window engrafted into Section 541
disregard the implicit intent of the benefactor; under another subsec-

tion of 541, it overrides explicit expressions of testamentary intent.
Were a benefactor to seek to anticipate the contingency of insolvency,

instead of disinheriting the beneficiary outright, the bankruptcy court
would deny effect to his estate plan. Under Section 541(c)(1), any
property interest, includinga legacy, that is conditioned on the benefi-

ciary remaining solvent or staying out of bankruptcy, becomes part of
the bankruptcy estate notwithstandingthat condition.2 17 Such a condi-

tion is void in a federal bankruptcy proceeding,

18

even though sol-

vency conditions in wills have long been upheld by state probate
courts.2 19 Hence, far from respecting the wishes of benefactors, the
217. 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(1)(B) (1988). This provision voids solvency conditions contained within a "transfer instrument" that would otherwise provide the debtor with an
interest in property under named subsections of 541, including (a)(5). The drafters' intention to cover testamentary instruments is thus explicit. 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(1) (1988). The
provision also covers solvency conditions created by "applicable nonbankruptcy law." Id.
Were a state to extend its lapse statute to insolvent or bankrupt beneficiaries, such a statute would again be void in a bankruptcy proceeding by reason of federal preemption.
Section 541(c)(1)(B) of the Code "marks a distinct change from the law under the
[former Bankruptcy] Act," having had no analogue therein. 4 COLLIER, supra note 21,
§ 541.22, at 541-112. Prior to the enactment of the Code, solvency conditions were effective to bar expectancies from a bankruptcy estate. Nichols v. Eaton, 91 U.S. 716 (1875);
Beals v. Croughwell, 299 N.W. 638 (Neb. 1941); Hull v. Palmer, 140 N.Y.S. 811 (App. Div.
1913), aff'd, 107 N.E. 653 (N.Y. 1915), aff'd sub non. Hull v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co.,
245 U.S. 312 (1917); Miller v. Miller, 31 S.E.2d 844 (W. Va. 1944). Solvency conditions
have always been and remain effective under British bankruptcy law. HUNTER & GRAHAM, supra note 20, at 281-82. Along with solvency conditions, forfeiture restraint clauses
(whereby the beneficiary loses her interest in the event of voluntary or involuntary alienation, for example by a trustee in bankruptcy) are void under § 541(c)(1)(A), overriding in a
bankruptcy proceeding conditions on the transfer of property of the debtor.
218. Or, more precisely, they should be void. In the one case arising under the Code
thus far, however, a conditional bequest was misconstrued to be a spendthrift provision
(which is effective in bankruptcy, see infra note 220). Scott v. Bank One Trust Co. (In re
McCombe), 93 B.R. 597, 598 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1988). In McCombe the trustee in bankruptcy made no allegation that the bequest was conditional, as opposed to spendthrift, and
hence the court failed to address the application of § 541(c)(1)(B) to the expectancy. The
failure to raise the issue appears to have resulted from poor lawyering and does not speak
to the merits of the case. See also Mann v. Kreiss (In re Kreiss), 58 B.R. 999, 1003
(E.D.N.Y. 1986) (suggesting in dicta that a conditional bequest would be effective in bankruptcy, without reference to § 541(c)(1)(B)). Similarly, in In re Baldwin, 142 B.R. 210
(Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1992), the court interpreted a forfeiture restraint clause as "intended to
accomplish the same goal as a spendthrift trust" without addressing the potential application of § 541(c)(1)(A) to void the condition. Baldwin, 142 B.R. at 213-14.
219. E.g., In re Ames, 46 A. 47 (R.I. 1900); see Annotation, Provision in Trust Instrument Making Solvency of Beneficiary, or Discharge of His Debts, a Condition Precedent to
His Receipt of Trust Property, 138 A.L.R. 1336 (1942); 5 PAGE, supra note 118, § 44.30, at
476-77. Likewise, forfeiture restraint clauses are universally valid under state law. Id.
§ 44.30, at 477-78.
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drafters of the Bankruptcy Code went a step further afield, placing
unprecedented obstacles along the path of will-effectuation in order
(one could almost say) to dupe benefactors into swelling the bank-

ruptcy estate. Yet, astonishing though it may seem, the same drafters
were not otherwise insensitive to the interests of benefactors. If one
turns from Section 541(c)(1) to (c)(2),220 one discovers that spendthrift trusts are effective in bankruptcy, as under state law, 221 to shelter trust assets from creditors. 2 2 The reason, as baldly stated in the
220. 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(2) (1988).
221. Spendthrift trusts are, however, only effective to the extent that they would effectively shield the corpus from creditors under state law. Johnson v. Fenslage (In re Johnson), 724 F.2d 1138, 1140 (5th Cir. 1984) (holding that a self-settled spendthrift trust is
ineffective in bankruptcy as under state law); Putney v. May (In re May), 83 B.R. 812, 814
(Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1988) (holding trust not to be spendthrift); Reardon v. Brackett (In re
Brackett), 54 B.R. 57,58 (Bankr. D.N.M. 1985) (holding that a self-settled spendthrift trust
is ineffective in bankruptcy as under state law); In re Frangos, 132 B.R. 723, 724 (Bankr.
N.D. Ohio 1991) (same); In re Rolfe, 34 B.R. 159, 161 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1983) (holding that
a spendthrift trust is ineffective to the extent the beneficiary had a right of withdrawal).
222. This was also true under the former Bankruptcy Act. For cases decided under the
Act, see Hull, 140 N.Y.S. at 811; Allen v. Tate, 6 F.2d 139 (8th Cir. 1925); see also 2A
Scorr,supra note 55, § 152.2, at 175-77; Countryman, For a New Exemption Policy, supra
note 85, at 699-703; Erwin N. Griswold, Reaching the Interest of the Beneficiary of a Spendthrift Trust, 43 HARv. L. R~v. 63, 73-78 (1929); Plumb, supra note 22, at 77-82, 84. One
lingering issue is the extent to which the trustee in bankruptcy can reach the debtor's income stream from (if not the corpus of) a spendthrift trust for the six months following
discharge under § 541(a)(5). In a case decided under the former Act, the court held that
the income stream is exempt because the old § 70(a) covered expectancies that "vest"
within six month, and the trust technically vested when it was created, not when the income
became transferable. Roy v. Edgar (In re Edgar), 728 F.2d 1371, 1374 (11th Cir. 1984).
Section 541(a)(5) substitutes the word "acquires" for "vests," and cases decided under the
Code have ruled that the income from a testamentary spendthrift trust goes to the bankruptcy estate for six months; but because § 541(a)(5) does not pertain to inter vivos gifts,
income from an inter vivos spendthrift trust is entirely exempt. Neuton v. Danning (In re
Neuton), 922 F.2d 1379, 1384 & n.6 (9th Cir. 1990); In re Newman, 88 B.R. 191, 193
(Bankr. C.D. II. 1987), rev'd, 99 B.R. 881 (C.D. Ill. 1989), aff'd, 903 F.2d 1150 (7th Cir.
1990); Harkins v. Patterson (In re Patterson), 70 B.R. 124, 127 & n.8 (Bankr. W.D. Mo.
1986); York v. Kragness (In re Kragness), 58 B.R. 939, 944 (Bankr. D. Or. 1986), and 63
B.R. 459, 464 (Bankr. D. Or. 1986); Togut v. Hecht (In re Hecht), 54 B.R. 379, 384-85
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985), affd, 69 B.R. 290 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); In re Hersloff, 147 B.R. 262,
266 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1992); see also Smith v. Moody (In re Moody), 837 F.2d 719,723 (5th
Cir. 1988) (holding that trust income qualified as a "bequest," though the temporal character of the trust was unclear from facts presented); In re Goulding, 79 B.R. 874, 876 (Bankr.
W.D. Mo. 1987) (same). Because ERISA pension trusts are not "bequests," income distributed from them is also excepted from the six-month window. Mitchell v. West (In re
West), 81 B.R. 22,25-26 & n.2 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1987); see Patterson v. Shumate, 112 S. Ct.
2242,2250 (1992) (holding ERISA trusts to be spendthrift under § 541(c)(2)); see also Myler v. Arney (In re Arney), 35 B.R. 668, 672 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1983) (holding spendthrift
trust covering contingent remainder effective in bankruptcy). For a criticism of the nowstandard interpretation of § 541(a)(5) as applying to income from a testamentary spendthrift trust, see Pitts, supra note 13, at 77-80.
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legislative history, is that "the bankruptcy of the beneficiary should
not be permitted to defeat the legitimate expectations of the settlor of
the trust. '223 And laboring in this vineyard, at least, courts have remained free to construe ambiguous trusts in favor of debtor protection, even in a bankruptcy proceeding. 22 4
Thus illuminated, the juxtaposition of subsections (c)(1) and
(c)(2) is little short of remarkable. The first provision voids explicit
expressions of intent that are uncontroversial outside of bankruptcy.
The second validates explicit or even implicit expressions of intent
that have aroused far greater controversy, because spendthrift trusts
permit debtors both to avoid satisfying creditors and to keep their
property. 225 That two provisions so gratingly out of harmony should
coexist, not just within the same code, not just within the same section
of a code, but within the same subsection of a code, illustrates vividly
the extent to which lawmakers are capable of uncoordinating their
226
efforts. Here is a case of tunnel vision in the extreme.
Discretionary trusts are also excepted from the bankruptcy estate. Morrow v. Apple,
26 F.2d 543, 544 (D.C. Cir. 1928); Farmers Coop. Co. v. Timken State Bank (In re
Pechanec), 59 B.R. 899, 905 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1986); Brown v. Lumbert, 108 N.E. 1079, 1080
(Mass. 1915); In re Esterson, 150 B.R. 72, 73 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1993); Plumb, supra note
22, at 85.
223. H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 13, at 176 (emphasis added). This congressional
sentiment echoes earlier judicial rationales for upholding the validity of spendthrift trusts.
E.g., James v. Harrison, 7 F.2d 461, 466 (8th Cir. 1925) (holding that the property owner
"has the right to bestow it with such restrictions as he sees fit"), cert. denied, 270 U.S. 652
(1926); In re Morgan's Estate, 72 A. 498, 499 (Pa. 1909) ("Spendthrift trusts can have no
other justification than is to be found in considerations affecting the donor alone.") Some
bankruptcy commentators have criticized the Code's sanctioning of spendthrift trusts, however, and the Bankruptcy Commission's draft bill had recommended that they be effective
"only to the extent of the income reasonably necessary for the support of the debtor and
his dependents." H.R. Doc. No. 137, supra note 22, pt. 1, at 193, 197-98; see id., pt. 2, at
148, 151; Countryman, The Use of State Law, supra note 22, at 448 n.256; William T.
Vukowich, Debtors' Exemption Rights Under the Bankruptcy Reform Act, 58 N.C. L. REV.
769, 770, 777-78, 804 (1980); cf. Elizabeth Warren, Reducing Bankruptcy Protection for
Consumers: A Response, 72 GEO. L.J. 1333, 1335 n.17 (1984) (minimizing the practical
significance of the issue).
224. In re Wax, 147 B.R. 205 (Bankr. D.S.D. 1992); see supra note 206 and accompanying text.
225. E.g., Tillinghast v. Bradford, 5 R.I. 205, 212 (1858) ("Certainly no man should
have an estate to live on, but not an estate to pay his debts with. Certainly property available for the purpose of pleasure or profit should also be amenable to the demands of
justice."). Noting the policy distinction between solvency conditions and spendthrift trusts,
see BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 24, § 222, at 388-89.
226. How did this asymmetry come to pass, as a matter of statutory pathology? The
provision invalidating solvency or bankruptcy conditions first appeared in the draft bill
prepared by the bankruptcy commission. That bill also limited the effectiveness of spendthrift trusts in bankruptcy, and so the two provisions were seen as complementary. H.R.
Doc. No. 137, supra note 22, pt. 2, at 147-48; Plumb, supra note 22, at 90-92. But when the
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At any rate, the fundamental point to be made here is a simple
one: Even ignoring the Code's incongruous treatment of insolvency
conditions, the existing six-month window runs counter to a cardinal
principle of inheritance policy. On that account alone, the rule is of
doubtful public utility.
Conclusion
As I have sat in my office lo these many evenings reflecting on
these ideas, I have sometimes wondered whether I heard the ghost of
Anatole France laughing at me. "The law, in its majestic equality,
should permit children of the poor as well as the rich to scramble into
bankruptcy and then inherit a fortune," might be his mocking refrain.2 7 Forgive the legislative moles their congenital blindness, put
aside all the pretentious theorizing; when one steps back and examines matters at an intuitive level, there still seems to be something
invincibly disturbing about permitting debtors to do as I have advocated here. In the course of assessing rights to exempt property in
bankruptcy, the drafters of the Code remarked that "the policy of the
bankruptcy law is to provide a fresh start, but not instant affluence" to
the debtor.228 Were Section 541(a)(5) repealed, debtor-beneficiaries
would indeed emerge from bankruptcy poised to enjoy "instant affluence." This same spectre may also have hovered over Professor MacLachlan sixty years ago, when he justified denial of expectancies to
the discharged debtor, inter alia, on the ground that expectancies bore
"no relation to his normal budget" and could result in his "coming
into great wealth during the administration of bankruptcy." 229 If
nothing else, decorum demands that the discharged debtor scrape a
living for a while23 0
limitation on spendthrift trusts was later dropped from the final version of § 541, the drafters apparently forgot to revise the treatment of solvency conditions, standing right alongside it!
227. Cf.ANATOLE FRANCE, LE Lys ROUGE 118 (1894) ("The law, in its majestic equality, forbids the rich as well as the poor to sleep under bridges, to beg in the streets, and to
steal bread.")
228. BANKRu-yrcY REFORM ACr OF 1978, S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 6
(1978), reprintedin 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5792.
229. See supra note 71 and accompanying text; see also Note and Comment, supra note
61, at 918.
230. A recent court applauded the six-month window on this basis: "A debtor could,
prior to the addition of these sections ....
come into great wealth during the administration
of his estate.... ." In re Hamill, 317 F. Supp. 909, 912 (D. Kan. 1970); see In re Hall, 16 F.
Supp 18, 18 (W.D. Tenn. 1936) (condemning, but not voiding, a bankruptcy petition when
the debtor's expectancy was "almost immediately realizable"); Bank of Elberton v. Swift
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I would submit that the unseemliness of this scenario is an illusion
that dissolves on closer inspection. The institution of inheritance, for
better and for worse, often prompts a quantum shift in the assets of
the beneficiary. If we wish to derive the benefits of the institution,

such as they are, we must import inheritance policies into the fresh
start. And to the extent this leaves some debtors better off than
others, well, the discharge has never truly functioned as a leveler. By
virtue of disparate human capital, if nothing else, some debtors always

have a head start over others. Nor, ultimately, should this disparity be
theoretically troubling: The whole point of the discharge is to encourage persons to take advantage of the opportunities that chance
and circumstance present to them.2 31 And so, when Gordon Johncock

prudently declares bankruptcy a month before racing in (and winning)
the Indy 500,232 he is doing precisely what we want him to donamely, taking advantage of the discharge to free up an opportunity
that he would otherwise have had little incentive to seize. 23 3 In the
context of family wealth transfers, those opportunities are certain to
vary widely, yet this variance is but an exaggerated form of the dispar(In re Swift), 268 F. 305, 307 (5th Cir. 1920) (similarly condemning a petition when expectancy "followed so closely in time upon the filing of the petition"). In a similar vein, courts
have looked askance at lottery winners in bankruptcy. Brown v. Boyn (In re Brown), 86
B.R. 944, 947-48 (N.D. Ind. 1988) ("The message to the [debtor] is clear: You won big in
the Arizona lottery. You lose here!"); see In re Koonce, 54 B.R. 643, 644 (Bankr. D.S.C.
1985) (holding that receipt of a lottery prize warrants modification of a Chapter 13 plan);
In re Cook, 148 B.R. 273, 277-81 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1992) (same, Chapter 12 plan); In re
Miller, 16 B.R. 790, 791 (Bankr. D. Md. 1982) (holding that lottery winnings become property of the estate upon filing a Chapter 7 petition); In re Meyers, 139 B.R. 858, 861-62
(Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1992) (same). For an early English discussion, see Tudway v. Bourne,
96 Eng. Rep. 1231, 1232, affd, 97 Eng. Rep. 529 (K.B. 1759) (dicta).
231. Compare exemption law, which has been criticized for "tend[ing] to perpetuate
our economic class structure." Vukowich, supra note 223, at 770-71. But see STANLEY &
GRmT-, supra note 36, at 206 (suggesting that exemption law should help the debtor to
"maintain a standard of living reasonably consistent with his occupation and previous
history").
232. N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 16, 1973, at 48. The jurisprudential significance of the race was
overshadowed by its human tragedy. Johncock left behind him a grisly trail: one dead
crewman, two drivers critically burned, and thirteen hospitalized spectators. Johncock
himself was reportedly "subdued in victory." Robert F. Jones, Indy's Somber Trial by Fire
and Rain, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, June 11, 1973, at 30, 33.
233. But see supra text accompanying note 183. It may be noted here that the endeavor to "strike it rich" is as much a part of the American grain as is the endeavor to
persevere through hard and extended effort. Notice, for example, how the heroes in Horatio Alger novels always labor assiduously but usually owe their success not to those efforts,
but rather to some lucky stroke. See JoHN TEBBEL, FROM RAGS TO RICHES 14, 17, 204
(1963). There would seem no reason under discharge theory to distinguish the two
endeavors.
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ities of opportunity that also await discharged debtors in the context
of commercial employment.
That legislative drafters in MacLachlan's day as well as ours ultimately recognized 'all of this, despite ritual protestations about bankruptcy abuse, is again suggested by their decision to limit the sixmonth window to testamentary transfers, both under the Chandler

Act and the modem Code. Section 541(a)(5) does not apply to inter
vivos gifts, 2 34 and the benefactor remains free to shower gratuitous
riches upon the debtor the moment she descends the courthouse steps,
discharge in hand. However noxious the odor of such a case, the fact
remains that parents are not responsible for the debts of their children,23 5 and creditors have naught to gain from laws requiring persons
who enter bankruptcy to live in poverty for a spell. Effectively barring (by threatening to confiscate) discretionary transfers to discharged debtors would be to give cosmetic considerations undue
6
weight.23
Yet this scenario reveals another dimension to the problem at
hand, one suggesting that the present treatment of expectancies under
the Bankruptcy Code is not only unhelpfully decorous, but affirmatively perverse. For while the six-month window appears at first sight
to curtail legal manipulations by the wealthy, in practice it almost certainly has the opposite effect. As a consequence, it will function to
discriminate against poorer families.237 By excepting gifts from its
234. See supra note 23.
235. See Re Baker, 63 C.B.R. (new ser.) 21, 23 (Ont. 1987) (citing this lack of obligation as a justification for declining to suspend the discharge of a debtor with a prospect of
inheritance); see also infra note 238.
236. This is not to say that cosmetic considerations are weightless. To the extent that
lay persons perceive the discharge to operate unfairly-in contravention of social normsthe law may be thrown into disrepute. See William T. Vukowich, Reforming the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978: An Alternative Approach, 71 GEo. LJ. 1129, 1132 (1983).
There does in fact appear to be a popular perception that bankruptcy is frequently abused
by the well-to-do. See DAvID R. EARL, THE BA Ruim s 21-22 (1966); A Rush to Personal Bankruptcy, NEwswEEK, Aug. 11, 1980, at 59; Jonathan Foreman, The Freedom to
Fail, AUDAcrrY, Winter 1994, at 28, 28; Teresa Sullivan et al., Limiting Access to Bankruptcy Discharge: An Analysis of the Creditors'Data, 1983 Wis. L. REv. 1091, 1136 n.283;
Bill Surface, Planned Bankruptcy: The Racket that Cheats Us All, READER'S DIG., May
1966, at 125; Susan D. Kovac, JudgmentProofDebtorsin Bankruptcy, 65 AM. BANKR. L.J
675, 675-76 & n.5 (1991). It is questionable, however, whether this perception extends to
holders of expectancies, and whether it is sufficiently widespread and pronounced to disturb public confidence in the integrity of the bankruptcy system.
237. Readers of a critical bent might be tempted to surmise that this result is precisely
what the drafters intended and that the prevailing rule, coming in the guise of a uniform
prescription, is an example of brilliantly disguised retrogressivity. See generallyMORTON J.
HoRwrrz, THE TRnNsFomA-rioN OF AmRcAN LAW, 1780-1860, at 253-66 (1977). I re-
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purview, Section 541(a)(5) offers the well-heeled a simple expedient
whereby they can provide for a discharged beneficiary. In the natural
order of things, they can far more easily afford to part with property
during their lifetimes than can the less fortunate. But even absent this
exception, a knowledgeable benefactor would have small difficulty
evading the six-month window. Through estate planning gimmicks
like the spendthrift trust, he could accomplish even a testamentary

transfer to his intended beneficiary without triggering this provision of
the Code. z38 As it stands, then, Section 541(a)(5) has no other effect
than to set traps for the unwary-it preys upon ignorance and inadvertence-and, as always, it is the poorer, less well-advised benefactor

who is more likely to get caught with his legal guard down. Time and
again, commentators have cautioned against the enactment of rules
that discriminate against the unsophisticated, 39 and courts have often

expressed sympathy for this jurisprudential principle, on occasion
even relaxing rules that conflict with it.240 The six-month window, on
main skeptical of such a sinister interpretation. It seems to me far more plausible that
§ 541(a)(5) is a product of analytical oversight, or rather shortsightedness, as explained
hereinafter. Certainly, there is nothing to be found in the documentary record, including
Professor MacLachlan's private, unpublished papers, to suggest otherwise. See MacLachlan Papers, supra note 30.
238. See supra note 222. That testators could estate-plan around the six-month window
was noted by several early critics. Gage, supranote 151, at 400-01; Walker, supra note 214,
at 44. For examples of such estate planning by wealthy testators to protect beneficiaries in
bankruptcy, see Beals v. Croughwell, 299 N.W. 638 (Neb. 1941); Kreiss v. Mann (In re
Kreiss), 58 B.R. 999 (E.D.N.Y. 1986); and Mann v. Kreiss (In re Kreiss), 72 B.R. 933
(Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1987). In each case, the court rejected creditors' challenges to benefactors' actions as fraudulent, on the ground that benefactors are free to dispose of their property as they please. Beals, 299 N.W. at 641; Kreiss, 72 B.R. at 941. Clever estate planning
to thwart creditors of beneficiaries is an old game, predating even the Chandler Act. E.g.,
In re Harper, 155 F. 105 (2d Cir. 1907).
239. In connection with bankruptcy law, see Frank R. Kennedy, Limitations on Exemptions in Bankruptcy, 45 IOWA L. REv. 445, 479-81 (1960); Harris, supra note 90, at 342;
Eisenberg, A Rejoinder, supra note 90, at 621-22; cf. Eisenberg, Bankruptcy Law, supra
note 89, at 996 (observing that to some extent such discrimination is inevitable under any
detailed law). In connection with probate law, see John H. Langbein, Substantial Compliance with the Wills Act, 88 HARV. L. REv. 489, 531 (1975); Fellows, supra note 211. For
general discussions, see Peter H. Schuck, Legal Complexity: Some Causes, Consequences,
and Cures, 42 DUKE L.J. 1, 22-25 (1992) (criticizing complicated rules); Carol M. Rose,
Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REV. 577, 590-93 (1988) (criticizing the
strict application of rules).
240. In connection with bankruptcy see, for example, Arkison v. Plata (In re Plata), 958
F.2d 918, 922 (9th Cir. 1992); Dampskibsselskabet AF 1912 v. Black & Geddes, Inc. (In re
Black & Geddes, Inc.), 16 B.R. 148, 151 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1981) (federal rules of pleading);
In re B & F Assocs., Inc., 55 B.R. 19, 22 (Bankr. D.C. 1985); Martin v. First Nat'l Bank (In
re Butcher), 78 B.R. 520, 523 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1986); In re Owens, 67 B.R. 418, 422
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1986) (motion practice); In re Copeland, 391 F. Supp. 134, 151 (D. Del.
1975) (Uniform Commercial Code); Liberty Loan Corp. v. Wallace (In re Wilson), 390 F.
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the other hand, has been scrupulously enforced.
That legislators and judges by and large have failed to grasp this
rule's substantive demerits as well as its capriciousness may not, at the
end of the day, be so surprising. Their shortsightedness can once
again be traced to tunnel vision, though operating within somewhat
broader confines than that already described.241 It happens that the
six-month window appears within a bankruptcy code, administered by
bankruptcy courts. Its drafters, Messrs. Weinstein, MacLachlan, and
other participants in the National Bankruptcy Conference, treated of
their subject as bankruptcy experts.z42 The Code reflects this doctrinal
focus. Its flaws become clearly apparent only when it is read in the
light of inheritance policies. 243 That those policies received shorter
shrift than they merited stemmed from the (categorically arbitrary)
decision to assign this borderline problem to one set of specialists, instead of the other.244 Had the issue arisen under a probate code, to be

applied by probate courts, it almost certainly would have been handled differently.
Though the insular nature of the Bankruptcy Code has been criti-

cized before, 24 5 the problem remarked here is hardly unique to this

particular area of law. Once we have taken the structural step of partitioning the legal landscape into discrete categories, lawmakers immersed in any one area are unlikely to pay adequate regard to the
Supp. 1121, 1122 (D. Kan. 1975); Tejas Drilling Co. v. Del Int'l, Inc. (In re Tejas Drilling
Co.), 849 F.2d 176, 179 (5th Cir. 1988) (vendors' liens); Feldman v. Trans-East Air, Inc., 497
F.2d 352, 355-56 (2d Cir. 1974); In re Car-Gill,'Inc., 125 B.R. 133, 136-37 (Bankr. E.D. Pa.
1991); In re Piecuil, 145 B.R. 777, 778-79 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1992).
241. See supra text accompanying note 226.
242. See supra note 32. MacLachlan may have been the most versatile of the drafters,
having taught a wide range of courses at the Harvard Law School, including basic property.
James Angell MacLachlan, supra note 70, at 3.
243. See supra notes 108-121, 197-211 and accompanying text.
244. The problem of categorical overlap is, of course, an ancient one, and it spawned
an ancient solution: acknowledgment of the "mixed" action. As Professor Maitland (no
friend of the writ system) added playfully: "'Mixed' is a blessed word. The impatient student who looks down upon medieval law from the sublime heights of 'general jurisprudence' will say that most of our English actions are mixed and many of them very mixed."
2 FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC W. MAITrLAND, Tim HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 572
(S.F.C. Milsom ed., Cambridge Univ. Press, 2d ed. 1968) (1895).
245. "[T]he problem is the way in which bankruptcy law is perceived as an area separate from the rest of the legal world. In many respects the new bankruptcy [code] inadequately reflects bankruptcy law's existence as part of a legal structure that includes many
other... laws . . ." Eisenberg, Bankruptcy Law, supra note 89, at 953; making the same
point, see JACKSON, supra note 25, at 279. For a discussion of the problem from the perspective of the insular practitioner, see Adler, supra note 7. I have further harped on the
problems of legal categorization in Hirsch, supra note 25, at 652-54.
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policies prevalent within others. Of course, it is easy enough to admonish them to do so-but more difficult, bureaucratically, to ensure
that they will. Legal categorization is so useful; it is a pity that it is
also so troublesome.
In any event, analysis of the problem at hand from the perspective of testamentary intent should at least steel us to the disembodied
musings of Anatole France. I bid him to go off and haunt the drafters
of inheritance tax legislation before he torments the novice bankruptcy commentator.

